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Abstract 
 
Granting family residence rights to third country national EU family members is a 
controversial issue that has been the object of a lively debate, especially in recent years. 
The debate has been particularly focused on the role played by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in deciding cases involving EU citizens and their third country 
national family members. The Court has been criticized for inconsistent judgments and 
providing a lack of legal certainty. The object of this thesis is to analyse the intricate 
jurisprudential scenario of family reunifications between EU citizens and third country 
nationals. In order to do so I will place the Court’s case law in its broader historical 
context. Through my analysis, I will show how the phenomenon of family reunification 
between EU citizens and third country nationals is the fruit of a development that, 
starting from the legislation of the first post World War II era reached its climax in the 
more recent judgments of the CJEU. Using a historical prospective, I will outline that 
the original meaning of the first family reunification legislative provisions, their more 
recent CJEU interpretation and the new application of the concept of EU citizenship 
find their ground on specific trends that have characterized the process of European 
integration for years. I will look in particular at the development of the Common Market 
project, focused on eliminating obstacles that would hinder the right of free movement 
of workers and at the strengthening of the rights deriving from the EU citizenship 
status.  I will also show how since the oil economic crises these two currents begun to 
clash with the stricter immigration policies adopted by some Member States. I will 
argue that the approach of the Court can be better appreciated when placed at the 
interplay of this clash.   
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Introduction  
The European Union (from now on also EU)1, over the years, has developed a 
complex legislation concerning residence family rights of third country national EU 
family members. 2 For the purpose of simplicity it is possible to subdivide the group of 
families affected by this legislation into three main categories. The first category 
includes those third country nationals already residing within the territory of one of the 
Member States wishing to live with a third country national family member. In 
accordance to the power granted by the Treaty at Art. 79(2)(a)(b) TFEU3 in the area of 
immigration, the EU released Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, 
that sets minimum standard conditions for the exercise of the right to family 
reunification by third country nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the Member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For purpose of simplicity, in this thesis the terms European Union, EU or Union will be used also when 
referring to the European Economic Community (EEC).	  
2 The necessity of protecting families was understood far back in the past, since the ius commune era. On 
this point see Masha Antokolskaia, “The “better law” approach and the harmonization of family law”, in 
Perspective for the Unification and Harmonization of Family Law in Europe, ed. Katharina B. Woelki, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), 169-170. After the Second World War, protection was granted to 
families at international level. State family law is subject to both private international law conventions 
and public international law. Under the first group we can list the Hague Convention on Child Abduction 
(25th of October 1980, entered into force on the 1st of December 1983), the Hague Convention on Inter-
country Adoption (29th of May 1993, entered into force 1st of May 1995), the Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children (24th of October 1956, entered into force 1st of 
January 1962) and the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other 
Forms of Family Maintenance (23rd November 2007, entered into force on 1st January 2013). These 
treaties are binding on state parties and in many states they become enforceable through implementing 
legislation. As far as public constitutional law is concerned, the major pieces of legislation affecting 
family law are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 16, 10th of December 1948), the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, art. 8, art. 14 and Protocol 1 art. 1, 4th 
of November 1950, entered into force 3rd of September 1953), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR, art. 7, 16th of December 1966, entered into force 23rd of March 1976), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, art. 10, 16th of December 
1966, entered into force 3rd of January 1976). However, the first treaties that, at international level, 
recognized the right to family reunification were Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (signed 18th of December 1979, entered into force 3rd of September 1981), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted on the 20th of November 1989, entered into force 2nd of 
September 1990) and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (approved on the 18th of December 1990, entered into force 1st of July 2003). 
Nevertheless, even when these provisions started to be protected internationally, the treaties and 
conventions that contained them did not envisage a clear system of enforcement. For example the 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
established, at Art. 72, a Committee for the Rights of Migrant Workers. However, this body functions as 
a body of political pressure and is not able to enforce sanctions. 
3 Several Directives have been adopted by taking this article as a legal ground (or the previous 63(3)(4) 
TEC): Directive 2003/86/EC on the right of family reunification; Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents; Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence 
permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings; Directive 
2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil 
exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service; Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for 
admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research; Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of highly qualified workers. 
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States.4  This Directive has consequentially shaped the national legislation that has to be 
applied to this category of family members. The second category covers EU workers or 
citizens residing in another Member State wishing to live with a third country national 
family member. Also in this case the right of entry and residence of the third country 
national is granted in accordance to EU law, although this time owing to Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of free movement of EU citizens and their family members. 
Finally, the third category concerns those nationals residing in their EU Member State 
of origin wishing to live with a third country national family member. The legislation 
applying to this category is still national. In other words, it is up to the state to decide 
the conditions and the modality of admission of these specific third country nationals. 
However, in accordance to the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (from now on CJEU or Court), third country national family members 
of EU non moving citizens should be allowed to reside in the national Member State of 
their EU sponsor if the denial of this right would force the latter to leave the territory of 
the European Union. In these cases family reunification rights are granted not via 
national rules but by EU law.  
The topic of this thesis focuses on the issue of family residence rights granted to 
third country nationals within the EU and, in particular, on the two last categories of 
potential applicants listed above.  Leaving aside the numerical importance of this 
phenomenon5, it is worth focusing on this specific issue because it has been the object 
of a lively and still ongoing debate. Indeed, over the years, Member States6 have often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Council Directive 2003/86/EC [2003] 0J L 251/12. For an account of this Directive see Kees 
Groenendijk, “Family Reunification as a Right under Community law”, European Journal of Migration 
and Law 8, no 2 (2006). (Apart from freedom of movement legislation and Directive 2003/86/EC, family 
reunification provisions can be found in several Association Agreements with third countries. In addition, 
there are also several special EU law regimes of family reunion with regard to special categories of third 
country nationals such as Refugees and Blue Card Directive holders. The special rules for refugees are set 
out in Chapter V of the general Family Reunion Directive. The special rules for Blue Card Directive 
holders are instead contained in the Council Directive 2009/50/EC [2009] OJ L 155/17. For a detailed 
explanation of these exceptions see Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 473-478. 
5 Family reunification between third country nationals and EU citizens, being them either moving or 
static, is not an irrelevant phenomenon. In 2011 the total numbers of permits released by the 27 Member 
States to third country nationals willing to reunify with EU citizens was 239,533. In 2012 the provisional 
number, with Belgium’s, Latvia’s, Poland’s and Romania’s data still not available, amounted already to 
210,024 (Data collected from Eurostat, 2013). The total immigration of third country nationals in 2011 to 
the twenty-one EU Member States whose date are available amounted to 1.350.100 (see data at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Immigration,_EU-27,_2009-
2011.png&filetimestamp=20130325145256). Residence permits granted to third country national EU 
family members contributed 18% of all third country national immigration to these twenty-one EU 
Member States. 
6 It is worth pointing out that just some Member States raised issues concerning third country national 
family members. From the cases that will be analysed we can note that the ones involved in the kind of 
disputes more often are Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium and Ireland to which one should add 
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tried to deny residence rights to third country national EU family members.7 The 
Court’s answer to these challenges has not been consistent but rather swinging between 
liberal and austere positions.8 The object of this thesis is to analyse the intricate 
jurisprudential scenario of family residence rights of third country national EU citizen 
family members. In order to fulfill this aim I will endorse a historical approach. 
Through my analysis, I will show how the phenomenon of family reunification between 
EU citizens and third country nationals is the fruit of a development that, starting from 
the legislation of the first post World War II, era reached its climax in the more recent 
judgments of the CJEU. Using the historical prospective, I will show that the original 
meaning of the first family reunification legislative provisions, their more recent CJEU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also Denmark, Greece, Austria and Poland that are often listed among the intervening states in the post 
Zambrano cases. 	  
7 For example, with regard to cases concerning free movement, in Metock (Case 127/08 Blaise Baheten 
Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241) several 
governments, challenged by the issue of whether a third country national family member should be 
allowed to enter the territory of the host Member State of his Union relative without complying with the 
national immigration rules of the latter, held that “[...] prohibiting a host Member State from requiring 
prior lawful residence in another Member State would undermine the ability of the Member States to 
control immigration at their external frontiers” (see para. 71). On other grounds of reasoning, in relation 
to cases involving static EU citizens instead, in the very debated Zambrano (Case 34/09 Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-1177) several Member States argued that 
the situation at hand fell within their competences because, since the EU citizens never left the territory of 
Belgium, the circumstances did “not come within the situations envisaged by the freedoms of movement 
and residence guaranteed under European Union law” (see para. 37). In particular, it seems that the 
debate concerning marriage frauds across the Member States of the European Union has triggered the 
stricter immigration measures that have been adopted by some national legislators and, therefore, their 
stricter approach towards third country national immigration (Since 2008 the Italian citizenship is not 
granted automatically to a third country national spouse of an Italian citizen anymore but only after two 
years of permanent residence in Italy. In the UK the right to apply for permanent residence by the third 
country national spouse of an English citizen has been recently raised from two to five years. For a more 
detailed account on sham marriages in the UK see Helena Wray, “An Ideal Husband: Marriages of 
Convenience, Moral Gate-keeping and Immigration to the UK”, European Journal of Migration and Law 
8, no. 3 (2006).  
8 Alina Tryfonidou, “Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal 
Approach”, European Law Journal 15, n. 5 (2009), 634. It was argued that the Court “must either 
endeavour to wave its case law logically together or, if there are good reasons to push the law in a 
different direction, articulate its reasoning as clearly and explicitly as possible.”(see Niamh N. Shuibhne, 
“Case Law: (Some) Of The Kids Are All right”, Common Market Law Review 49, n.1 (2012), 379).  As 
far as family reunification between EU static citizens and third country nationals is concerned, it was also 
argued that the post Zambrano cases are good examples of how the Court conjured rights, and limits to 
them, out of nowhere (see Alan Dashwood, “Judical Activism and Conferred Powers – Is the CJEU 
Falling into Bad Habits?”, paper presented at 10th IEL (Institute of European Law) Annual Lecture, 
Birmingham University, 27th June 2012). On the academic debate addressed by the Court see also in 
particular Silvia Acierno, “The Carpenter judgment: fundamental rights and the limits of the Community 
legal order”, European Law Review 28, n.3 (2003), 407; Eleanor Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: 
Towards a (Non-) Economic European Constitution”, Common Market Law Review 41, n. 3 (2004), 767; 
Alina Tryfonidou, “Jia or "Carpenter II": the edge of reason”, European Law Review 32, n. 6 (2007), 917 
(in this case comment the author underlined how the Court did not succeed in making explicit whether it 
was willing to depart from the previous Akrich case and to endorse a new family reunification approach); 
Jeremy B. Bierbach, “European citizens' third-country family members and Community law”, European 
Constitutional Law Review 4, n. 2 (2008), 356-357 (in this case comment the author underlines how the 
CJEU’s reasoning was far from providing legal certainty); Nigel G. Foster, Foster on EU law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 353. 
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interpretation and the new application of the concept of EU citizenship find their 
grounds on different but concrete historical trends that influenced the approach of the 
Court.  
It is common knowledge that, since its origins, the main aim of the European 
Union has been the creation of Common Market. The Treaty of Rome, in establishing 
the EU, recognized that certain matters had necessarily to be free from any regulation 
that would restrict their movement among the Member States. The aim of developing 
the right of free movement of workers was immediately endorsed by the Court. The 
CJEU, through its restless activity, immediately from the early sixties started to 
interpret broadly the provisions on free movement of workers and to apply the market 
access model to free movement of labour cases in order to eliminate all the obstacles 
that could hinder Member States’ workers to take advantage of such a crucial right.9 
Furthermore, in 1992 the concept of European citizenship (from now on also EU 
citizenship) was finally introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. The Court interpreted this 
new concept not only as a way to extend free movement rights to non economically 
active people but also as a source of self-standing rights occurring without the presence 
of a real cross border element.  
However the action of the EU and of the Court, mainly focused on eliminating 
obstacles that would hinder the right of free movement and on strengthening the rights 
deriving from the EU citizenship status, soon begun to clash with the stricter 
immigration policies adopted by the Member States. Indeed, since at least forty years 
immigration has become a particularly serious issue in Europe and often it has been 
subject to a vehement national political debate. Since the oil crisis of the seventies, 
passing through the fall of the Berlin Wall, followed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
more recent Arab spring, many European states have begun to fear waves of legal and 
illegal third country nationals and to act in order to keep them out their borders as much 
as possible.10 For these reasons the signing of the Schengen treaty as well as the 
introduction of the concept of EU citizenship and the enhancement of free movement of 
people have had a deep impact on the perception of immigration, to the extent that the 
greater internationalism of Europeans has simultaneously triggered strong 
Eurocentrism, fear of third country nationals and higher levels of xenophobia.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 On this point see Chapter 2.  
10 Among all see the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, interview of Antonio Guterres, March 20, 
2012, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.epc.eu/events_rep_details.php?cat_id=6&pub_id=1430. 
11 David Cesarani, and Mary Fulbrook, Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe (London: Taylor 
& Francis, 2002), 3.  
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The solutions offered by the Court will be analysed considering these trends as a 
background. In particular, Chapter 1 will show that family reunification provisions were 
introduced within the free movement legislation for the purpose of matching the post 
war lack of manpower of Northern European States with the Italian surplus of labour 
through the establishment of the right of free movement of people.12 By looking at the 
Bilateral Treaties era and the development of the Common Market I will show how 
family reunification was introduced as an incentive to push Italian workers to move 
towards the northern European Member States in order to fill their lack of manpower. 
Finally, I will also underline how the openness toward Italians can be placed in the 
broader context of an initial general relaxed approach toward foreigners and, with the 
advent of the European Union, third country nationals. In Chapter 2 I will underline 
how, after the oil crisis of the mid seventies, the backdrop drastically changed.  The 
sudden drop in economic activity pushed some states to endorse protectionist measures, 
which included putting a stop to immigration. The “other” started to be stigmatized as a 
potential threat13 for the economy and the society by the media and within the political 
arena14 and this became part of the common mentality. Nevertheless, these years were 
also characterized by the liberalization of the rights of EU workers and citizens. On one 
side, the EU continued to pursue the strengthening of the right of free movement of 
workers. This right became soon a right to be claimed also by student and pensioners 
(90/364 EEC15, 90/365 EEC16, 90/366 EEC17) and, finally, by all EU citizens despite 
them being engaged in work, owing to Directive 2004/38/EC.18 Also the Court begun to 
interpret free movement cases in the light of the market access approach, according to 
which national measures can be turned down if they create obstacles to the smooth 
functioning of free movement. On the other side, EU politicians and academics started 
to discuss the opportunity of introducing the idea of EU citizenship, which was finally 
encompassed within the Maastricht Treaty. Far from being just an empty shell, as many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Among all see Ferruccio Pastore, and Giuseppe Sciortino, Tutori Lontani: il Ruolo degli Stati 
d’Origine nel Processo di Integrazione degli Immigrati, 2001, Ricerca svolta su incarico della 
Commissione delle politiche di integrazione degli immigrati presso Centro Studi di Politica 
Internazionale (Cespi), <www.cespi.it/PASTORE/tutori-lontani.PDF>, 10-11.  
13 Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 280. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Council Directive 90/364/EEC [1990] OJ L 180/26; concerning a general right of residence. 
16 Council Directive 90/365/EEC [1990] OJ L180/28; concerning a right of residence for pensioners. 
17 Council Directive 90/366/EEC [1990] OJ L 180/26; concerning a right of residence for students; after 
annulment by the CJEU (in Case C-295/90 European Parliament v. Council [1992] ECR I-4193) replaced 
by Directive 93/96/EEC, OJ 1993, L 317/59. For a summary of the case see Siofra O’Leary, “Case note 
on Case C-295/90 European Parliament v. Council, Judgment of 7th of July 1992”, Common Market Law 
Review 30, n. 3 (1993). 
18 Council Directive 2004/38/EC [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
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scholars initially argued, the treaty articles on citizenship started to be often utilized by 
the Court as a source of self stemming rights, including also family rights, in cases in 
which the connection between the circumstances at stake and EU law was not so clear 
since the EU citizen did not exercise his/her right of movement. In Chapter 3 I will 
show how applications on family reunification cases between EU citizens and third 
country nationals begun to be filed when the immigration concerns, as opposed to the 
enhancement of free movement and EU citizenship, became stronger. In this chapter I 
will focus on the analysis of the first case law over the issue of family reunification 
between EU moving citizens and third country nationals. Taking into account the trends 
described in the previous chapter, I will show how these cases found their roots at the 
interface between free movement of workers and citizens and Member States’ concerns 
over immigration and how these two currents ended up shaping the reasoning of the 
Court. I will point out that the reasoning of the Court, far from being the result of 
simplistic choices, can be considered as bringing solutions of compromise between the 
protection of the Member States’ sovereignty over immigration and EU interests over 
the enhancement of free movement. Likewise, in Chapter 4 I will show how the Court’s 
reasoning in cases involving EU static citizens was also built around the immigration 
concerns of some Member States, this time however at the interplay with the 
development of the EU citizenship status as a source of self-standing rights. I will 
highlight that also this stream of case law has been shaped by the Court’s attempt take 
account of Member States’ concerns over immigration as well as the development of the 
concept of EU citizenship through the application of the Zambrano test. In Chapter 5 I 
will bring together all the themes explored in the previous chapters and I will point out 
that the Court’s attempt of taking into account the various stances at stake has managed 
to grant, under certain conditions, an unrestricted right to family reunification for 
families composed by EU citizens and third country nationals. In order to show the 
peculiars of the family reunification protection endorsed by the CJEU I will compare its 
approach with that of the Court of Human Rights’ (from now on ECtHR or Court of 
Strasbourg). I will show that while the latter bases its reasoning on the principle of 
proportionality, which implies a balancing exercise between the competing interests of 
the family and of the Member States the CJEU, once assessed that the situation falls 
within the competence of EU law, can grant nearly unrestricted family residence rights 
to third country national family members. Finally Chapter 6 will be dedicated to the 
conclusions.  
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Chapter 1: Family Reunification at the time of Bilateral Agreements and Common 
Market  
 
1. Introduction 
The first EU law provision granting family residence rights to family members 
of EU workers can be found in Council Regulation 15/1961/EEC1 on free movement of 
workers. This was the first regulation of a three steps phase that culminated with 
Regulation 1612/1968/EEC and the full liberalization of manpower.2 Art. 10(1) of the 
latter regulation provided that the spouse, the descendants who are under the age of 21 
years or dependants and the dependant relatives in the ascending line of the worker and 
his spouse have the right, irrespective of their nationality, “to install themselves with a 
worker who is a national of one Member State and who is employed in the territory of 
another Member State”.  
It has been argued that, originally, these provisions were not only introduced for 
humanitarian concerns3 but also for economic reasons concerning the Common 
Market.4 As the goal of the EU was in fact the creation of a market in which factors of 
production (goods, services, capital and labour) could move where the requirements of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Council Regulation 15/1961/EEC [1961] OJ L 1073/6. This measure was also accompanied by the 
Directive of the 13th December 1961 on the administration practices concerning settlement, employment 
and residence.	  
2 The second step of this three steps phase started with the introduction of Council Regulation 
38/1964/EEC ([1964] OJ L 965/64). The third and last one started in 1968 with Council Regulation 
1612/1968/EEC (OJ Sp. Ed. 1968, L 257/2). The subdivision in different phases was meant to introduce 
gradually the concept of freedom of movement of workers in order not to negatively affect the domestic 
markets. For instance, in the first two phases, the priority to take up job offers was given to national 
workers (if the competent authorities did not propose the name of a national worker within three weeks 
time , only then could the offer be taken up by the worker of another Member State). This limitation was 
eliminated with Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC. Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC has been repealed in 
2011 by Council Regulation 492/2011/EU [2011] OJ L 141/1. 
3 A sign that the EU did not intend to create a general legislative protection for family reunifications 
consists in the fact that these rights were considered residual. Indeed, family members who had the 
nationality of a Member State and were economically active could rely directly on the free movement 
provisions in order to have access to the host Member State. On this point see John Handoll, Free 
Movement of Persons in the EU, (New York:Wiley, 1995), 249.  
4 Gavin Barret, “Family Matters: European Community Law and Third Country National Family 
Members”, Common Market Law Review 40, no. 2 (2003), 375-376.The first to explicate this idea was 
A.G. Darmon in the Demirel case (Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 1573). 
He pointed out that “family reunification for example is treated by community law as a necessary element 
in giving effect to the freedom of movement of workers and does not become a right until the freedom 
which it presupposed has taken effect”. The idea of third country national family members residence 
rights being secondary to the primary right of free movement was shared also by academics. See for 
example Barret, op. cit., and Elspeth Guild, The legal elements of European Identity, EU Citizenship and 
Migration Law, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 98.  
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supply and demand dictated,5 therefore residence rights of family members were built as 
an instrument to avoid hindrances to the free movement of the European worker.  
 In this chapter, I will look at the origins of the phenomenon of family 
reunification at EU level within the context of free movement. I will start this historical 
overview by looking at family residence rights from the time of Bilateral Agreements 
between Italy and northern European countries and I will show how they were 
conceived as an instrument capable of creating an incentive for workers to migrate 
towards the receiving state. I will then highlight that, since the Common Market project 
can be considered connected to the first Bilateral Agreements (given the same historical 
circumstances in which they were drafted and the Italian participation in both projects), 
it seems that family reunification provisions inserted in the first secondary free 
movement legislation were also drafted as a way to create incentives for unemployed 
Italians to move to the northern European Member States. Finally, I will note that the 
openness of family reunification provisions towards third country national family 
members can be placed in the broader context of a general liberal and relaxed approach 
toward foreigners characterising those years.  
The message conveyed in this chapter is that it is fundamental to clarify the 
origins of the first provisions on family reunification and to point out, in the next 
chapter, the change of some Member States towards immigration since the oil crisis.  
This chapter is subdivided in five parts. After this brief introduction part 2 will 
be dedicated explaining how the Common Market concept of free movement of persons, 
having developed during the same historical background that characterized the drafting 
of the first Bilateral Agreements, can be considered to be born in order to fulfill the 
same aim, which was the enhancing of the movement of the Italian unemployed 
workers toward the northern European states. In part 3 I will begin to focus on the 
analysis of family residence rights as endorsed in the Bilateral Agreements concluded 
between Italy and Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. At the end of this 
analysis I will show how residence family rights seemed to have been guaranteed not as 
a fundamental right but as an extra incentive for the Italians to move to the receiving 
state. In part 4, in the light of the previous considerations, I will underline how the first 
EU residence family rights were likely drafted in order to promote the Italian movement 
towards the other Member States and how this can be placed on the backdrop of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Barret, supra note 4, 375-376.  
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broader friendly attitude toward immigration in the first years of the post World War II 
period. Finally part 5 will be dedicated to the conclusions.  
 
2. Movement rights of workers and the role of Italy: from Bilateral Agreements to the 
Treaty of Rome and the Common Market Project. 
The years from 1945 to the late sixties were characterized by an increased 
inflow of migrants from and to different European states and from outside Europe.6 The 
rise in the number of migrants coming to Europe, historically, has been triggered by two 
main factors: on one side, the surprising economic growth in the old continent, on the 
other, the European shortage of workers and the process of decolonization.7 With 
regards to the economic growth, nothing in the history of Europe resembles the 
experience of the postwar years. Although absolute poverty was still affecting people 
even in the richest countries of the old continent, the standards of life of all social 
classes increased uninterruptedly and rapidly for more than two decades.8 As far as the 
lack of labour forces is concerned instead, data show that immediately after the war the 
number of displaced people was around 20 million.9  
The post war economic expansion triggered a time of intense capital formation 
but, despite this growth, many workers were still missing in their home countries. This 
circumstance made the Federal Republic of Germany (from now on Germany) and 
many other states of continental Europe realize that their demand for labour could not 
be satisfied just by their nationals.10 This realization engendered a significant rise in 
migration11 from the southern part of Europe,12 especially from Spain, Portugal, Greece 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Klaus F. Zimmerman, “Tackling the European Migration Problem”, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9, no. 2 (1995), 46-47. 
7 Klaus F. Zimmerman, European Migration What Do We Know, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 5. The author distinguishes between four phases of European Migration: a) period of postwar 
adjustments and decolonization from 1945 to 1960, b) labor migration from 1960 to 1973, c) restrained 
migration from 1973 till the end of the eighties, d) dissolution of socialism and afterwards from the 
nineties till nowadays. 
8 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, (London: Routledge, 1992), 21. The author 
explains the uniqueness of this period underlining the role of the state as the crucial and most important 
factor. The successful institutional management of the economy of that time, in his view, was one of the 
main explanatory factors of the new European economic expansion.  
9 K. F. Zimmerman, supra note 6, 46. On this point see also Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European 
History, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003),  215. 
10 Randall Hansen, “Migration to Europe since 1945: its History and its Lessons”, The Political Quarterly 
74, no. s1 (2003), 25.  
11 Leslie P. Moch, “Foreign Workers in Western Europe: The “Cheaper Hands” in Historical 
Perspective”, in European Integration in Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present, ed. Jytte 
Klausen et al. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 111.  
12 The demand of manpower was, nevertheless, also referred to extra-European states. The demand for 
labour was so high that many national labour offices searched for workers outside European sources, in 
countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Yugoslavia, Turkey and former colonies.  
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and Italy. It is on the role of Italy that this chapter is focused. This is because Italy was 
the only southern country involved both in negotiating Bilateral Agreements and in the 
drafting of the Common Market and, therefore, it is the link through which it is possible 
to discover potential connections between the two projects.  
From the end of the Second World War, Italy’s vast population and lack of 
capital enhanced a widespread political consensus on the necessity of developing new 
efficient migration policies. With an official level of unemployment at 2,000,000 
people13 the Italian government considered emigration of national workers a vital 
necessity.14 The migratory outflow had to be rapid and as vast as possible. The 
government’s own diplomatic initiatives had also to be focused on the pursuit of this 
goal. Hence, the promotion of emigration became the primary purpose of Italy’s foreign 
policy.15  
The exigency of several states to recruit worker and the correspondent need of 
Italy to find employment for its nationals made everyone realize the necessity of 
agreeing over an intelligent interstate policy that had to be capable of allowing workers 
to move from one part of Europe to another in order to take up job positions.16 This 
common purpose opened up the golden era of Bilateral Treaties. As Schmitter 
highlights, these treaties were the trigger and guidance of Europe after the Second 
World War.17 From 1946 onwards Italy signed Bilateral Agreements with all the 
European countries that experienced some shortage of manpower and, consequentially, 
needed an inflow of migrant labour such as, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, the UK etc. These agreements organized the co-operation between 
different state’s employment services with the aim to promote the recruitment of 
specific types of workers. An overall ceiling was usually set to limit the number of 
immigrant workers that could be admitted every year. The decision of recruitment was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 To this critical scenario one has to add nearly one million people, just from the north of Italy, that were 
previously employed in the war industry and, after the war ended, were left without a job. See Cesare 
Besana, “Accordi Internazionali ed Emigrazione della Manodopera Italiana tra Ricostruzione e 
Sviluppo”, in Il lavoro come fattore produttivo e come risorsa nella storia economica italiana: atti del 
Convegno di studi, Roma, 24 novembre 2000, ed. Sergio Zaninelli et al. (Milano: Vita e pensiero, 2002), 
4.   
14 Federico Romero, “Migration as an issue in European interdependence and integration: the case of 
Italy”, in The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992, ed. Alan S. Milward et 
al. (London: Routledge, 1993), 37.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ferruccio Pastore, and Giuseppe Sciortino, Tutori Lontani: il Ruolo degli Stati d’Origine nel Processo 
di Integrazione degli Immigrati, Ricerca svolta su incarico della Commissione delle politiche di 
integrazione degli immigrati, (2001) available at <www.cespi.it/PASTORE/tutori-lontani.PDF>, 10-11. 
17 Barbara S. Heisler, “Sending Countries and the Politics of Emigration and Destination”, International 
Migration Review 19, no. 3 (1985), 474.  
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left to the expressed demand of the receiving state. Depending on the country, 
sometimes the concrete process of recruitment was either managed directly by a 
government agency or left to the employer.18 
However, these treaties did not meet the expectations and the necessities of the 
Italian government. Despite the still increasing demand for Italian labour, Italy found 
difficulties and resistances of some European states during political and diplomatic 
negotiations aiming to approve these agreements.19 The Italian government became 
therefore increasingly persuaded that national barriers to the circulation of manpower 
had to be brought down. The only way to circumvent the problem of national barriers 
was to internationalize the issue of Italian unemployment and deal with it at a 
multilateral level. The issue of full employment had to transcend the national state 
borders and be placed in the broader backdrop of the economic cooperation within 
Western Europe.20 
Initially Italy, under pressure from the United States, proposed to the OEEC21 
Member States a complete liberalization on the circulation of manpower. This would 
have allowed a more efficient utilization of the available work forces through the total 
opening European borders within ten years. This solution, however, found the criticism 
of some states. In particular France, Belgium and the UK were very much concerned 
about losing their sovereignty on labour and immigration policies and the proposal 
ended up in nothing  being done.22 
In the early fifties the French Prime Minister Robert Schuman, tired of the 
hesitations of the European intellectual environment,23 proposed that the market for coal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Romero, supra note 14, 40.  
19 For example the German government was, for some years, quite reluctant to sign a bilateral migration 
agreement with Italy. On this point see Joannes D. Steinert, “L’accordo di emigrazione italo-tedesco e il 
reclutamento di manodopera italiana negli anni cinquanta” in, L’emigrazione tra Italia e Germania, ed. 
Jens Petersen, (Bari: Piero Lacaita Editore, 1993), 142-160.  
20 Romero supra note 14, 40. 
21 OEEC stands for Organization for European Economic Co-operation. It was founded in 1948 with the 
aim of continuing a joint economic recovery program within Europe after the end of the Second World 
War. Originally the OEEC had 18 participants. In September 1961 the OEEC was superseded by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a worldwide body. In 1961, the 
OECD consisted of the European founder countries of the OEEC plus the United States and Canada. The 
list of member countries has expanded over the years, with 34 countries today. 
22 Luciano Tosi, “La tutela internazionale dell’immigrazione”, in Storia dell’immigrazione italiana, vol. 
2, arrivi, ed. Piero Bevilacqua et al. (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 2001), 453-456. 
23 See Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe, A History of European Integration since 1945, (New 
York: Longman, 1995), 1-3. The author underlines how, between the 19th and 20th century, many 
politicians and intellectuals began to appreciate the remarkable potentialities of a European Economic 
Unity, either in the form of a customs union or of a free trade area. The most famous example was 
probably the Zollverein custom union. It was a coalition of German states, established in 1818 and 
created in order to equalize customs and tariffs among their territories. After nearly fifty years since its 
creation it ended officially in 1866 with the outbreak of the Austro Prussian war and was substituted by 
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and steel, of which Europe was witnessing a shortage, had to be controlled by a new 
supranational authority, which became on the 18th of April 1951 the European Coal and 
Steel Community (from now on ECSC).24 During the negotiations, the Italian delegates 
took the opportunity to argue that, in order to achieve a complete integrated market of 
coal and steel, freedom of circulation for workers had to be encompassed within the 
treaty provisions. However, France and Germany made it clear that free circulation 
could be contemplated just for workers with proven qualifications. The strict Franco-
German formulation was finally accepted in the ECSC Treaty.25 Art. 69 committed 
Member States to lift every employment restriction based on nationality, just for a 
restricted category of workers, by stating that “Member States bind themselves to 
renounce any restriction based on nationality against the employment in the coal and 
steel industry of workers of proven qualifications for such industries who possess the 
nationality of one of the Member States; this commitment shall be subject to the 
limitations imposed by the fundamental needs of health and public order”.  
The Franco-German approach to the issue of freedom of movement left the 
Italian diplomats, aiming for a wider interpretation of the ECSC Treaty,26unsatisfied. 
Due to this limited progress, Bilateral Agreements still seemed the only way to achieve 
more advantages. In 1955 Italy signed a migration Bilateral Agreement with Germany. 
With the signing of the German-Italian Treaty all the industrial regions of Western 
Europe were completely engaged in bilateral migratory schemes with Italy as a 
counterpart.27 
Perhaps the awareness of the fact that Europe was now thoroughly covered by 
this intricate network of migratory schemes helped the northern European states to 
surrender to the fact that the problem of working migration could be better faced at 
communal level. The issue of freedom of movement took an explicit and fuller shape 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
another regional organization, that kept the same name. Despite its relative local success, on a broader 
European level it can be considered a failure. The reason is because this organization had just German 
states as members and therefore, by the rest of Europe, it was still considered a protectionist initiative. 
Initiatives of this kind stopped at the beginning of the 20th century, due to the world wars. During this 
period states adopted a protectionist approach by raising their tariff barriers and restrictions upon imports.  
24 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, expired 23 July 2002.  
25 Romero, supra note 14, 43. 
26 Ibid. Italy argued that freedom of circulation had to entail the full harmonization of all the factors and 
procedures regulating access to the labour market of the six Member States. However, this attempt did not 
find the approval of the other Member States. France and Luxembourg conceived the free movement of 
workers within Europe as an aim that had to be achieved when the problem of unemployment in Europe 
had been completely solved. On the other side Belgium and The Netherlands did not agree to a mutual 
recognition of qualifications and to harmonization of social legislation. Finally Germany agreed on a 
common European approach to unemployment but foresaw its solution in a future coordination of 
economic policies and not in the move towards free movement of labour. 
27 Ibid.  
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with the negotiations for the Common Market, which began in 1955 in Messina.28 In 
that occasion the Benelux countries suggested that the target to achieve was the creation 
of a new comprehensive economic community. Surprisingly, they suggested that this 
new economic community had not to encompass limited economic areas of integration29 
but had to pursue the aim of achieving a complete Common Market of goods, capital 
and labour. Germany as well joined the Benelux countries and Italy in asking for a 
gradual introduction of the free circulation of workers. At the end of the conference the 
freedom of movement of workers was incorporated among the aims to pursue for the 
creation of a Common Market in order to launch “a fresh advance towards the building 
of Europe”.30 
These aims took the concrete form of an embryonic Common Market proposal, 
owing to the restless work of the Belgian Prime Minister of the time, Henry Spaak. His 
first ad interim report issued in 1956, known as the Spaak Report,31 referred to 
unemployment not as a hindrance but rather as a resource for European growth. 
According to it, unemployment could be better tackled by common action.32 To this 
end, Chapter III, Title III was completely dedicated to free movement of labour and 
particular attention was also given to the avoidance of discrimination between nationals 
and non-nationals when taking up job positions.33  
The Spaak report was examined in detail during the drafting for the preparation 
of the EEC Treaties. Italy insisted again that the liberalization of the free movement of 
goods, capital and services had to be accompanied by the right of workers to move 
freely within the Community. States ended up codifying freedom of movement of 
workers as a right to take up an employment offer in another Member State, freely 
move and reside in the territory of the Member State and right of not being expelled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 52. On this point see also Urwin, supra note 23, 74.  
29 Jean Monnet was the one who strongly suggested for further sector integration in the field of transport 
and energy. See Urwin (n 22) 62-67.  
30 Messina declaration, 3rd June 1955. 
31 Comite Intergouvernemental cree par la Conference de Messine, Rapport des Chefs de delagationaux 
Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, Bruxelles 21 Avril 1956. 
32 See Spaak Report, 91: “La perspective de la liberation des mouvements de main-d’oeuvre incitera des 
Etats a participer aux efforts qui s’imposent en vue du developpement economique et de la creation d' 
emplois neces- saires pour eliminer Ie grave probleme europeen du chomage structurel qui existe dans 
certaines regions; et la resorption de ce chomage eliminera la principale difficulte a laquelle se heurterait 
la libre circulation de la main-oueuvre, pour le moment meme ou elle pourra se trouver finalement 
etablie, c’est-a-dire au plus tard a la fin de la periode de transition”. 
33 Ibid.: “La Commission europeenne est chargee de proposer aux Etats membres, des qu' elle pourra, des 
mesures appropriees pour eliminer progressivement routes les reglementations discriminatoires legales ou 
administratives, y compris les pratiques administratives par lesquelles les ressortissants des Etats 
membres, les personnes juridiques y induses, sont soumis a un traitement moins favorable que les 
nationaux de l'un de ces Etats pour l' acces a une profession independante ou pour l'exercice de cette 
profession.” 
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from the Member State in case of temporary unemployment.34 Moreover, in order to 
comply with the French request, the idea of progressive quotas was abandoned and 
substituted with a transition that would be based on the gradual decrease of the 
procedures and qualifying periods that regulated the eligibility of foreigners for 
available jobs under the national permit system.35 
These indications were finally crystallized in the EEC Treaty.36 Workers were 
subdivided into salaried, service providers and self-employed37 and their right to freely 
move within the territory of the Union was encompassed in the part of the Treaty 
dedicated to the Foundations of the Community.38 With regards to salaried workers Art. 
48(2) stated that free movement “shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based 
on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment”. Likewise, with regard to 
the freedom of establishment, Art. 53 stated that Member States “shall not introduce 
any new restrictions on the right of establishment in their territories of nationals of other 
Member States, save as otherwise provided in this Treaty”. Finally, Art. 59 on service 
providers prohibited “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the 
Community”. The compromise on the abolition of quotas and on the gradual reduction 
of administrative restrictions, agreed by Italy and the other Member States, can be 
noticed in the words of the Treaty. The EEC Treaty stated in fact that “for the purpose 
of establishing a Common Market the activities of the Community shall include […] c) 
the abolition as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for 
persons, services and capital” and that “as soon as this Treaty enters into force, the 
Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives or make regulations setting out the 
measures required to bring about, by progressive stages, freedom of movement for 
workers, as defined in Article 48, in particular: […] b) by systematically and 
progressively abolishing those administrative procedures and practices and those 
qualifying periods in respect of eligibility for available employment, whether resulting 
from national legislation or from agreement concluded between Member States, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Tosi, supra note 22, 454-455 
35 Romero, supra note 14, 43 
36 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957. On the same day the Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or EAEC Treaty) was also signed.   
37 EEC Treaty provisions from Art. 48 to Art. 66.  
38 See Art. 3 EEC Treaty. This article lists the fundamental policies of the Community. Its paragraph C 
includes among these policies “the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital”. 
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maintenance of which would form an obstacle to liberalization of the movement of 
workers”. These programmatic provisions, in time, took a more detailed shape through 
the following secondary legislation. The secondary legislation concerning free 
movement of workers, adopted soon after the entry into force of the EEC Treaty and 
culminated in Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC, worked on a long “step by step” 
process in order to abolish the limits that could be perceived as a strain on the right of 
workers to move freely within the Union.39 
In this part, it has been seen how Italy was particularly involved in the 
negotiations and signing of Bilateral Agreements straight after the conclusion of the 
Second World War, mainly because of its surplus of manpower and lack of primary 
resources. Subsequently, on the occasion of the negotiations and ratification of the 
Treaty of Rome, Italy was again in the front line for the achievement of the Common 
Market project and, more specifically, for the development of the right of free 
movement of workers. The crucial role played by Italy both in the drafting of Bilateral 
Agreements and in the pursuing of the right of free movement of workers during the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Rome, together with the fact that both these moments were 
characterized by the same historical condition of lack of manpower in northern Europe 
and severe unemployment in Italy, suggest that the birth free movement finds its roots 
in the post World War II background as well as the first Bilateral Agreements 
concluded between some northern European states and Italy. Therefore we can conclude 
that, apparently, these two phenomena share common origins.  
 
3. Bilateral Agreements and family members’ residence rights 
 After having pictured the historical background from the Bilateral Agreements 
to the Common Market I will now focus on the family reunification approach adopted 
by the Bilateral Agreements concluded between northern European states and Italy. 
This section is divided in five subparts. In the first four parts I will describe the family 
reunification approach adopted by the Bilateral Agreements concluded by some states 
with Italy. In the last part I will show that the open approach towards family 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Secondary legislation soon followed the EEC Treaty provisions on freedom of movement. In the first 
phase, Council Regulation 15/1960/EEC tempered the normal priority given to national workers when 
taking up a job position with a temporal limitation. Art. 1 provided that, once passed three weeks from the 
registration of a vacancy without a national worker having responded to it, the position had to be granted 
to a worker of another Member State at equal conditions. This provision was completely abolished in the 
second phase by Council Regulation 38/1964/EEC, although even with this second regulation priority 
was still given to national workers. A complete abolition of any restriction occurred with Council 
Regulation 1612/68/EEC. 
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reunification adopted by the Bilateral Agreements was likely adopted in order to create 
an incentive to the Italian movement of workers towards northern Europe.  
 Before starting this analysis a clarification of the method is necessary. Given the 
fundamental role of Italy both in the drafting of Bilateral Agreements and in the pursuit 
of the Common Market this analysis is going to focus just on the Bilateral Agreements 
concluded by Italy, in particular with Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. The 
Netherlands, despite being one of the six founding fathers of Europe, will be excluded 
from this analysis because it had a later history of Bilateral Agreements with southern 
European states, Italy included.40  
 
3.1. Belgium 
From the 18th century the economy of thirty municipalities in the Borinage, a 
region of southern Belgium, was founded on coal mining. After the Second World War 
this region was a valuable resource, in the worldwide coal shortage, for the rebuilding 
of Europe. There was no more striking example anywhere in Europe of the post war 
concern for employment than the re-establishment and maintenance of the production of 
coal in the mines of southern Belgium. In fact during the world coal shortage of 1945, 
when the only coal available on world markets was allocations from the United States, it 
appeared logical to avoid any sort of reduction of the size of Belgian industries.41  
The necessity of re-establishing the coal industry made mining a protected 
occupation during the war and even after. For example, the lowest skilled group of 
mining workers was granted good salaries and good pension schemes.42 Moreover, the 
necessity of finding workers in order to revitalize the coal industry convinced the 
Belgian government to approve a “statute” for coal miners. This statute provided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The Netherlands was the last northern European state to start concluding Bilateral Agreements with 
southern European and northern African states. The Dutch Government concluded bilateral recruitment 
agreements with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Yugoslavia and Tunisia between 1960 
and 1970. On this point see Stephen Castles, “The Guest-Worker in Western Europe - An Obituary”, 
International Migration Review 20, no. 4 (1986), 765. The reason could be rooted in the fact that, unlike 
the other northern European states, the Netherlands had a very accelerated economic growth to the extent 
that, by the early fifties, the Dutch industry had largely recovered from the second World War and the 
unemployment reached a very low level (see Sara K. van Walsum, The Family and the Nation: Dutch 
family Migration Policies in the Context of Changing Family Norms, (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar 
Publishing, 2008), 26-27). Perhaps this fact slowed down, at least at the beginning, the request of foreign 
labourers. Moreover, the less immediate need of foreign workers seems to have triggered also a different 
approach towards family reunification compared to the other European states. Taking again Italy as a case 
study during the sixties, when the Netherlands started recruiting bigger numbers of Italian unschooled 
labourers, those had to be unmarried (see van Walsum, supra, 120). 
41 Milward, supra note 8, 51. 
42 For all the economic advantages applied to the miners see Albert Martens, Les Immigres: Flux et reflux 
d’une main-d’oevre d’appoit, La politique belge de l’immigration de 1945 a 1970, (Louvain: Presses 
Universitaries de Louvain, 1976), 64. 
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exceptional advantages to them such as right to retire before thirty years of work, 
supplementary holidays and free coal up until 4.200 Kg per year.43  
Despite such advantages, Belgian citizens still showed no great desire to work 
underground.44 Moreover, many citizens were still displaced because of the war and 
Belgium did not have a strong reserve of manpower.45 In order to fill these gaps, 
initially Belgium retained 64, 000 German prisoners in its mines. However, when 
prisoners where released in 1947, the crucial question was about who could replace 
them. Given its structural lack of workers, Belgium looked for men in a country in 
which it was sure to find them: Italy.46  
The first Bilateral Agreement between Belgium and Italy was signed on the 20th 
of June 1946.47 Belgium agreed to supply to Italy five tons of coal per month for each 
given Italian worker. Italy, on its side, agreed to provide Belgium with 2,000 workers 
per week.48 After 1947 immigrants made up about three-quarters of the total 
underground labour force, and of them about three-quarters were Italians.49  
Apart from this exchange between men and primary resources, the agreement 
encompassed also some other provisions on the rights of Italian workers. The agreement 
stated that the Belgian government had to provide Italian workers with appropriate 
housing, food, job conditions and a salary that had to be equal to the one paid to Belgian 
miners.50 Despite the attempt to give Italian migrants enhanced protection on certain 
issues, the legislation remained silent on family residence rights. However, like France, 
Belgium perceived itself as a country of immigration, needing families to settle both for 
economic and demographic reasons.51 To this aim, the famous French demographer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid.  
44 Milward, supra note 8, 51. 
45 Bade, supra note 9, 204. Even five years after the world war ended, Europe’s total population was 531 
million, about six million less than in 1940.  
46 Milward, supra note 8, 51. 
47 The text of this agreement was modified on the 23rd June 1947. The Italian text of the Bilateral 
Agreement between Italy and Belgium can be found in Atti Parlamentari dell’Assemblea Costituente, 
Doc. No. 42, 22nd of October 1947.  
48 Section 11 of the Protocol of the Agreement. On this point see Antonio Canovi, “L’Immagine degli 
Italiani in Belgio: Appunti Geostorici”, n.5 (2011), Dossier: Italia altre. Immagini e Comunita’ Italiane 
all’Estero, available at www.diacronie.it, 2.  
49 For detailed data see Besana, supra note 13, 26. According to their data Italian migrants working in 
Belgian mines were 26.000 in 1946 and doubled already in 1948, reaching the number of 46.000.  
50 See Art. 3 Bilateral Agreement Belgium-Italy 20th June 1946. Despite this provision in reality the 
working and living conditions of Italian miners were quite precarious. On this point see Flavia Cumoli, 
“Dai campi al sottosuolo. Reclutamento e strategie di adattamento al lavoro dei minatori italiani in 
Belgio”, in Storicamente, n.5 (2009), accessed May 2011, available at 
<http://storicamente.org/07_dossier/emigrazione-italiana-in-belgio.htm>.  
51 Arturo John, “Family Reunification For Migrants and Refugees: a Forgotten Human Right?”, A 
comparative analysis of family reunification under domestic law and jurisprudence, international and 
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Alfred Sauvy, in his report,52 underlined how Belgium had to adopt, in order to improve 
production and solve its demographic problems, a policy of integration and assimilation 
of the families of the migrant workers. As Belgium had a strong interest for Italian 
workers to stay in order to develop the coal industry, the authorities made efforts, 
through campaigns53 such as its brochures “Vivre et travailler en Belgique” to 
encourage prospective immigrants to bring their families along, as this would have 
allowed them to lead a normal life, overcome any difficulties in settling in54 and, 
therefore, to establish themselves finally in Belgium. According to the chronicles of the 
time, in many public squares in Italy it was possible to find posters declaring the 
advantages granted by Belgium to foreign miners, among which there was also the 
possibility to reunify soon with their families.55 One of these advantages granted by the 
Belgian government, for instance, was the covering of the 50% of the travel expenses of 
the family.56 From 1946 to 1957, 140, 469 Italian workers, followed by 46, 364 family 
members reached Belgium.57  
 
3.2. France 
France has a long tradition of immigration. Since the second half of the 
nineteenth century thousands of foreigners had been recruited or granted admission in 
the hope of compensating for the country’s insufficient labor supply and low birth 
rate.58 The real problem of immigration arose in France in 1945, in conjunction with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regional instruments, ECHR caselaw and the EU, (2003), accessed May 2011, available at 
<http://www.fd.uc.pt/hrc/working_papers/arturojohn.pdf>, 6.  
52 Alfred Sauvy, Le rapport Sauvy sur le probleme de l’economie et de la population en Wallonie, Liege, 
1962, Conseil Economique Wallon.  
53 Campaigns to recruit Italian workers were organized by the Belgian trade unions. For a deeper account 
see Francesco Micelli, “L’emigrazione dal Friuli Venezia Giulia in Belgio”, accessed June 2011, 
available at http://www.ammer-
fvg.org/ita/paesi/index_tree_d.asp?CCat_ID=BE&CCatS_ID=&Cont_ID=262.  
54 John, supra note 51, 6.  
55 This was the original content of the poster: “Approfittate  degli spaciali vantaggi che il Belgio accorda 
ai suoi minatori. Il viaggio dall’Italia all’estero e’ completamente gratuito per i lavoratori italiani firmatari 
di un contratto annuale di lavoro per miniere. Il viaggio dall’Italia al Belgio dura in ferrovia solo 18 ore. 
Compiute le semplici formalita’ d’uso la vostra famiglia potra’ raggiungervi in Belgio”. See “Dimensioni 
e caratteristiche del fenomeno occupazionale della popolazione immigrata in provincia di Latina”, 
research report, accessed May 2011, available at 
http://www.progettostima.it/public/articoli/29/Files/Rapporto%20finale%2009%2006%202010.pdf, 28. 
56 Western Europe’s Migrant Workers, report 28, 1974, 21. 
57 Micelli, supra note 53, 10. The fact that family reunification was just stimulated through political 
campaigns and not through the legislation leaves uncertainties on which family members could 
effectively join the Italian workers and what were effectively the rights granted to them once in the host 
Member State.  
58 Gilles Verbunt, “France”, in European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study, ed. Tomas Hammar, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 127. For a detailed account on this issue see Yves 
Lequin, Histoire des etrangers et de l’immigration en France, (Paris: Larousse, 1992), 313 et seq. 
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issues of demography and manpower. To understand their importance as postwar 
concerns, one must appreciate the situation that existed at the end of World War II. As 
result of World War II, France lost a big part of its population.59 On the top of this 
issue, France was also experiencing a severe decline of birth rate. It was again Alfred 
Sauvy, the eminent demographer that would advise Belgium some years later, who 
suggested that in order to overcome the postwar economic stagnation a program of 
permanent, large-scale immigration was a top priority.60  
On the 2nd of November 1945, with an ordonnance, the National Immigration 
Office (ONI) was created.61 This institution was given the monopoly over the 
recruitment of foreign labor into France. Although ONI was meant to become the most 
highly organized system of recruitment for migrants coming to France from every 
foreign state the reality was far from this assumption62and, for this reason, after some 
years after its creation the ONI was left responsible only for migrants coming from 
Europe.63 When the Commisariat General Du Plan64 set France the objective of 
increasing production 25% above that in 1929 by 195065, the ONI, with the support of 
the time Ministry of Labour Ambroise Croizat, concentrated all its efforts on Italy. All 
of a sudden Italy became the cornerstone of the new French migration policy.  
Geographic and cultural proximity, the presence of former Italian migrants and the 
absence of political obstacles made Italy the perfect candidate to supply the French with 
much needed labour.66 
The Bilateral Agreement between France and Italy was ratified on the 21st of 
March 1947.67 According to this agreement, France had to grant the recruitment of 200, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Apparently 1, 500, 000 military and civilians died during the First World War. In the second conflict 
figures are around 2, 100, 000.  
60 On this point see Alfred Sauvy, “Evaluation des besoins de l’immigration francaise”, Population 
(French Edition) 1, no. 1 (1946).   
61 For more details about ONI see Castles, supra note 40, 763, and Georges Tapinos, L’immigration 
etrangere en France 1946-1973, Travaux et Documents, Cahier n. 71, (Paris: Presses Universitaires De 
France, 1975), 22-23. 
62 See Castles, supra note 40, 763-764. The author underlines how, from 1948 to 1968, the proportion of 
migrants coming as "clandestine” increased from 26% to 82%. According to his view, this increment was 
triggered by the developing competition for labour within Western Europe as labour demands from 
Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands started to increase.  
63 Ibid., 764. 
64 It was created in 1946 and lasted until 2006. Its main purpose was to plan the economy of France, 
mainly through five years plans.  
65 Tapinos, supra note 61, 16.  
66 Ibid.,19. 
67 The text of the bilateral treaty between Italy and France can be found at Atti parlamentari 
dell’Assemblea Costituente, Doc. No. 45, 20th November 1947. Soon after, other bilateral agreements 
were signed with other countries which were experiencing excess of manpower, such as Spain in 1956, 
Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, former Yugoslavia in 1965, Tunisia and Turkey in 1964 (and came 
into force in 1969). On this point see Henry de Lary, “Bilateral Labour Agreements Concluded by 
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000 Italian workers per year.68 Prior to leaving, workers had to be subjected to medical 
check-ups by the Italian Health Authorities.69 Italian workers could not choose the job 
position they were going to cover, or the place in which they would have liked to be 
assigned.70 In contrast with the agreement with Belgium, in the French Bilateral 
Agreement one cannot find provisions binding the French government to provide Italian 
workers with an appropriate housing. Despite the faults of the system, a special regime 
was applied to Italian workers who had families. In this Treaty in fact it was possible to 
find provisions that explicitly referred to the possibility of transferring family members 
to France,71 instead of simply granting workers the right of sending allowances to their 
relatives back to Italy.72 In particular, Art. 14 stated that a special agreement had to 
determine the conditions under which families of Italian workers could travel to France. 
The French government, on its side, had to facilitate the arrival of these families to the 
territory of France by taking up some of their trip expenses. Again, as for Belgium, the 
Treaty did not give any specific definition of family members. From 1947 to 1949 the 
total number of families recorded by the O.N.I. included approximately 58,000 people, 
48% of which were Italian.73 
 
3.3. Germany 
Until 1885 Germany was mainly an emigration country.74 The peak of 
emigration was reached between 1881 and 1885 when 857,000 migrants left Germany.75 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
France”, in Federal Office of Immigration, Integration, and Emigration,  Migration for Employment: 
Bilateral Agreements at a Crossroads, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2004), 43. Each of these agreements 
specified the number of workers to be admitted each year, the conditions of work guaranteed and the 
requirements for entry. Every nationality group had its own set of legal rights and duties and its own 
limits on numbers. On this point see Gary P. Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial 
Societies: The French and British Experience 1945-1975, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 68-74. 
68 Art. 1 : “En vue d’assurer pendant l’annee 1947 le recrutement en Italie et la mise au travail en France 
de 200.000travailleurs destines a l’industrie et l’agricolture et desireux de se rendre en France, les deux 
Gouvernements predront les mesures necessaries, chacun en ce qui le concerne, pour que le depart en 
France de ces immigrants et leur mise au travail eient lie a la cadence de 17.000 personnes par mois, en 
moyenne”.  The recruitment had to happen with monthly quotas of 17, 000 workers each. To this end the 
Office National d’Immigration Francaise opened an Italian branch in Milan. Welcoming centers were also 
placed close to the borders between the two states.  
69 Artt. 3, 4, 5. 
70 Art. 7.  
71 Art. 18.  
72 With regards to the faculty to send allowances back in Italy see Artt. 12, 13, 14. 
73 Tapinos, supra note 61, 31. 
74 Hartmut Esser, and Hermann Korte, “Federal Republic of Germany”, in European Immigration Policy: 
A Comparative Study, ed. Tomas Hammar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 165. 
Germans emigrated mainly to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to Canada, Australia and South 
America.  
75 Ibid.,166. 
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After the economic expansion began, the number of emigrants dropped rapidly and, as a 
consequence, during the late nineteenth century overseas German migration was 
massively replaced by internal migration from rural to industrialized parts of the 
country.  
After the Second World War, Germany slowly started to turn into an 
immigration country. During this period Germany began to face massive immigration 
flows. The first people that entered the country were either refugees from Eastern 
Europe or expelled persons from the former German territories.76 These voluntary 
migrants practically covered the vacant places that, during the war, were occupied by 
war prisoners77 and ended up functioning as a large labour reserve. Nevertheless, the 
almost immediate efforts begun by the allies after the cessation of the hostilities to 
reconstruct the industrial capacity of Germany, together with the currency reform of 
1948, triggered such a deep and fast economic recovery that all the labour surpluses 
were soon absorbed.78 
 West German employers started actively importing foreign labour from 1948. 
Despite the delay compared to other European countries, the outcome was probably the 
most organized state recruitment apparatus anywhere in Europe, known as guestworkers 
system.79 Initially, the Federal Labour Office of Germany set up recruitment offices all 
around the Mediterranean countries. German employers in need of foreign labour had to 
apply to the Labour Office that, after receiving the payment of a fee, had the task of 
recruiting suitable workers. Workers had to pass a test that allowed the Labour Office to 
evaluate their occupational skills. Moreover, workers were subjected to medical tests 
and screening police records. If all the prerequisites were fulfilled, they were all 
accompanied in groups to Germany, where employers had to provide them a proper 
accommodation.80  
 The first Bilateral Recruitment Agreement was concluded with Italy in 1955.81 
Already in 1953 Italy expressed its will to sign a Bilateral Agreement with Germany. 
However, it was only in April 1954 that the negotiations started and, after a period of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See Thomas Liebig, “Recruitment of Foreign Labour in Germany and Switzerland”, in Federal Office 
of Immigration, Integration, and Emigration,  Migration for Employment: Bilateral Agreements at a 
Crossroads, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2004), 158. 
77 Esser and Korte, supra note 74, 167-169.  
78 Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1978), 61.  
79 Castles, supra note 40, 768. 
80 Ibid.  
81 The text of the Treaty can be found in Diritto Internazionale, Vol. XVII, 1963, 280. Further recruitment 
agreements were concluded later on with Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964) 
and Yugoslavia (1968). See Hammar (n 56) 170.  
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stalemate,82 the agreement was signed. The decision to sign this agreement was dictated 
by economic and historical circumstances. In the early fifties Germany, in order to 
develop its economy, pushed for a strong liberalization of international trade. At that 
time Germany traded intensely with Italy, one of its major coal importers.83 At the same 
time the Italian economy, as previously mentioned, was characterized by a strong 
unemployment rate. When the latter pressured Germany to hire seasonal Italian 
workers, threatening to adopt a more restrictive importation policy in case of a negative 
answer, Germany accepted the Italian conditions. This decision was moved surely out 
of fear of losing its biggest importer of coal84 and, presumably, also because Germany 
desperately needed new labour forces to keep the pace of its continuously growing 
economy.85 
 According to the agreement, Germany had to indicate the number of workers and 
the kind of jobs that needed to be recruited.86 Practically, the Federal Labour Office, 
acting jointly with the Italian Labour Ministry, was responsible for the recruitment. 
From Nuremberg all job requests from German employers had to be sent to the local 
offices of the Italian Labour Ministry, which was in charge of viewing and choosing the 
workers.87 Once the worker was accepted, he was granted a bilingual job contract88 and 
an authorization to work, which was the prerequisite to have the work permit released 
once in Germany.89 The German government covered also the visa and trip expenses for 
the Italian workers.90 They were also granted same work and housing conditions as 
German workers.91  
 Looking at the content of the agreement it is also clear how the presence of Italian 
workers on German territory was meant to be limited in time.92 In fact, probably 
because of the nation’s self perception of not being a country of immigration, German 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Grazia Prontera, “L’emigrazione italiana verso la Repubblica Federale Tedesca. L’accordo bilaterale 
del 1955, la ricezione sulla stampa, il ruolo dei centri di emigrazione di Milano e Verona”, in 
Storicamente, no. 4 (2008), accessed June 2011, available at 
<http://www.storicamente.org/07_dossier/migrazioni-prontera.htm>.  
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. In September 1955 the unemployment of German workers nearly disappeared. German 
unemployment reached in fact 2,7% by September 1955. 
86 Art. 4(2). 
87 Art. 5(1) 
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89 Art. 9(3) and Art. 11.  
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91 Steinert, supra note 19, 142-160. 
92 Paolo Borruso, “Note sull’emigrazione clandestina italiana 1876-1976”, Emigrazione e Storia d’Italia, 
ed. Matteo Sanfilippo, (Cosenza: Luigi Pellegrini Editore, 2003), 265. Art. 4 (2) of the Treaty shows how 
Germany looked at the Italian permanence within its territory as temporary. As a matter of fact it states 
that the job offers had to indicate clearly how long the job would have lasted.  
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Bilateral Agreements93 were characterized by the creation of a rotation system which 
intended to replace frequently the previous generation of temporary guestworkers with a 
new one.94 Despite the German temporary job policy towards migrants the agreement, 
surprisingly, made reference to family rights adopting quite an open position on family 
reunification. Art. 15 stated that all the Italian workers that wished to be accompanied 
by their families, had to prove to be living in a proper housing. Workers, when issues on 
public safety or public order were not occurring, were given residence permits for their 
families in the shortest possible time. Moreover, requests for residence permits of 
relatives not belonging to the core family unit were also accepted.95 In fact, the same 
article states explicitly that the competent offices had to examine “benevolently” the 
admission requests also of other family members.96 Finally, although the Bilateral 
Agreement between Italy and Germany did not specify it in any provision, the policy of 
Germany was that also the family member (generally the woman) who was allowed to 
enter with the foreign worker was entitled to take up a job position.97  
 
3.4. Luxembourg 
 The first migration flows to Luxembourg can be tracked back to the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century. That period was characterized by the industrialization of the 
country and the beginning of mining activities. The fast development of the mining and 
steel industry created the need to import a huge amount of manpower since the need for 
labour could not be supplied entirely by the native population. Both low and high 
skilled workers were required.98  
 The first wave of immigrants to be employed in the steel and coal industry was, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See John, supra note 51, 5. 
94 There were several reasons why the importation of temporary foreign workers seemed to be the right 
solution. Among all, importing temporarily foreign labour was considered less risky, considering the still 
uncertain economic recovery of Germany. See Heinz Werner, “From the German “Guestworker” 
Programmes of the Sixties to the Current “Green Card” Initiative for IT Specialists”, no. 43. Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (IAB), (2001), 7. 
95 See Art. 15. These provision was applied also to workers that were meant to remain in Germany for a 
period not more than 9 months. 
96 Ibid.  
97 The job market was in such need of recruitment that also the family member was encouraged to apply 
for jobs. See Monica Mattes, “Gender and Migration in Germany: the case of female labour migration 
from the 1950s to the 1970s”, (2009), accessed June 2011, available at 
http://migrationeducation.de/fileadmin/uploads/MattesGenderMigration_01.pdf, 4. The author underlines 
how, during the 60s, the German recruitment agencies promised Italians to receive a preferential 
treatment if they decided to move with or to be joined by their wives. On migration of women after the 
Second World War see also E. Kofman, “Female “Birds of Passage” a Decade later: Gender and 
Immigration in the European Union”, International Migration Review 33, no. 2 (1999), 274.  
98 Marie Valentova, and Guayarmina Berzoza, “Attitudes towards immigrants in Luxembourg: do 
contacts matter?”, CEPS/INSTEAD working paper, (2010), accessed June 2011, available at 
<http://www.ceps.lu/pdf/3/art1547.pdf>, 3. 
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once again, Italian.99 The first Italian wave of migration to Luxembourg was between 
the last decade of the nineteen century and the beginning of the First World War. Italian 
workers used to move to Luxembourg mainly from the northern and central regions of 
Italy. This first migration flow was characterized by the extreme temporariness of the 
presence of Italian labourers within Luxembourg. Workers in fact stayed for limited 
periods and generally returned back to Italy in winter.100 Temporariness, with some 
exceptions in the period before the First World War, continued to characterize the 
presence of Italian migrants in Luxembourg up until the post World War II period.101 
After the end of World War II Luxembourg was on its knees. One third of the country 
was destroyed. Infrastructures and railways had to be totally rebuilt. Agriculture stopped 
together with the steel and coal industry.102 Luxembourg realized that, in order to face 
its economic problems, migration had to be enhanced. In 1948, the first Bilateral 
Agreement between Luxembourg and Italy was signed. Luxembourg needed Italians to 
work in the mines to rebuild the country.103 On the other side Italy, once again, needed 
to reduce its national unemployment rate. The last Bilateral Agreement concluded 
between Luxembourg and Italy before the creation of the European Communities was 
signed on the 16th of January 1957.104 All the requests of hiring Italian employees had to 
be sent first to the Office National du Travail in Luxembourg and, from there, sent to 
the Italian Embassy that had the task to transmit them to the competent Italian office.105 
The Italian Labour Offices had to make sure that all the workers fulfilled all the health, 
sanitary and professional conditions required.106 The Government of Luxembourg had 
to make sure that Italian workers were granted the same work conditions that applied to 
national workers107 and that they were given proper housing and food in compliance 
with their eating habits.108 
 Like Germany, Luxembourg also had a preference for temporary immigration. In 
fact the Italy-Luxembourg Bilateral Agreement envisaged two kinds of contracts for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Ibid.  
100 Maria Luisa Caldognetto, “Per una storia dell’emigrazione dal Montefeltro al Lussemburgo: temi, 
problemi, prospettive”, in Studi Montefeltrani, 32/2010, Pesaro, Societa’ di Studi Storici per il 
Montefeltro, accessed June 2011, available at 
<http://www.cdmh.lu/resources/pdf/_base_documents/9983156792.pdf>, 506.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Jean-Marie Kreins, Histoire du Luxembourg: des origines à nos jours, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1996),104. 
103 Caldognetto, supra note 100, 510. 
104 Text of the Treaty can be found in Diritto Internazionale, Vol. XIII, 1959, 347. 
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106 Art. 3.  
107 Art. 8. 
108 Art. 7.  
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Italian migrant workers: contract A and contract B. Contract A was the contract 
concerning workers hired for a limited period of time. Contract B instead was utilized 
for workers engaged in a permanent position. From the text of the Bilateral Agreement 
it is evident that preference was given to temporary workers. In fact Art. 3 stated that all 
the Italian workers coming to Luxembourg after the 31st of December 1956 would have 
been given a contract of type A whereas contract of type B could be only issued in 
accordance to the quotas agreed by the two contracting states.109 In this context family 
reunification could surely be granted in cases in which the worker was hired with a 
contract classified as B, when he could prove he/she could fulfill the requirement of a 
proper housing. Nevertheless, despite the tendency of Luxembourg to prefer 
temporariness over permanence, in cases in which an Italian worker was issued with a 
type A contract he/she could still obtain the right to family reunification in case he/she 
was authorized by the Luxembourg Ministry of Justice. Finally, according to the 
Bilateral Treaty, the concept of family encompassed the spouse and children until 
eighteen years old or of any age if they were unable to work. The Luxembourg 
government also had to facilitate the reunion of other dependent family members who 
did not belong to the core family unit.110  
 
3.5. What is the role of family reunification provisions in Bilateral Agreements?  
Some scholars have tried to analyse the advantages and the disadvantages 
triggered by Bilateral Agreements on migratory waves. Among all, the very interesting 
article by Martin and Miller showed that, if on one side it is true that without the 
manpower supplied by guestworker programs the post war economy recovery could not 
probably have been possible, on the other side this short term benefit was diluted by 
long term economic problems such as dependence on foreigners for the growth, delays 
in the receiving countries on rationalization of industries and restructuring of the labour 
force, deteriorating working conditions of national low-skilled workers, social service 
expenses and governmental infrastructure expenditure and increasing social problems 
towards foreigners such as discrimination and xenophobia.111 To this dark side of 
Bilateral Agreements system one should also add the often precarious working and 
living conditions that the guestworkers had to face. As far as the Belgian experience is 	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110 Art. 3 final notes. 
111 Philip L. Martin, Mark J. Miller, “Guestworkers: Lessons from Western Europe”, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 33, no. 3 (1980), 327-328.  
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concerned for example, chronicles of the time spoke about “men worn out by silicosis, 
widows of miners, young people crippled from injuries suffered at work and families 
still housed in barracks”.112 Similar experiences were witnessed also in France and 
Germany.113 
 Despite the prospective of facing these precarious conditions, the signing of 
Bilateral Agreements increased the flux of Italian workers towards the above mentioned 
northern European States. As far as Belgium is concerned from 1947, in the same year 
in which the Bilateral Agreement between the latter and Italy was signed, the Italian 
population started to grow and from 84,134 of 1947 it reached the peak of 200, 086 in 
less than fifteen years.114 Likewise, in France the wave of Italian immigrants began in 
1946, once again in the same year in which the Bilateral Agreement between the two 
countries was signed, and from 1950 till 1956 the 77% of all the permanent immigrant 
workers were Italians.115 Finally also in Germany and Luxembourg the wave of Italian 
migrants increased dramatically since the years in which the Bilateral Agreements were 
signed. As a matter of fact in Germany, between 1955 and 1956, the Italian migrants 
moved from none to 15, 600 people. In Luxembourg after the signing of the Bilateral 
Agreement with Italy Italian migrants increased immediately to more than 2,000 people, 
reaching the peak of 8, 100 working permits released to Italian workers in a year.116 
 In the light of this data it seems evident how the prospect of finding a job, as 
opposed to being unemployed in an Italian country village, was stronger than the 
thought of all the difficulties that they had to face. In this backdrop, was the possibility 
of family reunification an incentive for the decision of the Italian workers to move 
abroad? In the previous paragraphs I showed how, although in different ways, in the 
Bilateral Agreements concluded between Italy and other northern European states 
special concerns towards family reunification were already conceived. When there were 
not written provisions, like in the Bilateral Agreement signed between Belgium and 
Italy, it was anyway commonly known that bringing family members was not 
prohibited but actually promoted by the Belgian government. Professor Boyd of the 	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room, for which they each pay 30DM a week”. For a deeper account see Western Europe’s migrant 
workers, supra note 56, 19.  
114 Joan Leman, From Challenging Culture to Challenged Culture: The Sicilian Cultural Code and The 
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Affairs, 5th of October 1960, Doc. No. 67, 4. 
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University of Ottawa made a point on the role of family networks in migration 
movements.117 In her work the author underlined the fact that families are migratory 
units.118 This means that a family may either migrate together or, as it happens in the 
majority of times, individuals may be sent out with the expectation that other members 
of the family will be in the future allowed to be sent for. Consequently, the increment of 
the scale of migration in certain regions is connected to the abolition of limitations to 
family reunifications, which can be perceived as a deterrent from moving into another 
state.119  
The states involved in the drafting of Bilateral Treaties with Italy seem to have 
understood and made use of this basic rationale of migration policies.120 One could 
recall that Germany and Luxembourg in particular, despite generally aiming for a policy 
that pursued limited and temporary presence of foreign workers, nevertheless accorded 
generous family reunification provisions to Italian workers. Since it was neither 
Luxembourg nor Germany’s intention to create a long term Italian workers’ colony 
within their territory, it is reasonable to think that family reunification was probably 
granted in order to stimulate the Italians to move to work there121. In addition Belgium, 	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118 Ibid., 643. 
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states. See also Rinus Penninx, “International Migration in Western Europe Since 1973: Developments, 
Mechanism and Controls”, International Migration Review 20, no. 4 (1986), 961. In this article the author 
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prolongation of legal residence for workers and dependants. On how countries can use family 
reunification according to their purposes see W.A. Dumon, “Family Migration and Family Reunion”, 
International Migration 14, no. 1-2 (1976), 61. According to the author, receiving countries can take 
quite different stands towards family reunification, swinging from rather strict to rather liberal family 
reunification policies in accordance to their necessities. This differentiation of policies is due to several 
factors. For instance, countries defining themselves as countries of immigration tend to have a favorable 
attitude towards families accompanying the migrant worker whereas states not defining themselves as 
countries of immigration generally set more strict conditions. Moreover, countries defining migration of 
labour force as multifunctional, such as fulfilling demographical next to economic roles, develop higher 
standards of family migration and family reunification than countries that do not. Finally the author 
underlines that some external factors may influence to a certain extent the adoption of family 
reunification policies within Bilateral Agreements. For example, differentiations can be made according 
to the nationality of immigrants coming from the sending country in cases in which the latter already had 
a privileged relationship with the receiving country. 
120 Boyd, supra note 117, 644.  
121 See Castles, supra note 40, 769. One could be surprised to find provisions on family reunification 
rights in this bilateral treaty, especially if one considers the fact that, at that time, Germany was 
promoting temporary working policies. As a matter of fact Germany generally embarked a policy against 
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despite not inserting any family reunification provision in the Bilateral Treaty with 
Italy, was very keen to advertise in every Italian piazza the right of workers to bring 
their families with them. The fact that no provisions on family reunification were 
officially included within the text of the agreement seems to indicate that there was no 
intention to preserve the right of the family to be united but more the idea to create an 
incentive for the Italian workers to migrate.122 Finally, one might think also about 
France whose main concern, as seen, clearly consisted in sorting out its demographic 
problems and lack of manpower. In this light, it seems that the generous family 
reunification provisions contained in the Bilateral Agreement with Italy were likely 
inserted in order to increase the population and create an incentive for the Italian 
workers to decide to move there.123  
 In the light of this reading one can reasonably appreciate the influence of family 
reunification in the choice to migrate for many Italians and how, since the origins of 
Bilateral Agreements, family residence rights seem not to have been conceived as 
human rights but as simple incentives in order to encourage –or to avoid obstacles for- 
the Italian workers to move.  
 
4. Rationale behind EEC family reunification provisions and approach towards third 
country nationals.  
 In the previous part of this chapter it was suggested that residence rights to family 
members seem to have been guaranteed in order to stimulate the decision of the Italian 
workers to move towards northern European states. The necessity of enhancing the 
decisions of the Italian workers to move abroad as much as possible was the result of 
the high Italian unemployment rate and the lack of manpower of northern European 
states, both consequences of World War II. Nearly ten years from the signing of the first 
Bilateral Agreements with Belgium, the social and economic conditions of Italy and of 
northern Europe were not drastically different. As a matter of fact, at the time of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
family rights of migrant workers and this attitude was not changed even in the German Alien Law 1965, 
that made no reference to family reunification whatsoever (on this point see John, supra note 49,  6). This 
apparent contradiction can be explained in the light of the historical background. Germany needed to hire 
as many Italian workers as possible to keep pace with its growing economy. Among the various 
incentives that were granted to Italian workers to convince them to move to Germany, family 
reunification might have been considered one of them. This approach allowed Germany, on one side, to 
maintain strong trade connections with Italy and, on the other, to fill the lack of national labour in the 
economic productivity. As a result to this policy, by the end of July 1960 the number of workers in the 
Federal Republic of Germany amounted 280.000, of which 45% were Italians. On this point see Hartmut 
Esser, and Hermann Korte, supra note 76, 170.  
122 See part 3.1. 
123 See part 3.2. 
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signature of the Treaty of Rome, the unemployment rate of Italy was still quite high 
while the other northern founding father states still suffered of a high shortage of 
manpower. As the Parliamentary Committee for the Social Affairs reported in 1960: 
“Italy is the only country that still has at his disposal sufficient reserve of labor force not 
only to avoid the danger of internal penury but also enough to satisfy the demand of 
other states.”124 In this similar historical background, considering in particular the 
protagonist role played by Italy both in the Bilateral Treaty Era and in the negotiation 
and drafting of the Common Market project, seems reasonable to suggest that the family 
members residence rights provisions contained in the EU free movement legislation, 
like the provisions contained in the Bilateral Treaties that have been analysed, have 
strong historical roots in the post World War II backdrop and in the necessity of 
pushing Italian workers to migrate towards states characterized by a lack of manpower.  
 The idea that family reunification provisions were inserted in order to create an 
incentive or, in the language to which we are more used to, remove all the obstacles, for 
the workers to move is evident in particular from the way in which they were drafted. 
Indeed, the more open the provisions are, the less the obstacles for the sponsor to move 
abroad will be. The openness of these provisions can be easily noted in their approach 
towards EU sponsor’s relatives. In Council Regulation 15/1961/EEC125, at Art. 11(1), it 
is stated that the spouse and descendants, under the age of twenty-one years old, could 
rejoin their EU national worker relative who was regularly employed in another 
Member State. Art. 11(2) stated also that every host Member State had to “facilitate” 
the entrance of “other” family members who do not belong to the core family household 
but, nevertheless, were totally or partially dependent on the worker and lived under the 
same roof in the Member State of origin. The same provision could be found in Council 
Regulation 38/1964/EEC at Art. 17 and in Council Regulation 1612/1968/EEC at Art. 
10(1) which, in addition, added a new category of family members who were entitled to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Commission for Social Affairs, supra note 116, 5.  
125 As mentioned in the introduction, the first provisions on family residence rights can be found in this 
regulation. Family provisions were encompassed in Title II, named “Workers’ Family”.  
It is important to note that, for the purpose of this thesis, I will particularly focus 
on the ancillary relationship between EU worker/citizen right of free movement and family members’ 
right to reside in the host Member State. To this extent the following analysis is particularly focused on 
the secondary law provisions that, throughout the years, granted the right of residence to family members 
of the EU sponsor who decided to exercise his/her right to move. However, it is worth noting that the free 
movement legislation encompassed other provisions that are more related to the status of family members 
once they are admitted to the host Member State and to the conditions in which such admittance is 
allowed. For a clear explanation norms and of all the relevant cases see Steve Peers, “Family Reunion and 
Community Law”,  in Europe’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice,  ed. Neil Walker, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).   
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join the EEC relative. Indeed, Art. 10(1) provided that the spouse, the descendants who 
are under the age of 21 years or dependants and the dependant relatives in the ascending 
line of the worker and his spouse had the right “to install themselves with a worker who 
is a national of one Member State and who is employed in the territory of another 
Member State”.126  
 Another interesting aspect that suggests the capacity of family reunification 
provisions to create incentives (or remove obstacles) for the workers to move is the 
openness of these provisions to third country national family members. It was initially 
Regulation 38/1964/EEC that, at Art. 17, specified that the spouse, dependants under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 With regard to facilitation of other family members to reunify with the EU sponsor, Art. 10(2) Council 
Regulation 1612/1968/EEC mirrored exactly Art. 11(2) Regulation 15/1961/EEC. This first legislation on 
freedom of movement was also completed by Directive 1968/360/EEC ([1968] OJ Sp. Ed. L 257/13), 
which laid down provisions on formal entry requirements for European workers and their family 
members, and by Regulation 1251/1970/EEC ([1970] OJ Sp. Ed. L 142/24), concerning the right to 
remain in the host Member State when the worker ceased to work there. The first directive did not add 
anything more to family reunification provisions but simply listed the requirements that the European 
worker and his family members had to fulfill in order to be admitted into the host Member State 
(Directive 1968/360/EEC, at Art. 2, stated that “ Member States shall grant nationals referred to Art. 1 
(nationals of a Member State), the right to leave their territory in order to take up activities as employed 
persons and to pursue such activities as employed person and to pursue such activities in the territory of 
another Member State such right shall be exercised only on a production of a valid identity card or 
passport. Member of the family shall enjoy the same right as national on whom they are dependent”. Art. 
3(2) stated that “no entry visa or equivalent document may be demanded save from the fact that members 
of the family are not of a Member State. Member States will accord any facilitation to the third country 
national family member to obtain the visa”). The second regulation did not add any new provision to the 
core rules on family reunification as well but simply specified the meaning of the right of residence of the 
EU family member in the host Member State more in detail (Regulation 1251/1970/EEC, in Art. 3(1)(2) 
established that “Members of a worker’s family referred to in Art. 1 of this regulation who are residing 
with him in the territory of a Member State shall be entitled to remain there permanently if the worker has 
acquired the right to remain in the territory of that state in accordance with Art. 2, and to do so even after 
his death. If however the worker dies during his working life and before having acquired the right to 
remain in the territory of the state concerned, members of his family shall be entitled to remain there 
permanently on a condition that:-the worker on the date of decease, has resided continuously in the 
territory of that Member State for at least two years; - his death resulted for an accident at work or an 
occupational decease or; -the surviving spouse is a national of the state of residence or lost the nationality 
of that state by marriage to that worker”). The Treaty of Rome, when referring to free movement of 
workers, did not just simply mean salaried workers but also to self employed workers and service 
providers. It was not necessary to wait too long to see the legislative scenario completed by the parallel 
secondary legislation on the right of establishment and the right to provide services. Directive 
1973/148/EEC (OJ 1973, L 172/14) on the abolition of restriction on movement and residence within the 
community for nationals of Member States with regards to establishment and provision of services, was 
directed to people who wish to establish themselves in another Member State in order to pursue activities 
as self employed persons or who wish to provide services. This Directive did not modify the provisions 
on family member residence rights contained in the older free movement of salaried workers legislation 
nor introduced new provisions, except from widening the category of the sponsors from people that were 
taking up a salaried position abroad to people that wished to establish themselves in another Member 
State as self employed or service providers. Similarly to what was stated by the secondary regulation 
concerning salaried workers, the host Member State had also to facilitate the admission of family 
members that did not belong to the previous group but that, nevertheless, were dependants of the national 
or of the spouse and that in the country of origin lived under the same roof (Art. 1(2). Also Directive 
1975/34/EEC ([1975] OJ L 14/10) on the right of nationals of a Member State to remain in the territory of 
another Member State after having pursued there an activity of self employed capacity, resulted to be the 
equivalent of Regulation 1251/1970/EEC and did not encompass any different provisions on family 
reunification. 
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twenty-one years old and ascendants or descendants who were dependants either on the 
European worker or his spouse were admitted to the host Member State regardless their 
nationality. This was later on confirmed in Regulation 1612/1968/EEC that, at Art. 10, 
emphasized the equality between nationals and third country nationals by stating that 
“irrespective of their nationality”, the spouse and their descendants had the right to 
install with the European worker in the Member State. Finally, also Art. 11 of the same 
regulation stated that the spouse of the European worker, children under twenty one 
years old or children who were dependant on the worker had “the right to take up an 
activity as an employed person throughout the territory of that same state, even if they 
are not nationals of any Member State”. 
 On this point, it is worth adding that the openness of family reunification 
provisions towards third country nationals seems to be a hint of the broader European 
attitude toward immigration in the immediate years following the World War II. 
Initially, at the time of Bilateral Agreements, everybody not belonging to the national 
state was considered a foreigner by that very same state. This fact, as seen, did not 
prevent several northern European states from concluding migration agreements with 
some other states, including states from southern Europe whose workers (before they 
became part of the European Union) were considered foreigners like anyone else. With 
the adoption of the Treaty of Rome and of the secondary legislation on freedom of 
movement, the founding states adopted an extensive set of principles, rules and norms 
aiming to provide labour mobility in order to implement a robust intra migration 
regime. The creation of a free movement space within these countries, initially, did not 
change the liberal approach towards those countries that were not part of the EU at the 
time, and that after the signing of the Treaty of Rome can be correctly referred to as 
third countries.127 Evidence of this is the fact that some of the EU founding father states  
also continued to sign Bilateral Agreements with states that did not belong to the 
Common Market at the time (and some who still do not) due to labour shortages.128  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 The creation of a free movement space started to change the conception of foreigner: foreigners were 
not anymore those who came from any other state apart from the state of origins but those who came 
from outside the European Union. However, it was just with the entry into force of the Schengen 
Agreements in 1986 that officially controls at the internal borders were replaced by controls at the 
external borders. For a deeper account of the issue of European borders see Kees Groenendjik, Elspeth 
Guild, and Paul Minderhoud, In Search of Europe’s Borders, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002).  
128 Since the labour shortage at the time of the creation of the European Communities was still high, the 
same European Member States kept on signing individually migratory Bilateral Agreements with 
countries that were not part of the Union. The first Bilateral Agreements concluded in the early fifties 
mainly with Italy were soon followed by a yet larger number of agreements with third countries in the 
sixties. For example Belgium, after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1964 a bilateral treaty 
with Morocco and with Turkey, in 1969 with Tunisia and in 1970 in Algeria and Yugoslavia (On this 
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 In conclusion, in this part it has been shown that the provisions on family 
reunification inserted in the secondary legislation on free movement were characterized 
by the aim of enhancing free movement of workers and, like the previous Bilateral 
Agreements, found their roots in the post World War II needs of matching the Northern 
Europe shortage of labour with the Italian surplus of labour. The way in which these 
provisions were drafted demonstrates how efforts to encourage movement of Italian 
workers were achieved in a concrete fashion. On a final consideration I pointed out that 
the willingness to extend family reunification provisions also to third country national 
family members can be placed in the broader context of a general relaxed approach 
toward foreigners characterising those years.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 In this chapter I have provided the background underpinning the introduction of 
the first provisions on family reunification. I have shown how it seems that in the 
Bilateral Agreements signed by Italy and other European states family reunification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
point see Marco Martiniello, “The new migratory Europe: towards a proactive immigration policy”, in 
Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, eds. Craig A. Parsons, Timothy M. Smeeding, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 311. France also, in 1963 signed an agreement with 
Morocco, in 1964 with Portugal (which was not already part of the Union), in 1965 with Yugoslavia and 
in 1968 with Algeria (On this point see de Lary, supra note 67, 43). Finally also Germany itself, which 
started recruiting people quite late in comparison to the other Member States, concluded agreements with 
Spain and Greece in 1960 (like Portugal, they were not already part of the Union), in 1961 with Turkey, 
with Morocco in 1963, with Portugal in 1964, with Tunisia in 1965 and finally with Yugoslavia in 1968 
(on this point see Werner, supra note 94, 10). It is interesting to note that openness towards third country 
nationals can be found in several aspects of these agreements. One aspect was the openness of family 
reunification processes for third country nationals. For example, in the Bilateral Agreements between 
Belgium and Morocco and Belgium and Turkey Art. 13 and  Art.11 respectively granted the right of 
family reunification to the Moroccans and Turkish workers at the condition of being able to find 
appropriate housing. The Belgian government was even meant to help those migrants to find an 
appropriate house for workers and their families. The same thing occurred in relation to Germany and 
Turkey. By 1974, there were one million of Turkish people in West Germany: 60% workers, 20% 
children and 20% non- working spouses and other dependants (see Ozlem L. Sari, “Migration and 
Development; the Case of Turkish Migration in Germany”, accessed 1 October 2013, available at 
<http://www.spaef.com/file.php?id=681>).  Another aspect is the length of the working permits issued. 
As far as France was concerned, at the time of the bilateral agreements it was possible to get three years 
work permit after just one year of employment (see de Lary, supra note 67, 44). For the sake of 
completeness, in order to show the original more liberal attitude of Europe toward immigration, it is 
worth pointing out that the European post World War II period was also characterized by huge 
immigration waves coming from ex colonies. In particular, Algerians in France, West Indians in Great 
Britain and Indonesians in the Netherlands came in large numbers over the fifties whereas Surinamese in 
the Netherlands and Pakistani and Indians in the United Kingdom reached their peak in sixties and 
seventies. Within the vast literature on this issue see in particular Leo Lucassen, David Feldman, and 
Jochen Oltmer, Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004), (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006); Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie, Postcolonial Migrants and 
Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States in Comparison, vol. 18, (New York: 
Berghahan Books, 2012); Klaus Bade, Migration in European History, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2002); Anthony M. Messina, The Logics and the Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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introduced in order to encourage Italian workers to move towards the receiving states. 
Likewise, the first EU provisions on family reunification seem to fulfill the same aim. 
Finally, I underlined how the first years of the post World War II immigration context 
were characterized by openness towards migrants and third country nationals more 
generally. 
  In the next chapter I will proceed to present further relevant historical 
developments of Europe from the mid seventies until now. I will point out that after the 
oil crisis the approach towards immigration changed drastically. Member States moved 
from a favorable approach toward third country national immigration to a strict one and 
rapidly begun to seal their borders. Simultaneously, the EU continued to develop liberal 
policies for its members. On one side, the Union continued enhancing free movement 
by extending this right from pure workers also to EU citizens, despite them not being 
involved in a working activity. On the other side, the EU started to contemplate the 
opportunity of introducing the concept of EU citizenship to the extent that from some 
embryonic proposals already in 1992 the idea of EU citizenship was introduced in the 
Treaty of Maastricht. Far from being simply an empty concept, soon the Court started to 
interpret it as a source of self-stemming rights. Underlying the historical changes 
occurred from World War II till today, it is crucial to understand the challenges faced 
lately by the Court when dealing with the issue of granting family residence rights to 
third country national EU family members. 
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Chapter 2: From the oil crisis till today  
 
1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter I looked at the origins of the provisions granting 
residence rights to family members of EU citizens in free movement legislation. I 
suggested that family residence rights were drafted as ancillary rights to the right of free 
movement because of the need to create incentives for Italian workers to move towards 
the other Member States, which were experiencing a lack of manpower.  
In this chapter I will continue the analysis of the historical background from the 
seventies till our days. I will show that, from the middle of the seventies, a significant 
change occurred in terms of the way migrants were perceived in Europe. At the time of 
the oil crisis available job positions were drastically reduced, and European States 
began to strengthen their borders and to look at immigrants as potential enemies. 
European States started to endorse a defensive attitude toward foreigners, which first 
concretely took the shape of stricter national immigration legislation, both on legal and 
illegal immigrants and then, for those states that were already part of the European 
Union, of stricter EU measures on border controls against the citizens of non Member 
States: the third country nationals. This was the beginning of a tougher immigration 
approach that, although for different circumstances from the initial recession of the 
seventies, has lasted over the years and characterized many immigration measures 
adopted by the EU. Nevertheless, despite a change of need and in attitude toward third 
country nationals, the EU continued to endorse a generous approach toward its own 
workers and citizens. On one side, the European Union continued to enhance the right 
of free movement of workers by extending it also to people that were not engaged in a 
working activity such as students, pensioners and, finally, to the entire category of EU 
citizens. On the other side, since the seventies, scholars started to hint to the 
introduction of the idea of EU citizenship that, after long negotiations, entered into force 
with the Maastricht Treaty. Over time, this new concept triggered the vibrant activity of 
the CJEU, which started to interpret it as a source of self-stemming rights, including 
residence family rights of third country nationals.  
In this chapter, through the explanation of the historical events in the way they 
occurred, it is my intention to show how the concerns towards third country nationals 
grew in parallel to the development of the right of free movement and of the concept of 
EU citizenship. This clarification will be particularly useful when, in the next two 
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chapters, I will show how the decisions of the Court on the issue of family reunification 
between EU citizens and third country nationals can be better understood if read at the 
interplay between, on one side, concerns over third country nationals and, on the other 
side, protection of the right of free movement or of the self stemming right of residence 
deriving from the concept of EU citizenship itself.  
This chapter is divided in five parts. After this brief introduction part 2 will 
focus on the approach of the Member States on third country nationals and on the 
process of strengthening of borders initiated after the oil crisis. Part 3 will be dedicated 
to the development of free movement and its extension also to EU citizens. Part 4 will 
focus instead on the concept of EU citizenship conceived as a source of self-stemming 
rights. Finally part 5 will offer some conclusions.  
 
2. Strengthening of borders against third country nationals.  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the economic expansion of Western 
Europe throughout the fifties was remarkable. This led to an enormous increase of 
migration.1 Such migration was seen as short-term migration, capable of satisfying the 
state’s immediate labour needs without long-term consequences.2 However in the 
seventies things started to change. It was in 1973-1974 when the first oil crisis struck 
the economies of the world and Europe. This crisis particularly affected the labour 
market. Almost overnight oil had become scarce and very expensive.3 Naturally, 
companies and states started to reduce their costs with capital and jobs transferred to 
parts of the world where it was cheaper to invest. This particularly affected the once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For the sake of completeness it is worth pointing out that, although in the previous chapter only labour 
immigration coming from the southern part of Europe was mainly mentioned, the European post World 
War II period was characterized by huge immigration waves coming from ex colonies. In particular, 
Algerians in France, West Indians in Great Britain and Indonesians in the Netherlands came in large 
numbers over the fifties whereas Surinamese in the Netherlands and Pakistani and Indians in the United 
Kingdom reached their peak in sixties and seventies. Within the vast literature on this issue see in 
particular Leo Lucassen, David Feldman, and Jochen Oltmer, Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western 
Europe (1880-2004), (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and 
Gert Oostindie, Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States 
in Comparison, vol. 18, (New York: Berghahan Books, 2012); Klaus Bade, Migration in European 
History, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002); Anthony M. Messina, The Logics and the Politics of 
Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
2 John Handoll, Free movement of persons in the EU, (New York: Wiley, 1995), 351.  
3 The price of a barrel of oil which had remained 2 dollars or less for 15 years up to the end of 1971 and 
had only risen gradually for the remaining two years, quadrupled within the span of three months. The 
UK monthly average crude oil bill, which was £78mn in 1973 rose to £308mn in the second quarter of 
1974 representing nearly one-quarter of the monthly import bill compared with less than one-tenth a year 
previously. For an economic explanation of the crisis see Alan Peacock, The oil crisis and the 
professional economist, for Sir Ellis Hunter memorial lectures, lecture delivered at the University of York 
on 11 December 1974, (York: University of York publication, 1975), 2.  
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prosperous coal and heavy industries that, due to the new investment policies and 
increased costs, started to face a situation of almost unstoppable job losses.4 
Due to the changes in the labour market, since migration was already conceived 
as a “tap” to turn on and off according to the labour market’s needs,5 the receiving 
countries started to push migrants to return their states of origin6 and started to limit the 
number of legal migrant workers who were granted access into the territory of the state. 
The tight controls on migration were accompanied by structural state actions to make 
sure only national workers supplied the demand for labour.7 
Despite these restrictions, immigration did not end. On one side, with regard to 
legal immigration, although a stop was put on economic immigration, foreigners that 
established themselves in the host country pursued other ways to gain residence. For 
example, around the seventies European national state legislation started to adopt 
measures to guarantee family reunification at national level. Consequentially, it was 
more difficult for states to stop the old guestworkers to rejoin with their families in the 
guest state.8 Likewise, the imposed limitations on economic migration could not restrict 
the right of asylum.9 On the other side, with regard to illegal immigration, European 
governments were not immediately able to enforce effective measures on illegal 
foreigners and, consequentially, these years became characterized by increasing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marco Martiniello, “The new migratory Europe: towards a proactive immigration policy”, in 
Immigration and Transformation of Europe, edited by Craig A. Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 302-303.  
5 See Randall Hansen, “Migration to Europe since 1945: its History its Lessons”, The Political Quarterly 
74, no. s1 (2003), 31.  
6 Martiniello, supra note 4, 303. France and Germany raised their ban to entry to non EU workers 
respectively in 1974 and 1973. In 1974 the Netherlands ceased its recruitment programs. See in particular 
Stephen Castles, “The Guest-Worker in Western Europe – an Obituary”, International Migration Review 
20, no. 4 (1986), 761. On January 1973, the Immigration Act 1971 came into force in order to “stop large 
scale permanent migration”, in particular from the Commonwealth. See John Solomos, “Racism and 
Anti-Racism in Great Britain: Historical Trends and Contemporary Issues”, in Racism and Anti-Racism in 
World Perspective, ed. Benjamin P. Bowser, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), 169. 
7 Handoll, supra note 2, 351. 
8 Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards a Fortress Europe?, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), 20-21. The author describes the situation of the seventies in this 
way: “Migrant workers and their families began to build new lives for themselves in Europe: they bought 
houses, their children attended school, opened businesses and similar. In short, migrants and their 
descendants became part of the social and cultural fabric of modern and western Europe.” On this point 
see also Bade, supra note 1, 232: “Special social benefits, such as childhood benefits in West Germany, 
led to increased immigration of children and adolescents to join parents. Consequently, from 1973 to 
1975, more than 31% of all the new immigration was attributed to family reunification which in other 
countries developed in one of the largest immigration movement”.  
9 Martiniello, supra note 4, 304. See also Wenceslas De Lobkowicz, “Intergovernmental Cooperation in 
the Field of Migration – From the Single European Act to Maastricht”, in The Third Pillar of the 
European Union, Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, eds. Joerg Monar, Roger Morgan, 
Proceedings of an International Conference organized by the College of Europe, Bruges, the Institut für 
Europäische Politik, Bonn, and the European University Institute, Florence, Conférences de Bruges - 
Bruges Conferences - Volume 5, Bruxelles, (1994), 105.  
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irregular employment situations.10 Moreover, states were not even able to control the 
entry of asylum seekers with the consequence that the right of asylum was increasingly 
abused.11   
The economic emergency12 and the realization of the incapacity of not being 
able to tackle the immigration problem triggered the stigmatization of the figure of the 
immigrant. The fear of the “other” took the form of populist alarmism, dramatization 
and demonization of immigrants also at the level of media and political discourse.13 
Within the broader European Union context immigrants meant, for the Member States, 
nationals of countries that were not part of the Union or, in other words, third country 
nationals.14 Aware that immigration was a common issue and that it was difficult to 
tackle the problem alone, the European Member States slowly started to look to each 
other. If after the end of the Second World War and even after the creation of the EU 
national migratory policies regarding third country nationals were still very much 
“nationally oriented”,15 the years following the oil crisis witnessed the development of a 
supranational level of discussion about migration. The discussion, initially, was simply 
focused on illegal crimes somehow connected to illegal immigration. In 1975, on the 
occasion of the Rome Council, the heads of each Member State decided to proceed 
together with regard to terrorism, equipment, public order, training, drugs, serious crime 
and, later on, internal security implications,16 by setting up a special working group 
called Trevi.17  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bade, supra note 1, 250. The author underlines how one of the main consequences of illegal 
immigration and irregular employment was the expansion of bidonvilles at the outskirts of major cities in 
the sixties and seventies. In 1970, there were around 25, 000 residing in bidonvilles Marseilles and Paris.  
11 De Lobkowicz, supra note 9, 105.  
12 Klaus F. Zimmerman, “Tackling the European Migration Problem”, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9, no. 2 (1995), 45. The author clearly states that the Fortress Europe policy finds its roots in 
the 1973 economic recession (at 45).  
13 Bade, supra note 1, 280. See also Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal. What Globalization 
Means for Migration and Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). In this book the author 
underlines how globalization had an impact on the concept of migration to the extent that if at the outset 
of the twentieth century migration was in the process of becoming legalized, with the development of a 
globalized world, the illegalization of migration became the new trend.  
14 The creation of a free movement space started to change the conception of foreigner: foreigners were 
not anymore those who came from any other state apart from the state of origins but those who came 
from outside the European Union. For a deeper account of the issue of European borders see Kees 
Groenendjik, Elspeth Guild, and Paul Minderhoud, In Search of Europe’s Borders, (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2002). It has been argued that these days we cannot find anymore a clear line between third 
country national and citizens in the EU. This is due to practices of semiinclusion, expression of security 
relationship between individuals, community and states. On this point see in particular Elspeth Guild, 
Security and Migration in the 21st Century, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 190.   
15 Martiniello, supra note 4, 312-313.  
16 Geddess, supra note 8, 74-75. On the structure and development of Trevi see also Valsamis Mitsilegas, 
Jorg Monar, Wyn Rees, The European Union and Internal Security: Guardian of the People?, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2006), 23-27. Initially Trevi consisted of only two working groups, 
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However, during the eighties a new and stronger wave of discriminatory and 
xenophobic phenomena began to predominate. Differently from the seventies when 
there was still hope that immigration was just a temporary phenomenon, in this period 
European states finally realized the fact the ethnic minorities settled.18 The formation of 
racially mixed societies “prompted many locals, encouraged by political agitation and 
support by the media, to set in motion processes of negative integration and defensive 
crowding together at the expense of strangers”.19In the light of these concerns, Member 
States decided for the first time to act together both on illegal and legal immigration.  
With regard to illegal immigration, in 1986,20 all the EU Member States of the 
time decided to create an Ad Hoc Group on Immigration. The Group practically had to 
monitor “the improvement of checks at the external frontier community, the value of 
internal checks, the role of coordination and possible harmonization of Member States 
visa policies in improving controls, the role and effectiveness of controls at internal 
frontiers in the fight against terrorism, drug, crime and illegal migration, exchange of 
information about the operation of spot-check systems, close cooperation to avoid the 
abuse of passports, measures to achieve a common policy in order to eliminate asylum 
abuse in consultation with the Council of Europe and UN High Commission of 
Refugees and examination of ways in which Community travel could be improved 
without adding to the terrorist threat, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other 
crime.”21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comprising of senior officials from national ministries, senior police officers and intelligence personnel. 
The first group was called TREVI I and dealt with international terrorism. The second group was called 
TREVI II and dealt with general public order issues and the organization and training of police forces. On 
June 1985 the Trevi ministers of Justice and Home Affairs decided to establish a third working group, 
TREVI III, on drugs and organized crime. Trevi III focused on the methods of fighting all forms of 
international and organized crime, with particular emphasis on drugs and arm trafficking and links to 
international terrorism. The creation of Trevi III was a major step towards wider police cooperation 
between EC Member states. Its existence and work prepared the ground for the establishment of Europol 
in 1990.   
17 Trevi, whose name was taken from the famous fountain of Rome, operated within the European Policy 
Cooperation stream of action. It ceased to exist in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty integrated it into the 
Justice and Home Affairs Pillar.  
18 In Germany the matter at hand was the shift from work stays to immigration situations; in Britain 
instead it was about the emergence of ethnic minority populations from colonial and post-colonial 
immigration; in France both trends occurred at the same time.  
19 Bade, supra note 1, 279.  
20 The Ad Hoc Group on Immigration was the fruit of the London meeting of 1986. It was an 
intergovernmental structure of a particular type because besides the twelve Member States, also the 
Community institutions belonged to it. For a more detailed description see De Lobkowicz, supra note 9, 
107-108. 
21 Elspeth Guild, and Jan Niessen, The developing immigration and asylum policies of the European 
Union : adopted conventions, resolutions, recommendations, decisions and conclusions, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996), 32.  
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In relation to legal immigration, on the 14th of June 1985, the first Schengen 
Agreement was signed by France, Germany and the three Benelux countries.22 Its 
ultimate goal was to dismantle the internal European border controls in order to make 
internal borders open at any point without checks on the person being carried out. 
However, if on one side these provisions were particularly favorable to EU workers or 
citizens wanting to cross the internal borders, on the other these provisions were imbued 
by a strong security rationale, of which third country nationals were the main targets. 
For example, the Convention clarified that the right to freedom of movement within the 
Schengen area was granted just to some specific and limited categories of third country 
nationals such as those who held a uniform Schengen visa, those who were residents of 
third countries and not subject to a visa requirement and those who were holding valid 
resident permits issued by one of the contracting parties.23 If they did not meet these 
requirements or if they were considered a threat for the public order they had to be 
refused entry unless a state considers necessary to derogate on humanitarian grounds.24 
The Schengen Convention also introduced the principle of removal of third country 
nationals not fulfilling the conditions for a short stay applicable within the Schengen 
territory25and, finally, it created the Schengen Information System (SIS), which 
included data related to aliens who were reported for having been refused entry.26 
The Member States’ concerns over immigration reignited once again at the end 
of the eighties.27 In 1989 Europe was struck by the fall of the Communist states. This 
fact gave rise to new and specific fears of mass immigration from Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union.28 Statistics mooted at the beginning of the nineties pictured a 
situation of nearly twenty million refugees fleeing from war and more than a hundred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The Schengen Agreement was originally signed by 6 member states in 1985. This agreement however 
was not crowned with immediate success. Schengen countries had to struggle for five years before they 
were able to agree on the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) which was only 
signed on the 19th of June 1990. The Schengen Agreement was largely programmatic. CISA was instead 
drawn up for the practical functioning of Schengen.  
23 Art. 19-24 of the Schengen Convention. Georgia Papagianni, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU 
Migration Law, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 113. 
24 Art. 5(2). 
25 Art. 23 of the Schengen Convention. See Papagianni, supra note 23, 117. 
26 From Art. 92 onwards of the Schengen Convention. The SIS became fully operational since 1995. The 
system is composed of a central database, located in Strasbourg, to which all the other national SIS 
databases are linked. According to Art. 96 of the Schengen Convention, the decision of SIS for issuing an 
alert against a third country national had to find its grounds on either a threat of public policy or national 
security. In 2006 works started to begin for the creation of the second generation of Schengen 
Information System (SIS II). This new system has been operational since April 2013. 
27 On the politicization of immigration in this period see Anastassia Tsoukala, “Looking at migrants as 
enemies”, in Controlling frontiers: free movement into and within Europe, eds. Didier Bigo, and Elspeth 
Guild, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 
28 Handoll, supra note 2, 352. 
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million poor legal migrants trying to escape extreme poverty.29 These new fears for the 
future, once again, called for a renewed control of the borders, which implied also a 
more rigorous asylum policy to avoid giving refugee status to purely economic 
migrants, in order to prevent illegal entry of people coming from Eastern Europe.30 
Having realized that an overall migration strategy was lacking, with the introduction of 
Maastricht Treaty,31 Member States started collaborating in a “formal 
intergovermentalism”32. With the advent of Maastricht, the Member States introduced 
for the first time migration within the treaty’s text as a European independent subject. 
Maastricht did not just provide the legal grounds to develop the legislation connected to 
illegal immigration such as border control and unauthorized migration33 but also in the 
area of legal migration.34Indeed the measures adopted in this area, despite being rather 
limited and not legally binding, had a strong restrictive character.35 For example the 
Resolution adopted on family reunification of third country nationals used a restrictive 
definition of family.36 Moreover, one year later, the resolutions regarding the admission 
of employed and self-employed workers set again a heavy series of limitations granting 
extremely limited leeway for admission.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Mitsilegas, supra note 16, 25-26.  
30 Handoll, supra note 2, 352. 
31 On the negotiations and drafting of the Maastricht Treaty see Guild, and Niessen, supra note 21.  
32 See Steve Peers, “EU Justice and Home Affairs Law(non-civil)”, in The Evolution of EU law, eds. Paul 
Craig, and Grainne de Burca, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 270: “Formal, because 
cooperation between Member States on immigration was brought within the umbrella of the Treaty, 
intergovernmentalism, because the modus operandi of Member States based on unanimity”. 
33 Mitzigelas, supra note 16, 32. 
34 Papagianni, supra note 23, 127. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Resolution on the harmonization of national policies on family reunification, Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration, Copenhagen, 1 June 1993, SN 2828/1/93 REV 1 WG I 1497. According to Art. 2 access 
was granted to: the resident’s spouse, the children, other than the adopted children, of the resident and his 
or her spouse, the children adopted by both the resident and his or her spouse while they were resident 
together in the third country. Text reproduced in Guild and Niessen, supra note 21, 251-273. See also 
Papagianni, supra note 23, 128.  
37 Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 on limitation on admission of third country nationals to the 
territory of the Member States for employment, OJ C 274/3, 19.9.1996 and Council Resolution of 30 
November 1994 relating to the limitations on the admission of third country nationals to the territory of 
the Member States for the purpose of pursuing activities of self employed persons, OJ C 274/7, 
19.9.1996. For instance, the Resolution of the 20 June 1994 stated at C(i) “Member States will consider 
requests for admission […] only where vacancies in a Member State cannot be filled by national and 
Community manpower or by non –Community manpower lawfully resident on a permanent basis in that 
Member State[…]. Such an offer is named to a named worker or a named employee […]. An employer 
offers named workers vacancies only where the competent authority consider, if appropriate, that the 
grounds adduced by the employer, including the nature of the qualifications required, are justified in view 
of a temporary manpower shortage on the national or Community labour market […]”. On this point see 
again Papagianni, supra note 23, 128.  
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The last decade was characterized by the gradual communitarization of the areas 
of immigration and asylum starting from the Amsterdam Treaty.38 Four days after the 
collapse of the Twin Towers in 2001 the European Commission in a communication to 
the European Parliament stressed the necessity of fighting terrorism by tackling 
irregular immigration and stated that “criminal activities, which are regularly connected 
with irregular migration flows, are a major concern in all Member State”. 39 Hence, 
terrorism started to be perceived as a threat that had surely to be combated through 
tackling illegal immigration.40 With regards to illegal immigration the Member States, 
within the Council, worked hard for the creation of Frontex, an EU agency created to 
help the Member States to manage external borders, and VIS, a database containing 
information for all the Visa applicants.41 The concern towards new immigrants touched 
also field of asylum, on which the directives adopted (minimum standards for asylum 
seekers,42 procedure for granting and withdrawing a refugee status,43 for the 
qualification of the status of refugee44 and for temporary protection to refugees in a 
crisis situation45) were strongly criticized for their low standards of protection.46 The 
suspicion towards third country nationals did not leave legal migration untouched. The 
first period after Amsterdam was characterized by legislation that set relatively low 
standards of protection for third country nationals such as the Family Reunification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For an explanation of how Maastricht developed into the Amsterdam Treaty see Geddes, supra note 8, 
113 et seq.  
39 European Commission, On a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, Communication from the 
Commission and the European Parliament, COM(2001)672 final, Brussels, 15.11.2001, 10. Soon after, at 
the Seville European Council, Member States called for an urgent action by the whole international 
community. See European Council 2002, Conclusions of the Presidency, Seville 21–22 June, 35. 
40 Gemma Pinyol-Jimenez, “The migration security nexus in short: instruments and actions in the 
European Union”, Amsterdam Law Forum 4, no. 1 (2012), 41.  
41 Papagianni, supra note 23, 281. The European Agency for the management of operational cooperation 
at the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, better known as Frontex, started to 
operate in October 2005. It was established in Warsaw. Frontex’s mission was to help EU Member States 
implement EU rules on external border controls and to coordinate operational cooperation between 
Member States in the field of external border management. While it remains the task of each Member 
State to control its own borders, the Agency has the function to ensure that they all do so with the same 
high standard of efficiency. The European Union Visa Information System is a database containing 
information, including biometrics, on visa applications by third country nationals requiring a visa to enter 
the Schengen group. The system was established in June 2004 by the Council decision 2004/512/EC. VIS 
is organized on a regional basis, starting on 11 October 2011 with north African countries. These systems 
have been considered to promote coercive sanctions such as the refusal to travel, refusal of visa and 
asylum applications, the refusal of admission to a country at external borders, detention and extradition. 
For a deeper comment see Ben Hayes, “From the Schengen Information System to SIS II and the Visa 
Information (VIS): the proposals explained”, (2004),  accessed March 2013, available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/analysis-sisII.pdf.  
42 Directive 2003/9/EEC [2003] OJ L31/18.  
43 Directive 2005/85/EEC [2005] OJ L 326/13. 
44 Directive 2004/83/EEC [2004] OJ L 304/12. 
45 Directive 2001/55/EEC [2001] OJ L 212/12. 
46 Peers, supra note 32, 284.  
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Directive, that was the subject of a challenge by the European Parliament because its 
standards fell under the minimum level of human rights protection, and the Long Term 
Resident Directive, which omitted refugees and persons with subsidiary protection from 
its scope.47  
Finally, the more recent years have also been characterized by the debate over 
immigration. As far as illegal immigration is concerned new stringent measures against 
third country national unlawful immigration were applied such as Directive 
2008/115/EC48 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, Directive 2009/52/EC49 on providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals and Directive 2011/36/EU50 on preventing and combating the 
trafficking of human beings. Moreover, also on the side of legal migration, the approach 
towards third country nationals has been very cautious. With regard to Directive 
2009/50/EC51 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment, the initial ambitious aim of the Commission 
to replace the national admissions schemes has been left unsatisfied by a weak directive 
in which Member States still enforce significant barriers to intra-mobility.52 Finally, 
with regard to Directive 2011/98/EU53 on a single application procedure for a single 
permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State 
it was pointed out that the very low harmonizing effect still leaves the procedure related 
to immigration very much on the national level and to the discretion of the Member 
States.54 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid., 289. See in particular footnote 140.  
48 Directive 2008/115/EEC [2008] OJ L 348/98. 
49 Directive 2009/52/EEC [2009] OJ L 168/24. 
50 Directive 2011/36/EEC [2011] OJ L 101/1. 
51 Directive 2009/50/EEC [2009] OJ L 155/17. 
52 For a literature on this Directive see Steve Peers, “EC Immigration and Asylum Law Attracting and 
Deterring Labour Migration: The Blue Card and Employer Sanctions Directives”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law 11, no. 4 (2009); Elspeth Guild, “EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First look at the 
Commission’s Blue Card Initiative”, CEPS Policy Brief 145/2007, accessed September 2013, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334076>; Lucie Cerna, “The EU Blue Card: 
preferences, policies and negotiations between Member States”, Migration Studies 1, (2013), available at 
http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/07/26/migration.mnt010.full; Elisabeth Collett, 
“The Proposed European Blue Card System: Arming for the Global War on Talent?”, Migration Policy 
Institute 7/1/2008, accessed September 2011, available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=667>.  
53 Directive 2011/98/EU [2011] OJ L 343/1. 
54 On this point see Yves Pascouau, and Sheena McLoughlin, “EU Single Permit Directive: a small step 
forward in EU migration policy”, European Policy Centre Policy Brief, 24/1/2012, accessed September 
2013, available at <http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=3&pub_id=1398>.  
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In light of this historical excursus it is apparent how Member States, particularly 
since the advent of the oil crisis, have been continually focused on protecting their 
borders from threat of third country nationals.55 Moreover, the process of border 
strengthening did not just involve illegal migration or asylum issues but touched also 
the field of legal migration.  
 
3. Enhancing free movement of people (EU nationals) 
3.1. Promoting mobility by extending free movement also to non-workers 
The development of the process of strengthening the EU borders was 
accompanied, in parallel, by the continuous pursuit of the right free movement of 
people.56 The two trends are inextricably linked as “freer movement for EU citizens has 
brought with it tighter controls on movement by non-EU citizens […].”57 
As seen in the previous chapter free movement was born having workers, 
originally in particular Italian workers, in mind. The implementing regulations for the 
right of free movement, for example, provided for the right to take up a job activity as 
an employed person.58 For some years, since the creation of the Union till the eighties, 
the exercise of an “effective and genuine activity” remained the fundamental 
prerequisite for accessing the benefits linked to the status of a migrant worker.59 
However, soon after the introduction of the first legislation on free movement, while 
labour mobility between Member States and third countries increased enormously, 
labour mobility between European workers came to a stalemate.60 In front of the 
stillness of free movement, considering also that the pre oil crisis economic growth had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 On this view see also Daniel Wilsher, “Economic Migration into the European Union: standing at the 
crossroads”, Yearbook of European Law 21, no. 1 (2001).  
56 In this context we are talking about free movement of EU workers/citizens. However, attempts to 
enhance free movement of third country nationals, and therefore their integration in Europe, have recently 
been made over the years. On this point see in particular Sara Iglesias Sanchez, “Free Movement as a 
Precondition for Integration for Third Country Nationals in the EU”, in Illiberal liberal states: 
immigration, citizenship, and integration in the EU, eds. Elspeth Guild, Kees Groenendijk, and Sergio 
Carrera, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009).   
57 Geddes, supra note 8, 32, 46. It is interesting to note that Art. 48(1) of the Treaty of Rome made no 
reference to the fact that free movement was to be exercised only by the nationals of Member States. On 
this point see Anne P. Van Der Mei, Free Movement of Persons Within the European Community: Cross-
Border Access to Public Benefits, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), 28. 
58 Ibid., 48. Until Council Regulation 1612/1968/EEC, Member States were still able to control entry, 
residence and access to employment. After this regulation they were no longer capable to do so because 
their competence in this area was ceded at supranational level.  
59 Geddes, supra note 8, 32. See Levin (Case 53/8 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035) 
and Lebon (Case 316/85 Centre public d'aide sociale de Courcelles v Marie-Christine Lebon [1987] ECR 
281). 
60 Van Der Mei, supra note 57, 26.  
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largely solved the Italian unemployment problem,61 the EU started to refer to free 
movement of workers not as a macroeconomic need but more as an individualistic right. 
Indeed, shortly after the adoption of Regulation 1612/1968/EEC, Lionello Levi Sandri 
referred to free movement as an embryonic form of European citizenship.62  
From the early CJEU case law it is evident how the Court immediately started to 
interpret free movement provisions broadly in order to promote mobility. This 
originally consisted of extending the conditions of free movement outside the original 
category of workers and provide total equality among European nationals coming from 
different Member States. The Court in particular focused on the definition of the term 
“worker” and insisted that this was a matter for EU law and not national law because if 
the definition was a matter relegated to national law competence “it would therefore be 
possible for each Member State to modify the meaning of the concept of migrant 
worker and to eliminate at will the protection afforded by the Treaty to certain 
categories of persons”.63 To this extent, immediately, it highlighted that part time 
workers should be covered by free movement rules too and that it is not relevant if 
workers have to supplement their income from private sources64 or public funds from 
the Member State.65 On the same matter, some time later, the Court made a step forward 
and defined as genuine and effective work the essential feature of an employment 
relationship according to which “for a certain period of time a person performs services 
for and under the direction of another person in return of which he receives 
remuneration”,66 regardless the amount of pay or even when payment is not existent at 
all.67 Furthermore the Court pointed out that, despite the silence of Art. 45 TFEU, also 
the job seekers can benefit from free movement laws,68 showing clearly its purposive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid.  
62 Bulletin of the European Communities, vol. 1(11), 1968, at 6. 
63 Case 75/63 Hoeckstra v. Bestuur der BedriJfsvereninging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten [1964] 
ECR 177, 184.  
64 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035. Although the Court in Levin made 
clear that the reason for undertaking work was not to be relevant to his genuineness, in other cases the 
Court examined the purpose of the work performed. To this end, in the Bettray case (Case 344/87 Bettray 
v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 1612) the fact that the only purpose of the job was to 
rehabilitate the person rather than a genuine economic need triggered a ruling against the applicant. In 
Brown (Case 197/86 Brown v. Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 3205) the fact that the 
applicant was undertaking a job in order to pay for his university courses in Cambridge did not entitle 
him to all the same social advantages as a fully-fledged worker under EU law.  
65 Case 139/85 Kempf v. Staatsecretaris vaan Justitie [1986] ECR 1741. 
66 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v. land Baden Wurttemberg [1986] ECR 2121.  
67 Case 196/87 Steymann v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159.  
68 Case 48/75 Procureur du Roi v Royer [1976] ECR 497, para. 31; Case 292/89 R. v. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal, ex p. Antonissen, [1991], ECR I-745. 
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approach in suggesting a wider scope for Art. 45 that its words could actually convey.69 
Finally, the Court interpreted the secondary free movement legislation in a broad 
manner, in particular with regard to equality. Art. 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68/EEC 
provided for the same social and tax advantages for nationals and non-nationals, pushed 
for equal access to vocational training and declared void any discriminatory provisions 
of collective or individual employments agreements. Initially, the Court read this article 
limitedly and ruled that it concerned just benefits concerning with employment.70 
Shortly after however, the Court departed from this interpretation and stated that Art. 
7(2) should be read to include also social and tax advantages, to apply not just to 
workers but also to surviving family members of a deceased worker or to any family 
member that provides an indirect advantage to the worker.71 
By the end of the eighties, in the light of the steps made by the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence, the European legislator was ready to act again. In 1989, the Commission 
withdrew its proposal of a Directive on the right of residence of all nationals of a 
Member State on the territory of another Member State72 and instead of a single 
directive extending the right of residence to all citizens the Commission73 proposed 
three “Residency Directives” (90/364/EEC74, 90/365/EEC75, 90/366/EEC76) that opened 
the right of movement and residence also to students, retired persons and more 
generally to all the economically inactive persons.77 The Residency Directives extended 
the scope of residence rights to non-economically active migrants and their third 
country national family members, provided they were covered by sickness insurance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Paul Craig, Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 727.  
70 Case 76/72 Michel S. v. Fonds National de Reclassement Handicapes [1973] ECR 457.  
71 Case 32/75 Cristini v. SNCF [1975] ECR 1085, Case 63/76 Inzirillo v. Caisse d’Allocations Familiales 
de l’Arrondissement de Lyon [1976] ECR I-2957; Case 94/84 ONE v. Deak [1985] ECR I-1873; Case 
152/82 Forcheri v. Belgium [1983] ECR I-2323; Case 65/81 Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-
Wurttenberg [1982] ECR 33.  
72 COM (79) 215 final. 
73 The Commission decided to change its approach given the fact that multiple amendments had made its 
proposal more restrictive than existing policies. For this reason the Commission realized that the draft 
Directive was no longer appropriate to enable the Council to reach positive conclusions on that issue.  
74 OJ 1990, L 180/26; concerning a general right of residence. 
75 OJ 1990, L 180/28; concerning a right of residence for pensioners. 
76 OJ 1990, L 180/26; concerning a right of residence for students; after annulment by the CJEU (in Case 
295/90 European Parliament v. Council [1992] ECR I-4193) replaced by Directive 93/96/EEC, OJ 1993, 
L 317/59. For a summary of the case see Siofra O’Leary, “Case note on Case C-295/90 European 
parliament v. Council, Judgment of 7th of July 1992”, Common Market Law Review 30, no. 3 (1993).  
77 The Commission previously proposed to introduce a generalized right of residence into EU law already 
in 1979. The idea of a single directive granting a general right of residence to community nationals and 
not just to workers was strongly supported by Adonnino (see first report of the Commission on the 
Citizen Europe).  
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and had sufficient resources not to become a burden on the host Member State’s welfare 
system.  
The introduction of the Residency Directives and of the concept of EU 
citizenship in Maastricht,78 gave the Court a source of inspiration in order to pursue the 
objective of creating an area of free movement that all the citizens, despite of being 
involved in a job activity, should be able to enjoy. In order to develop a real right to free 
movement of people, the Court argued for the creation of substantive equality social 
treatment of European nationals neither economically active nor economically self-
sufficient with the nationals of the host Member State. One of the first leading cases in 
this field was Martinez Sala79 which concerned a Spanish national, resident in 
Germany, who applied for a child raising allowance under national law despite not 
being a worker and being in receipt of social assistance. The Court ruled that, as long as 
an EU national is legally resident in another Member State, he/she deserves equal 
treatment with the other Member States’ nationals on a combined reading of Art. 18 and 
20(2) TFEU. A similar reasoning was deployed also in Grzelczyk,80 where a French 
national studying in Belgium was granted the right to apply for a social assistance 
scheme as all the other Belgian students owing to the application of Directive 
93/96/EEC and Art. 18 TFEU. 
 Little by little, the Court engaged more and more with the concept of free 
movement of European citizens not occupied in an economic activity. In the Baumbast 
case,81 the CJEU relied on the weight of the concept of Union citizenship, and ruled that 
“although before the Treaty on European Union entered into force the Court had held 
that that right of residence, conferred directly by the EC Treaty, was subject to the 
condition that the person concerned was carrying on an economic activity within the 
meaning of Articles 48, 52 or 59 of the EC Treaty […] it is none the less the case that, 
since then, Union Citizenship has been introduced into the EC Treaty and Article 18(1) 
EC has conferred a right, for every citizen, to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States”.82 In the given case therefore Mr. Baumbast was granted the 
right of residing in the UK although he was not longer a worker there. Although the 
Court specified that the right of residence as simple citizens of the Union was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The concept of EU citizenship will be discussed later in the chapter.  
79 Case 85/96 Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691.  
80 Case 184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies – Louvain la Neuve [2001] ECR I-
6193. 
81 Case 413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I- 7091. 
82 Ibid., para 81.  
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absolute83, the Court also made clear that any limitations and conditions imposed on 
that right had to be applied in compliance with EU law and in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality.84 The interpretation offered in Baumbast strongly diluted 
the link between the economic status of a worker and the right to free movement. Being 
a worker that took up an economic activity in another Member State was not anymore 
the only way to see the right of residence in another Member State recognized. In other 
words, the concept of the worker was still important in order to determine the scope of 
application of EU law but “failure to qualify as a worker did not entail anymore an 
immediate failure to being granted rights by Community law.”85 The same reasoning 
was adopted later on in Trojani,86 in which a French national was allowed the right to 
apply for the Belgian minimex on the base of Art. 18 TFEU deriving his status as legal 
resident from the concept of EU citizenship alone. 
The approach of the CJEU was not simply confined to some law cases but 
reflected broader normative aspirations. These aspirations eventually found their way.87 
In 2001 the Commission pointed out that “residence rights were becoming an integral 
part of the legal heritage of every citizen of the European Union and, for this reason, 
had to be formalized in a common corpus of legislation, irrespective of the fact that they 
(citizens) pursued a gainful activity or not.”88 It was therefore necessary, as it was stated 
in recital 3 of the preamble of the proposal, “to codify and review the existing 
Community instruments dealing separately with workers, self-employed persons, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ibid., para 87: “As regards the limitations and conditions resulting from the provisions of secondary 
legislation, Article 1(1) of Directive 90/364/EEC provides that Member States can require of the nationals 
of a Member State who wish to enjoy the right to reside within their territory that they themselves and the 
members of their families be covered by sickness insurance in respect of all risks in the host Member 
State and have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence.” 
84 Ibid., para 91.  
85 Agustin J. Menedez, “European Citizenship after Martizez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law 
Become More Human but Less Social?”, in The past and the future of EU law: the classics of EU law 
revisited on the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaty, eds. Miguel P. Maduro and Loic Azoulai, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2010), 21. See also Dora Kostakopoulou, “European Union Citizenship: Writing the 
Future”, European Law Journal 13,  no. 5 (2007).  
86 Case 456/02 Troyani v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles [2004], ECR I-7573. 
87 On this point see Ferdinand Wollenschlager, “The judiciary, the legislature and the evolution of Union 
citizenship”, in The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market, ed. Phil Syrpis, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 302. From the same volume see also Niamh N. Shuibhne, “The Third 
Age of EU citizenship: Directive 2004/38/EC in the case law of the Court of Justice”, 331. Both the 
authors in these pieces, looking at the concept of EU citizenship, try to explore the difficult relationship 
between legislation and judiciary, especially in terms of their institutional positions. In the first piece the 
author reminds us that Directive 2004/38/EC is a way to codify and develop personal free movement 
rights and not to limit the activity of the Court, although in some cases such as Metock the discrepancy 
between legislation and the Court becomes too evident. In the second piece instead the author shows how 
both the legislature and the judiciary are trying to fill gaps for the protection of EU citizenship rights.   
88 Commission Proposal on Commission Directive 2004/38/EC OJ C 270 E, 25.9.2001, 150. 
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well as students and other inactive persons in order to simplify and strengthen the right 
of free movement and residence of all Union citizens.” In April 2004 the scattered 
framework of secondary law on free movement of persons, from the sixties until the 
Residency Directives, was consolidated into one single instrument: Directive 
2004/38/EC.89 This directive aimed to ‘simplify and strengthen’ Union citizens right of 
free movement and residence.90 As the Economic and Social Committee itself 
underlined, this directive was “a step forward, as it comprehensively recognized the 
right of every Union citizen to move and reside freely in any Member State.”91 For the 
first time in the secondary legislation all the European citizens regardless of being 
workers or not, were entitled to move and reside within the European Union. Since 
2006 all the citizens, and not just workers, with a valid identity card or passport are 
officially entitled to enter in the territory of another Member State up until a period of 
three months without any conditions or formalities other than the required identity 
documents.92 European citizens are also entitled to enter and stay in another Member 
State for a period superior of three months if, apart from being in possession of the 
required identity documents, they are also workers or self-employed persons in the 
Member State, or have sufficient resources for themselves and their families and they 
are covered by a sickness insurance, or are attending their studies or a vocational 
training and have sufficient economical resources and are covered by a sickness 
insurance, or are companying EU family members of a EU citizen satisfying one of the 
previously listed conditions.93 Finally, if a Union citizen has resided legally and 
continuously for a period of at least five years within the host Member State he/she is 
entitled to the right of permanent residence.94 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Directive 2004/38/EC [2004] OJ L 158/77.  
90 Preamble of Directive 2004/38/EC, third recital.  
91 OJ 2002, C 149/46. 
92 Art. 6(1).  
93 Art. 7(1). Third country national EU family members are allowed to enter the territory of the host 
Member State without showing any document. Art. 5 brings Directive 2004/38/EC completely into line 
with the ruling of MRAX (Case 459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l' antisémitisme et la xénophobie 
ASBL (MRAX) v Belgian State [2002] ECR I-6591) which will be discussed more in detail in the next 
chapter.  
94 Art. 16(1). Directive 2004/38/EC introduced also some novelties with regards to the previous free 
movement legislation. Whereas, for example, Art. 10(1) of Council Regulation 1612/1968/EEC talked 
about the “right of installation” of the family members of the worker “who is a national of one Member 
State and who is employed in the territory of another Member State”, Directive 2004/38/EC abandons the 
old economic orientation by recognizing as beneficiaries of the Directive all the Union citizens who have 
exercised their right to move and reside and their family members who join and accompany them (Art. 
3(1)). The group of family members allowed to reunify with the EU citizen, once again, are the same as 
the ones listed in the secondary legislation of the sixties. However, the new conceptions of what a family 
group entails saw a change of treatment of unmarried partners (On this point see the proposal of the 
Commission on the Citizens Directive at page 7 and 8). Directive 2004/38/EC includes registered 
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3.2 Promoting mobility through the application of the market access model 
In parallel to the attempt of extending the right of free movement to a broader 
category of sponsors than simply workers, the Court worked on the enhancement of the 
right of free movement of persons by interpreting it in accordance to the market access 
model. As Barnard highlights, there are two approaches underpinning the Common 
Market: the centralized and the decentralized model. While the centralized model 
consists in establishing a single set of rules to apply to all the Member States 
(harmonization), the decentralized model leaves the freedom to regulate matters to the 
Member States as long as the national rules do not create obstacles to movement.95 With 
particular regard to this second model, the key principles that characterize it are non-
discrimination96 and market access. The non-discrimination model, despite its utility, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
partnerships, within the protected families, and also requires Member States more generally to facilitate 
the admission of companions of a durable relationship (Art. 3 (1) in connection with Art. 2 (2), the direct 
descendants and the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line include those of the spouse or 
registered partner). On this point see Craig, de Burca, supra note 69, 753. See Citizen Directive at Art. 
2(2)(b) and Art. 3(1). The Directive introduced some novelties also with regard to divorced couples. 
Before the introduction of the Directive the Court was called to face this issue. With regards to the 
category of the spouse the Court ruled that the spouse remains a spouse until the marriage is fully 
dissolved, regardless the state of divorce proceedings or the separation of the spouse. In Singh (Case 
370/90 R. v. IAT and Singh ex parte Secretary of State [1992] ECR I-4265) the Court stated that even if 
between the EU spouse and the third country national spouse a decree nisi of divorce occurred, the third 
country national spouse does not lose the right of residence while the marriage was still actually in 
existence (para 12). A similar outcome can be noticed in the Diatta case (Case 267/83 Diatta v. Land 
Berlin [1985] ECR 567). A.G. Darmon stated that the expression “to install themselves with the worker” 
adopted by Art. 10 Regulation 1612/68/EEC could not be interpreted restrictively in the sense that the 
third country national had to be obliged to live under the same roof of the worker (Opinion Diatta page 
572). Therefore, according to him, since Ms. Diatta was just separated from the husband and living in a 
different house but, nevertheless, the marital relationship was not dissolved, Ms. Diatta could rely on Art. 
10 and, therefore, could be granted the right to stay (Opinion Diatta, 570). The Court followed the same 
approach and further held that “the marital relationship cannot be regarded as dissolved as long as it has 
not been terminated by the competent authority”(Diatta, para. 20). Later on the Court in Baumbast also 
ruled that that a non EU national spouse could, after the divorce, continue residing in the host Member 
State under EU law where the children, whether or not they had EU nationality, were exercising their 
educational rights under article 2 of the regulation and the divorced third country national spouse was 
their primary career (para. 64 et seq.). The Court’s activity on this issue was finally crystallized in Art. 13 
Directive 2004/38/EC. Art. 13 now provides that even after divorce, annulment of marriage or 
termination of a civil partnership, the right of residence of the family members who are non-EU nationals 
will not be affected. With regard to the other relatives who do not belong to the core group of family 
member, Art. 3 of the Directive eliminated the requirement of living under the same roof and simply 
stated that those who are entitled to get a facilitation in entering the state are those who, despite of not 
belonging to the core family members group, “are dependants or members of the household of the Union 
citizen having the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds strictly require the personal 
care of the family member by the Union citizen” (Art. 3(2)(a) Citizen Directive 2004/38/EC) or are “the 
partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested” (Art. 3(2)(b). Finally, once 
again, all these rights are granted regardless the nationality of the family member (Art. 3(2)(a) Citizen 
Directive 2004/38/EC).  
95 Catherine Barnard, “The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms”, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 18.  
96 Ibid. The principle of discrimination on the ground of nationality is a core principle of EU law and 
pursues equality between workers, goods, services and capital coming from different Member States. In 
particular, “this model presupposes that domestic and imported goods, and national and migrant persons, 
services and capital are similarly situated and that they should be treated in the same way”. 
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does not guarantee the perfect functioning of the Common Market since it still allows 
barriers to movement to remain by permitting “the host state to impose its own rules on 
imported goods/migrants provided those rules apply equally to domestic 
goods/persons”.97 The limits of non-discrimination triggered the introduction of the 
market access model. Unlike non-discrimination, according to market access the 
national rules posing obstacles to the market are always unlawful, irrespective they 
discriminate or not foreign goods or migrants.98  
The market access model was applied for the first time in free movement of 
goods cases involving non-fiscal measures such as quantitative restrictions and 
measures having quantitative effect. In the famous Dassonville case99 the Court ruled 
out the legality of a Belgian national provision without basing its reasoning on 
discrimination but simply stating that “all trading rules enacted by Member States 
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra 
Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions”.100 Dassonville, according to Craig and De Burca, also sowed 
the seeds which bore fruit in the Cassis de Dijon case.101 The applicant wanted to 
import a liqueur from France to Germany but the German authorities refused the 
importation because the drink was not sufficiently alcoholic. The Court pointed out that, 
although the national rule was not discriminatory towards the French product because it 
was applied exactly the same also to German products, “the minimum alcohol content 
for the purposes of sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an obstacle to trade which is 
incompatible with the provision of Art. 30 of the Treaty.”102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid., 19.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
100 Ibid., para. 5.  
101 Craig, De Burca, supra note 69, 640.  
102 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, para. 
14. Other more recent cases concerning free movement of goods have referred to market access. Among 
all see Monsees (Case 350/97 Wilfried Monsees v. Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für Kärnten [1999] 
ECR I-2921) where the Court said that Austrian rules stating maximum journey time and distances for the 
transport of animals before being slaughtered constituted an obstacle to free movement of goods; 
Commission v. Austria (Case 320/03 Commission v. Austria [2005] ECR I-7929) in which the Court 
stated that the prohibition for heavy goods to be driven along the motorway A12 obstructed free 
movement of goods and Case 110/05 Commission v. Italy (trailers), [2009] ECR I-519. More recently the 
issue of what it means to hinder the market access has been raised. In some cases it consists with the 
actual interference with trade (Case 65/05 Commission v. Greece (computer games) [2006] ECR I-
10341). In some other cases obstacles of market access can be considered to occur when the national rule 
generate additional costs (Case 270/02 Commission v. Italy (foodstuffs for sportsmen and women) [2004] 
ECR I-1559; Case 189/95 Public Prosecutor v. Harry Franzen [1997] ECR I-5909). A.G. Poiares 
Maduro specified instead that “a measure constitutes a barrier to access to a national market where it 
protects the acquired positions of certain economic operators on a national market or where in makes 
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As hinted before, although the model of market access arose in particular with 
regard to free movement of goods soon after it started to be applied also to cases of free 
movement of workers and to freedom of establishment and the provision of services. 
The Bosman103 ruling is a clear example of application of market access to free 
movement of workers cases. The CJEU found that the transfer system developed by 
national and transnational football associations was in breach of Art. 45 TFEU because, 
despite not being discriminatory since it applied in the same way both to national and 
non-national teams, it was found to still directly affect players’ access to the 
employment market in other Member States.104 Moreover, the Court went even forward 
in the adoption of the market access model by scrutinizing national rules that just 
potentially could be capable to prohibit, impede or restrict the individual right of free 
movement.105  This formulation has been adopted in Gebhard106 in which the Court 
stated that national measures that are able to hinder or make less attractive the exercise 
of the fundamental freedoms are in breach of the Treaty.  
The Court made use of the market access formula also in free movement of 
workers cases, often recurring to the words “restriction” or “obstacle” to free 
movement.107 This is the same formulation that we will see applied in many cases 
concerning free movement of citizens and third country nationals starting from Singh, as 
it will be seen in the next chapter.  
In the light of this analysis it seems that over the years free movement of 
persons has developed both as a right to be applicable also to non workers and as a 
primary aim to be achieved by the Union, to the extent that every single national 
measure that hinders it should be considered an unlawful obstacle to such freedom.  
 
4. Introduction of the concept of EU citizenship  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intra-trade more difficult than trade within the national market” see joined Cases 158/04 and 159/04 Alfa 
Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Greek State [2006] ECR I-8135, para. 44.  
103 Case 415/93 Football Association ASLB v Jean- Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
104 The Bosman ruling has been applied in other following cases such as Case 464/02 Commission v. 
Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929 and Case 232/01 Openbaar Ministerie v. Hans van Lent [2003] ECR I-
11525. 
105 Case 76/90 Sager v. Dennemeyer & Co Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221.  The same principle was applied in 
Kraus (see Case 19/92 Kraus v. Land Baden-Wuerttemberg [1993] ECR I-1663), according to which the 
national measure, although it was not discriminatory, “was liable to hamper or to render less attractive the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties”.  
106 Case 55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e dei Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-8453.  
107 Barnard, supra note 95, 256.  
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Up until the mid seventies the concept of European citizenship108 was still 
completely alien to the European plethora.109 In 1992 the new concept of Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Literature on the concept of EU citizenship is abundant. See Jo Shaw, “Citizenship: Contrasting 
Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism”, in The Evolution of EU Law, eds. 
Grainne de Burca, Paul Craig, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Luigi Moccia, Diritti 
Fondamentali e Cittadinanza dell’Unione Europea, (Milano: Franco Angeli publishing, 2010); Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, “Europa: Nous coalisons des États nous n’unissons pas des homes”, in La Sostenibilita’ 
della democrazia nel XXI secolo, eds. Marta Cartabia, and Andrea Simoncini, (Bologna: Il Mulino 
publishers, 2009); Dora Kostakopoulou, “European Union Citizenship: The Journey Goes On”, in Fifty 
years of European integration: foundations and perspectives, eds. Andrea Ott, and Ellen Vos (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2009); Jo Shaw, “The Constitutional Development of Citizenship in the EU 
Context: With or Without the Treaty of Lisbon”, in Ceci n’est pas une constitution-constitutionalism 
without constitution?, eds. Ingolf Pernice, and Evgeni Tanchev, (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009); Patrick Dollat, La Citoyennete’ Europeenne: Theorie et Status, (Brussels: 
Bruylant Ed., 2008); Xavier Groussot, “Principled Citizenship’ and the Process of European 
Constitutionalization—From a Pie in the Sky to a Sky with Diamonds”, in General Principles of EC law 
in  a process of development, eds. Ulf Bernitz, Joakim Nergelius, Cecilia Cardner, and Xavier Groussot, 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluver, 2008) ; Stefan Kadelbach, “Union Citizenship”, in Principles of 
European constitutional law, eds. Armin von Bogdandy, Jurgen Bast, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006); Jo 
Shaw, “The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship”, in Modern Law Review 61, no. 3 (1998); 
Massimo La Torre, European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998); Siofra O’ Leary, The evolving concept of Community Citizenship, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996); Ferdinand Wollenschläger, “A New Fundamental Freedom Beyond 
Market Integration: Union Citizenship and Its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of 
European Integration”, European Law Journal 17, no. 1 (2011); Niamh N. Shuibhne, “The Resilience of 
EU Market Citizenship”, Common Market Law Review 47,  no. 6 (2010); Dimitry Kochenov, “Ius 
Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights”, 
Columbia Journal of European Law 15, (2008); Willem Maas, “Unrespected, Unequal, Hollow?: 
Contingent Citizenship and Reversible Rights in the European Union”, Columbia Journal of European 
Law 15, (2009); Miriam Aziz, “Implementation as the Test Case of European Union Citizenship”, 
Columbia Journal of European Law 15, (2009); Eleanor Spaventa, “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees?: 
On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects”, in Common Market Law Review 45, 
no. 1 (2008); Dora Kostakopoulou, “European Citizenship: Writing the Future”, European Law Journal 
13, no. 5 (2007); Francis G. Jacobs, “Citizenship of the European Union—A Legal Analysis”, European 
Law Journal 13, no. 5 (2007); Matthew Elmore, Peter Starup, “Union Citizenship— Background, 
Jurisprudence, and Perspective: The Past, Present, and Future of Law and Policy”, Yearbook of European 
Law 26, (2007); Michael Dougan, “The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union 
Citizenship”, European Law Review 31, (2006); Dora Kostakopoulou, “Ideas, Norms, and European 
Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change”, Modern Law Review 68, no. 2 (2005); Gareth Davies, 
“Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence is the New Nationality”, in European Law Journal 11, no. 1 
(2005); Robin C.A. White, “Free Movement, Equal Treatment and Citizenship of the Union”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54, no. 4 (2005); Gianluigi Palombella, “Whose Europe? 
After the Constitution: A Goal-Based Citizenship”, in International Law Journal of Constitutional Law 3, 
(2005); Cris Shore, “Whither European Citizenship?: Eros and Civilization Revisited”, European Journal 
of Social Theory 7, no. 1 (2004); Dora Kostakopoulou, “Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the 
European Union: Bringing Out the Complexity”, Columbia Journal of European Law 5, (1999); Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, “To Be a European Citizen— Eros and Civilization”, in The Constitution of Europe: Do the 
new clothes have an emperor and other essays on European integration, ed. Joseph H.H. Weiler, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Dora Kostakopoulou, “Towards a Theory of 
Constructive Citizenship in Europe”, Political Philosophy 4, no. 4 (1996); Dimitry Kochenov, 
“Citizenship Without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal”, (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
08/10, 2010), accessed Mary 2013, available at 
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citizenship was introduced. This concept was located “immediately after principles and 
before Community policies, and this marked out its general importance within the 
system of the Treaty”.110 In this part I will briefly show the process that led to the birth 
of the concept of EU citizenship and how this concept was interpreted as a source of 
independent rights by the CJEU.  
The concept of European citizenship was not born suddenly in the Maastricht 
Treaty but it was the result of an ongoing process. It was the year 1967 when Walter 
Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission, in his speech for the 10th 
anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome, stressed how the achievement of the 
free movement of workers was a step to be taken in order to allow the blossoming of the 
European integration.111 The issue of European integration was raised seriously in the 
debate during the Paris Summit of October 1972.112 The spirit of the summit was in 
fact, apart from the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union, clearly based on 
finding solutions for improving the integration and the social and political face of 
Europe. This can be noticed in the summit declaration: “the Member States reaffirm 
their resolve to base their community development on democracy, freedom of opinion, 
free movement of men and ideas and participation by the people through their freely 
elected representatives” and in the opening speech of the President of the French 
Republic George Pompidou: “Europe, the community of prosperity, must not become a 
community of inflation. But Europe must not become a community of tradesmen. 
Europe must be designed and constructed in the service of mankind.”113 
The willingness to promote integration in Europe characterized also the Paris 
Summit of December 1974. The task of this second summit was to overcome all the 
difficulties deriving from a profound recession of the oil crisis by giving a new 
momentum to the process of European unification.114 Practically, Heads of the 
Government were instructed with the task of verifying “the possibility of establishing a 
passport union”115 and to give to the citizens of the Member States “special rights as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Massimo Codinanzi, Alessandra Lang, and Bruno Nascimbene, Citizenship of the Union and Freedom 
of Movement of Persons, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 1. 
111 Walter Hallstein, “Halfway to Europe Unity”, EU speech held in occasion of the 10th anniversary of 
the signature of the Rome Treaty, published in Die Zeith, 17 and 24 March 1967, accessed March 2012, 
available at the Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburgh, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/13606/01/S22.pdf>.  
112 The Paris Summit of 1972 was called mainly to establish a Monetary Union by 1980. However, the 
outcome of this summit went far beyond what was originally thought and ended up discussing many other 
issues such as cooperation and integration. 
113 Bulletin of the European Communities, vol. 5(11), 1972, at 14.  
114 Bulletin of the European Communities, vol. 7(12), 1974, 6, para. 1102. 
115 Bulletin of the European Communities, vol. 7(12), 1974, 8, para. 10. 
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members of the community”.116 Although there was not a definition of these special 
rights it was argued that “the linking of the concept of citizens and special rights might 
even suggest that the will existed to confirm the civil and political character of these 
special rights”.117  
It was 1976 when finally Tindemas, the Belgian prime minister at the time, was 
asked to prepare a report on the overall concept of European Union.118 Among the 
various policies he developed, he dedicated the whole paragraph IV of his report to the 
“Citizen’s Europe”.119Although, again, he did not mention expressly the word European 
citizenship, he referred to “Europeans” as people of a unique country. Tindemans 
believed in fact that, in order for Europe to be close to its citizens, it was necessary “to 
adopt a further protection of the rights of the Europeans” and to pursue “a concrete 
manifestation of European solidarity by means of external signs discernible in everyday 
life”120.  
The Tindemans Report did not have immediate direct consequences on the 
development of the concept of European citizenship.121 It was just ten years after the 
1974 Paris Summit that some concrete actions were taken. In the middle of the eighties, 
the debate on European citizenship restarted under the more committed and more driven 
motivation of giving to the citizens of Europe a deeper identity and image, within 
Europe and towards external countries.122This trend was made apparent in the 
Fountainbleau European Council of 1984.123 In this occasion an Ad Hoc Committee 
was set up to promote the identity and the image of the Union. The results of this 	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117 Guido Van de Berghe, Political rights for European citizens, (Gower Publishing Company Limited, 
1982), 32.  
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120 Ibid., 26. 
121 Although no concrete action was taken immediately after the Tindemans report, the idea of citizenship 
was still present. In October 1978, in Florence, the Round Table Conference on “Special Rights and a 
European Community Civil Rights Charter” organized by the European Parliament with the participation 
of representatives of the Community Institutions, members of the national parliaments and experts in 
general, took place. At that time “nobody wanted a super constitution” but simply a “transformation from 
a Community of states to a community of people” (See proceedings of the round table on special rights 
and a charter of the rights of citizens of the European community and related documents, Florence, 26-28 
October 1978, Luxemburg, European parliament, September 1979.) and EU citizenship was considered 
the adequate instrument to get to that stage. 
122 Mehan argued that the strengthening of the European Union as a political unified entity, allowed a 
“resuscitation of the idea of citizen as human being”. Elisabeth Mehan, Citizenship and the European 
Community, (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 147.  
123 Bulletin of the European Communities, June 1984, N. 6.The Fountainbleau European Council was 
held on the 25-26 of June 1984. The conclusions of this Council put a particular emphasis on the 
necessity to strengthen and promote the identity and the image of the European Community among its 
citizens and in the world. 
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summit were two reports from the Ad Hoc Committee on a People’s Europe that took 
the name after their chairman, Mr. Adonnino. The first of these reports was specifically 
focused on certain matters such as freedom of movement and wider opportunity for 
workers relating to employment and residence.124 The second report instead gave a 
concrete shape to the concept of special rights to be associated to the idea of European 
citizenship (such as the participation of citizens in the political process of the Member 
states or the need of assistance in case of travelling outside the community).125  
Simultaneously, some lawyers started to talk about “incipient form of European 
citizenship” looking at the case law of the CJEU. The Court in fact, in some of its cases, 
began to interpret the treaty rights of free movement and non-discrimination with the 
willingness of extending them also to people that did not belong to the traditional group 
of economically active persons protected by the EEC Treaty (workers, self employed 
and service providers).126 In Gravier,127 for example, a French national who was 
studying for a course in strip-cartoon design in Belgium was granted the right not to pay 
an additional fee for non Belgians under the now Art. 18 TFEU (the right of not being 
discriminated on the grounds of nationality), although she was not involved in a job 
activity. Similarly, in Cowan,128 a British tourist in France was granted compensation 
for victim of violent crime through the application of Art. 18 TFEU despite not being a 
worker but a recipient of services. Following the CJEU approach, in the nineties 
secondary legislation regulating the right of residence of the economically inactive was 
introduced too.129 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall the development of European citizenship was 
finally advanced. In the changed geopolitical context, one of the main key concerns of 
the Dublin Summit of April 1990 was to shape the future political Union by introducing 
European citizens’ rights. One of the questions that the states submitted to the Council 
was: “how will the Union include and extend the notion of Community citizenship 	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The Evolution of EU Law, eds. Grainne de Burca, Paul Craig, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
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127 Case 293/87 Gravier v. City of Liege [1985] ECR 593.  
128 Case 186/87 Cowan v. Le Tresor public [1989] ECR 195. In this case the Court referred to Luisi and 
Carbone (Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377) in which 
the Court, for the first time, confirmed that the Treaty covers the situation of recipients as well as 
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129 Council Directive 90/366/EEC on the right of residence of students [1990] OJ L 180/30, replaced by 
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carrying with it specific rights (human, political, social, the right of complete free 
movement and residence etc.) for the citizens of Member States by virtue of these states 
belonging to the Union?”130 In this backdrop, it was the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe 
Gonzales that urged the official inclusion of the concept of European citizenship in the 
European Community Treaty.131 By the time that the Heads of governments reconvened 
in Dublin, they agreed to call for another Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on 
political union parallel with the one on the EMU.132 In preparation of the IGC, Spain 
tried to define the concept of European citizenship in a memorandum called “Towards a 
European Citizenship”.133The content of this memorandum was based on the idea that 
the European citizen was not just a privileged foreigner but also a fundamental actor in 
the life of the European Institutions. It underlined how the European citizen had to be 
conceived as a subject with duties and rights stemming not just from the Member States 
but also from the Community.134  
The following European Council held in Rome in October 1990 unfolded this 
statement by listing a number of defined rights: right to participate to the election of the 
European Parliament and local elections, freedom of movement irrespective of the 
economic activity, protection of citizens outside the EU border and right to petition to 
Obudsman.135 The result of the European Council of Rome was adopted by the Treaty 
of Maastricht for the first time.136Part II of the Maastricht Treaty was completely 
dedicated to the citizenship of the Union. Art. 8(1) stated “every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union 
shall complement and not replace national citizenship” and Art. 8(2) that “Citizens of 
the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the 
duties imposed thereby”. The other paragraphs of Art. 8 were related to the right to 
freedom of movement of European Citizens (art. 8 a) who have the right to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, right to vote in the municipal 	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135 Rome European Council 27, 28 October 1990. The Rome Council, however, failed to identify duties 
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elections and in the elections of the European Parliament (art. 8 b), protection of the 
diplomatic and consular authorities of any other Member State in any territory of third 
countries (art. 8 c), right to petition to the European Parliament and to the Ombudsman 
(art. 8 d). Nothing more was added in the Amsterdam Treaty whereas the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed at Nice in 2000, included a full 
Chapter (Chapter V) totally dedicated to Citizens’ Rights. This chapter however just 
added the rights of good administration and the right of access to documents (Arts 41 
and 42) but it basically ended up replicating the provisions already mentioned in the 
previous Treaties. Finally, in December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
Although the main structure of the articles dedicated to European citizenship remained 
more or less the same, two interesting modifications are worthy of notice. First of all, 
the idea that EU citizenship should complement national citizenship has been modified 
with Lisbon. Art. 20 (1) TFEU in fact states that “Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship”. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty makes 
clear that the rights listed in the Treaty are not an exhaustive group but are rights “inter 
alia”.137 
The content of Maastricht on citizenship testified how the Union managed to 
move beyond its economic and market oriented views towards a deeper idea of 
integration. This point was highlighted as well in the Report from the Commission on 
citizenship of the Union, which stressed how “the introduction of these new provisions 
underscores the fact that the Treaty of Rome is not concerned solely with economic 
matters, as is also plainly demonstrated by the change of name of the EEC to the EC.” 
138 Moreover, the following Lisbon Treaty managed to create an even more autonomous 
status of EU citizenship, that now is not just complementary but it is even additional to 
the status of national citizenship, and is willing to encompass a series of rights whose 
Art. 20(2) represents a not exhaustive list. By introducing the concept of EU citizenship 
the legislator has therefore “created a direct political link between the citizens of the 
Member States and the European Union […] with the aim of fostering a sense of 
identity with the Union.”139  
The concept of EU citizenship, far from being an empty shell as some scholars 
suggested, was immediately object of further interpretation by the CJEU. The Court 
interpreted the new concept of EU citizenship according to what is called new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Art. 20(2) TFEU.  
138 COM (93) 702 final.  
139 Ibid. 
	   64	  
constitutionalism, a theory that engages with the question of what it means to be a 
European citizen regardless the classic EU rules of supremacy, direct effect, 
transnationalism and freedom of movement.140 In other words, if in free movement 
cases the Court tried to pair the concept of EU citizenship to free movement, in cases 
concerning static citizens the Court stressed the intrinsic value of the concept of EU 
citizenship as a source of self-standing rights, regardless the exercise of the right of free 
movement.  
 The initial challenges for the Court in these directions concerned the issue of 
wholly internal situations and raising the problem of reverse discrimination,141 	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according to which a static home national may be treated less favorably than someone 
from another Member State who could invoke EU law in similar factual circumstances. 
The CJEU initially ruled142 that the concept of EU citizenship was not intended to 
extend the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty provisions also to internal situations 
that had no link with community law. Hence, situations of discrimination towards 
nationals of the Member State had to be dealt necessarily by the national legislation.143 
Already from this early stage, however, not everybody shared the views of the Court. In 
his opinion in the Shingara case144, A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer seemed to suggest that 
the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty were seriously trying to create a meaningful 	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citizenship status.145 He stated in fact that “the creation of Citizenship of the Union, 
with the corollary […] of freedom of movement for citizens throughout the territory of 
the Member States, represents a considerable qualitative step forward that […] separates 
that freedom (freedom of movement) from its functional or instrumental elements (the 
link with an economic activity or attainment of the internal market) and raises it to the 
level of a genuinely independent right inherent in the political status of the citizens of 
the Union.”146 
 The bold approach of A.G. Colomer was initially isolated.147 Nevertheless, some 
years later, the Court seemed to be more willing to rule favorably also in cases in which 
applicants did not exercise their free movement rights. In Garcia Avello148 and Chen149 
for example “the treaty provisions on citizenship conferred rights on the applicants in a 
situation where they had never left the territory of the Member State other than that of 
the host state.”150 The Garcia Avello case concerned a dispute between Mr. Avello and 
the Belgian state regarding the refusal of the latter to grant his children, of Belgian and 
Spanish nationality, the double surname as in the Spanish tradition. The Court held that, 
in principle, this was a matter that fell within the competence of the Member States. 
However, the simple fact that the children had double nationality and were residing in 
Belgium enabled them, without necessarily having to physically move to another 
Member State, to be granted protection under Art. 18 TFEU on non-discrimination. In 
Garcia Avello, Chen found its roots. Pursuant the peculiarities of Irish citizenship law at 
the relevant time, the daughter of a Chinese couple who was born in Belfast, i.e. UK 
territory, acquired Irish nationality and was thus a Union citizen. When the mother and 
the little daughter decided to move to Cardiff and were refused a residence permit, the 
CJEU held that the little child151 could nevertheless rely on what is now Art. 21 of 
TFEU152. In the first part of the verdict, the Court was engaged in answering the 
objection raised by the English and Irish Government, that upheld how the facts of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Tryfonidou, supra note 143, 143.  
146 Ibid. See also Opinion in Joined Cases 65/95 and 111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1996] ECR I-3343, 
para. 34. 
147 Tryfonidou, supra note 143, 143-144.  
148 Before Garcia Avello also the Micheletti case was decided (Case 369/90. Mario Vicente Micheletti a.o. 
v. Delegación del gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239). Also in this case the Court granted to an 
Italo-Argentinian the right to reside in Spain owing to his Italian citizenship without having ever resided 
in Italy.  
149 Case 200/02 Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-09925. 
150 Craig, De Burca, supra note 69, 830.  
151 The Court found that also the mother had the right of residence on the grounds that she was the 
primary carer of the little Catherine. This specific point will be faced in Chapter 4.  
152 Chen judgment, para. 26.  
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case could be described as purely internal for the simple reason that the little Catherine 
never physically moved from a state to the other and, therefore, protection to her could 
be granted just by the national legislation. To this objection the Court answered by 
stating that the link with EU law could be established even when a person having 
nationality of a Member State resided in another Member State without having 
necessarily exercised his/her right to free of movement.153  
In both Garcia Avello and Chen the Court decided that, in order to be able to be 
granted the more favorable protection under the EU citizenship status, it was not 
necessary to have exercised the right to move to another Member State but the simple 
mismatching of nationalities was enough to make the situation fall under EU 
competence. In more recent years however the Court pushed itself forward considerably 
and begun to offer protection through the use of Art. 20 TFEU, despite the exercise of 
the right of free movement. The Rottman case154 found its grounds in an application 
made by a German national against the German administrative authorities that deprived 
him of his German nationality because they found out that the German citizenship had 
been acquired in a procedure vitiated by fraud. The decision of the German authorities 
to withdraw his German nationality, given that he already lost his Austrian nationality 
of origin once he became German citizen, would have had rendered him stateless and 
deprive him of his status as a Union citizen and of the rights attached to that status. 
Despite many states arguing that the situation was completely internal both the A.G. and 
the Court took a different path. While the advocate general tried to encompass the 
situation within the boundaries of EU competences using the logic of freedom of 
movement,155 the Court simply stated that: “it is clear that the situation of a citizen of 
the Union who, like the applicant in the main proceedings, is faced with a decision 
withdrawing his naturalization, adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and 
placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally 
possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 20 
of the TFEU and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Chen judgment, para. 19 (taken directly from Garcia Avello).  
154 Case 135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449. 
155 In the view of A. G. Maduro the applicant was born Austrian and had only acquired German 
nationality as a result of availing of his free movement rights and settling in that Member State. In other 
words a border had been crossed and movement had occurred, although in the past. Para. 13: “The fact 
nevertheless remains that the exercise by Mr. Rottmann of his right, as a citizen of the Union, to move 
and reside in another Member State had an impact on the change in his civil status: it was because he 
transferred his residence to Germany that he had been able to satisfy the conditions for acquiring German 
nationality, namely, lawful habitual residence within that country’s territory. The existence of such a link 
is sufficient for acceptance of a link with Community law […]”.  
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consequences, within the ambit of European Union law”. In other words, the link with 
EU law became the status of EU citizen itself: the threat of losing the status of EU 
citizen was so great that it was enough to bring the situation within the scope of EU 
law.156  The attempt of the Court to give a more meaningful role to the concept of 
European citizenship strengthened with Zambrano157 and was more delineated in the 
post-Zambrano line of cases, as it will be seen in Chapter 4.  
In conclusion, on the top of the cases involving moving EU citizens, the Court’s 
activity also focused on developing the concept of EU citizenship regardless its 
connection with the right of free movement. This process started conceiving EU 
citizenship as a source of self-stemming rights.  
 
5. Conclusions  
In this chapter I have presented an account of the relevant factors that 
characterized the EU from the post oil crisis.  In particular, it has been noted that while 
free movement and EU citizenship rights became more and more generously fashioned, 
Member States (initially individually and later at intergovernmental and at EU level) 
began to collaborate more closely over the issue of third country national legal and 
illegal immigration. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 have been crucial for the description of the 
historical background underpinning the CJEU’s decisions on the third country national 
residence rights that we are about to discuss. In Chapter 1 it has been pointed out how 
the first family residence rights were introduced as incentives to enhance the movement 
of Italian workers abroad and how this period was characterized by a liberal approach 
towards third country national immigration. In Chapter 2 it has been underlined how, 
while the aim of the EU and of the Court after the 1970s was still the promotion of 
workers and people’s mobility (and the enhancement of the idea of EU citizenship as a 
source of independent rights), the immigration approach towards third country nationals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 O’Leary, supra note 141, 13 et seq. Apart from this discussion scholars interrogated themselves on the 
loss of states’ sovereignty over national rules granting citizenship. It seems that the majority agreed on 
the fact that state sovereignty in deciding who can be citizen of the state was seriously curtailed by the 
CJEU interpretation of the concept of EU citizenship. Among all, on this point see Jessurun H. U. 
d’Oliveira, “Court of Justice of the European Union decision of 2 march 2010, Case C-315/08 Janko 
Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern case note 1: decoupling nationality and Union Citizenship?”, European 
Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 1 (2011); Gerard R. De Groot, and Anja Seling, “Court of Justice of the 
European Union decision of 2 march 2010, Case C-315/08 Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern case note 
2: the consequences of the Rottmann judgement on Member State autonomy – the European Court of 
Justice’s avant-gardism in nationality matters”, European Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 1 (2011); 
Sandra Mantu, “Janko Rottman v. Freistat Baern”, in Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality 
Law 24, no. 2 (2010).   
157 Case 34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-1177. 
 
	   69	  
overall became stricter.  
Border restrictions versus European intra-migratory integration are the base of 
the fundamental EU-Member States clash underpinning family residence right cases 
involving EU citizens and third country nationals. A better understanding of the origins 
of the first free movement provisions and of the historical context in which the case law 
can be placed are crucial to try to decipher the deeper reasoning deployed by the Court 
in its jurisprudence.  
In the next two chapters -Chapters 3 and 4- starting from background delineated 
in the current and in the previous chapter, I will explain how historical circumstances 
and trends exposed before influenced and shaped the outcome of the Court. In order to 
analyse the Court’s jurisprudence I will distinguish between cases concerning free 
moving EU citizens and cases concerning EU static citizens. The free moving EU 
citizens cases concern circumstances in which a cross border movement can be 
individuated. The EU static citizens cases are cases in which the Court had to face 
circumstances in which the free movement legislation could not be applied because the 
sponsor did not exercise his/her right of free movement. In these cases the Court 
legitimately wondered whether the Treaty concept of EU citizenship could be applied 
instead. However, this distinction is not such a clear cut. In fact, to the first group also 
the Eind case was included which, despite the presence of a cross border movement, 
was decided in the light of EU citizenship. At the same time, to the second group, also 
the Chen and the Iida case have been added despite the fact that, in the first case, a sort 
of fictional movement did occur and, in the second one, the EU sponsor did move to 
another Member State. Nevertheless, since in Eind the free movement logic was still 
applied and given that with both Chen and Iida the Court excluded the applicability of 
the free movement legislation and contemplated the possibility of relying on the concept 
of EU citizenship (with a positive result in Chen and with a negative one in Iida), I 
suggest that this subdivision, despite its imperfections, can still be a useful tool to 
understand the differences between the two approaches adopted by the Court.  
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Chapter 3: Free moving EU citizens law cases  
 
1. Introduction  
 In the previous chapters an account of the historical trends and changes 
occurring from the post World War II period to the present has been offered.  Since the 
Treaty of Rome, the Union introduced the idea of free movement, which was soon 
developed in the first Council regulations of the sixties. To these regulations family 
reunification provisions were added as ancillary rights in order to promote the primary 
right of free movement of European workers with the main purpose, at the time, to 
create incentives for Italian workers to move to the northern European Member States. 
However, while in the postwar period immigration was perceived as a resource, after 
the oil crisis Member States developed a suspicious attitude toward third country 
nationals and started to adopt much stricter policies with regard immigration more 
generally. The more stringent approach toward immigration was accompanied by a 
continuous enhancement of free movement rights, which at some point were extended 
to citizens who were not engaged in a working activity, and of the birth and rapid 
development of the concept of EU citizenship.   
 Interestingly, during the first decade after the introduction of the free movement 
legislation no applications concerning the issue of family reunification between EU 
citizens and third country nationals can be found.  Since the eighties several cases 
concerning third country national family members were submitted to the Court, with 
most activity occurring after 2000. Without speculating on the reasons why the Court 
was required to act after twenty years the first family reunification provisions were 
introduced on family reunification issues, it is an interesting coincidence the fact that 
the applications on family reunification cases between EU citizens and third country 
nationals begun to be filed when the immigration concerns, as opposed to the 
enhancement of free movement and EU citizenship, increased.1  
In this chapter I will particularly focus on the analysis of the first group of case 
law concerning the issue of family reunification between EU moving citizens and third 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It could be argued that one of the reasons that triggered the beginning of the Court’s activity was the 
increase of mixed marriages with third country nationals and the fact that the original family reunification 
provisions did not match the new society’s trends any longer. From the nineties the rate of mixed 
marriages increased (see Giampaolo Lanzeri, “Mixed Marriages in Europe: 1990-2010”, in Cross-Border 
Marriage: Global Trends and Diversity, ed. Doo-Sub Kim, published by Korea Institute for Health and 
Social Affairs (KIHASA), available at 
https://www.academia.edu/2565558/Mixed_Marriages_in_Europe_1990-2010) reaching a peak around 
2000  (see data available from 2006 in Research note, Mixed Marriages in the EU, 2008, available at 
http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/attachments/eurostat_mixed_marriages.pdf).  
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country nationals. I will show how these cases found their roots on the interface 
between free movement and Member States’ concerns over immigration, and how these 
two currents ended up shaping the reasoning of the Court. Indeed I will point out that 
the reasoning of the Court, far from being the result of schizophrenic choices, was the 
fruit of the Court’s attempt to accomplish both Member States’ concerns over 
immigration and free movement stances.  Finally I will show that, although the Court 
shaped its reasoning between the trends mentioned above, in its outcomes it prioritized 
free movement protection over immigration concerns.  
This chapter will be divided in nine parts. After this brief introduction, I will 
dedicate parts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to a detailed explanation of the leading law cases on 
this topic starting from Singh2 until Metock3. In this excursus I will show how the Court, 
with the exception of the MRAX4 case, considered in its reasoning both EU free 
movement stances and the Member States’ immigration interests. Finally, part 9 will be 
dedicated to the conclusions. I will underline how free movement and immigration 
concerns have been at the base of the Court’s activity and how its judgments have been 
shaped around these two currents although, overall, eventually their outcome prioritized 
free movement over border protection.  This analysis will point out that the judgments’ 
inconsistencies and incongruities are not the result of the Court’s lack of accuracy but 
find their reason in the bigger willingness of the Court of taking into account both free 
movement and immigration concerns.  
 
2. Singh  
The first case on the issue of family reunification between EU citizens and third 
country nationals, Morson and Jhanjan,5 appeared at the beginning of the eighties and 
set out a basic rule for the application of family residence rights contained in the free 
movement legislation. The CJEU stated that EU free movement law and family 
residence rights were not applicable in the circumstance in which a national of a 
Member State did not move from his/her state of origin.6 In other words the Court made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Case 370/90 R. v. IAT and Singh ex parte Secretary of State [1992] ECR I-4265. 
3 Case 127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] 
ECR I-6241. 
4 Case 459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l' antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgian 
State [2002] ECR I-6591. 
5 Joined cases C- 35 and C-36/82 Morson and Jhanjan v. The Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723. 
6 The Court applied the purely internal rule established in the Saunders case (Case 175/78 R. v. Saunders 
[1979] ECR 1129). For a comment see Alina Tryfonidou, “Family reunification rights of (migrant) union 
citizens: towards a more liberal approach”, European Law Journal 15, no. 5 (2009), 636. For a comment 
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clear that, in absence of a situation governed by EU law, the favourable rules on family 
reunification could not be applied.7 Bigger challenges for the Court started to arise 
when Member States began to deny family residence rights to third country national 
family members, despite the fact that right of free movement had been exercised. This 
was exactly what happened in the Singh case. Surinder Singh, an Indian national, 
married Rashpal Purewal, a British national in 1982 in the UK. They then decided to 
move to Germany and work. In 1985 the couple returned to the UK to set up a business. 
Mr. Singh was initially admitted to the UK for one year as the husband of a UK 
national. When the marriage broke down and the husband was refused indefinite leave 
and became an overstayer, the Secretary of State initiated deportation proceeding, 
against which Mr. Singh appealed. He argued that the Home Office had been wrong in 
admitting him only for a year under the British Immigration rules. Since his wife was an 
EU worker she was entitled to have her husband granted a long-term residence permit. 
Precisely, the question submitted for the preliminary ruling by the national Court 
concerned whether Art. 52 of the Treaty (right to establishment) and Directive 
73/148/EEC required that “the Member State should accept within its territory the third 
country national spouse of one of its nationals when, after having moved to another 
Member State to take up a job position, he decides to return to his Member State of 
origin to establish himself.”8 The CJEU held that a national of a Member State might be 
discouraged from leaving his country of origin if on returning his conditions (in this 
case the right of residence of the spouse), were not at least equivalent to those which he 
would enjoy under EU law in the territory of any other Member State.9 The Court 
applied this rule to the situation at stake and concretely held that the right of Mrs. Singh 
of moving back to the UK would have been obstructed if, when she decided to return, 
Mr. Singh was not granted the same residence rights as the ones accorded to him in 
Germany. In other words, by using the market access language the Court introduced the 
idea that family residence rights find protection under EU law when their denial would 
obstruct the primary right of free movement. Given that Mrs. Singh’s free movement 
right would have been obstructed had long-term residence been denied to her third 
country national husband, the Court decided to grant him the right to stay under EU 
law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on this case see also Gavin Barret, “Family matters: European Community Law and third country national 
family members”, Common Market Law Review 40, no. 2 (2003), 377-378.  
7 Morson and Jhanjan judgment, para. 16.  
8 Singh judgment, para. 11. 
9 Singh judgment, para. 23.  
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In the light of the Court’s decision scholars proposed two readings of the case, 
according to which the decision can be perceived either bad or good.10 The sustainers of 
the idea that the Court struck an unfair balance between the state and the Union interests 
believe that a person in Mrs. Singh’s position could see her right of leaving her Member 
State of origins obstructed only 1) if upon her return her position would be worse off 
than if she had remained; 2) if she would be prevented from enjoying any goods or 
qualification obtained during her stay in another Member State.11 Apparently, neither of 
these two options happened in Singh. Hence, why should Mrs. Singh be deterred from 
moving from the UK to Germany knowing that her spouse had a limited right to stay in 
the UK anyway in the first place? On the other side a more practical view on the Court’s 
decision can be applied and, in this eventuality, the decision of the Court could be seen 
as a good decision. Indeed, instead of considering the right of free movement obstructed 
from the moment of the departure from the state of origin, the right of free movement 
could be realistically obstructed in the moment of departing the host Member State 
towards the state of origin. As a matter of fact, realistically, the individual could be 
deterred from going back to the state of origin once he/she has experienced better 
treatment in the host Member State. Avoiding the possibility of enjoying the same rights 
once back to the country of origin “would arguably damage the notion of Common 
Market involving free movement of workers and self employed persons”.12 
Interestingly however, this position follows a narrower line of argument than the 
one endorsed by the CJEU. The Court, as mentioned above, did not state that the right 
of free movement of Mrs. Singh would have been obstructed from going back to the 
state of origin because Mr. Singh would have not been able to enjoy the same long term 
residence right as the one accorded to him in Germany but stated that Mrs. Singh would 
not have had any incentive to move from the UK in the first place, should not she have 
had the certainty that Mr. Singh would have had exactly the same residence rights 
enjoyed in Germany once back in the UK. The Court’s broad interpretation of the 
ancillary scope of third country national family residence rights surely grants a deeper 
protection than the more limited view of those who considered Singh a good decision. 
The Court’s approach indeed is characterized by a less rigorous test: once abroad 
willing to come back to the state of origin with the third country national family 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Tryfonidou, supra note 6, 639-640. 
11 Miguel P. Maduro, “The scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and 
Reverse Discrimination” in The future of remedies in Europe,  eds. Claire Kilpatrick, Tonia Novitz, and 
Paula Skidmore, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 124.  
12 Barret, supra note 6, 379.  
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member, the sponsor can just expect his/her national Member State to grant the same 
family rights as the ones granted by the host Member State to his/her third country 
national relative simply alleging that, otherwise, he/she would have probably decided 
not to leave the home state in the first place. However, this is an unverifiable 
assumption that is potentially able to cover any kind of circumstances as judges will 
never be able to know whether it is true or not that the European sponsor would have 
never left his/her state of origin.13 
Leaving the issue of the Court’s application of the ancillary relationship between 
free movement and family reunification provisions aside for a moment, it is interesting 
to point out that in this judgment the Court’s activity is based on the interplay of 
Member States’ sovereignty over immigration and the enhancement of the right of free 
movement of workers. The argument submitted by the UK government shows the 
government concerns towards third country national immigration. On one side, the UK 
used the division of competences argument by claiming that EU law was not applicable 
because a EU returnee worker re-enters the state of origin by virtue of national law. For 
this reason, national immigration laws should be applied also to the third country 
national family member.14 On the other side, the UK argued that allowing the third 
country national spouse to enter by virtue of EU law would increase the possibility of 
fraud and sham marriages.15 The words of Mr. Singh and the Commission show instead 
that the right of free movement and residence should take priority over immigration 
concerns.16 From their submission it is clear how their concern was focused on the fact 
that a Member State national that exercised his/her right of movement to another 
Member State and then decided to go back to the state of origin should be treated in the 
same way as a national of another Member State who comes to establish himself in that 
country in accordance to the prohibition to discrimination,17 and that national rules 
should not be taken into account. 
The above mentioned analysis and comments over the different interpretations 
of the ancillary relationship between free movement and family reunification provisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. The reconstruction of the Court was nevertheless subject to criticism. Against the reasoning of the 
Court Barret argued that it seems odd to say that an individual would be limited from going to another 
Member State because the conditions of entry and residence in that Member State are much better than 
the one of origin. It is more likely that the worker would be more deterred from leaving the host Member 
State to go back home if the conditions there are more favorable than the state of origin rather than 
deterred from leaving the state of origins in the first place as the Court suggested. 
14 Singh judgment, para. 14. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., para. 13.  
17 Ibid.  
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suggest that the pronouncement of the Court has been built upon the idea of enhancing 
free movement and removing the national measures that can create an obstacle to the 
exercise of the right of free movement. The endorsement of the market access language 
in interpreting the relationship between free movement and family reunification 
provisions, for the first time in a case concerning free movement and third country 
nationals residence rights, frames Singh within the broader free movement EU 
jurisprudence that gives priority to the protection of the right of free movement unless a 
justification such as protection of public policy, security and health can be found.  
Nevertheless, it can be also argued that the Court’s approach might also have 
been driven by Member States’ immigration concerns. As a matter of fact, from the text 
of the original provisions on family reunification contained in the free movement 
legislation, it seems that the intentions of the EU legislator were simply to guarantee a 
corollary right of residence to family members of EU workers once the right of free 
movement was exercised by the latter. The idea of granting family reunification just 
when free movement would be obstructed was indeed a jurisprudential endorsement of 
the market access approach, adopted by the Court in cases involving free movement and 
family reunification for the first time in Singh. By using the “obstacles to free 
movement” language the assessment of the right of entry of a third country national 
family member still remains within the Member States’ competence when a denial of 
this right would not have any effect over the exercise of free movement. In other words, 
by applying the Singh interpretation on the relationship between free movement and 
family reunification provisions, Member States can still claim sovereignty over 
immigration of third country nationals in cases in which the exercise of the EU citizen’s 
right of free movement is not affected at all by the denial of family reunification rights.  
In conclusion, it can be said that in the Singh judgment the Court upheld a 
position that prioritized the right of free movement over member States’ immigration 
concerns. However, the application of the idea that residence family rights should be 
granted when their potential denial would hinder the right of free movement of the 
sponsor seems to take into account Member States’ concerns over immigration too.  
 
3. Carpenter18  
Mrs. Carpenter was a national of the Philippines who had married a UK national 
while being present in the UK in breach of immigration legislation. Her application for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Case 60/00 Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-06279 9.  
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a residence permit as the spouse of a UK national was refused and an order removing 
her to the Philippines was issued. Mrs. Carpenter appealed against that deportation 
order, claiming that she was entitled to a right to remain in the UK under EU law. She 
essentially argued that Mr. Carpenter was exercising a Treaty freedom since a 
substantial part of his business entailed providing services in other Member States. Her 
deportation would have been an obstacle to his right of providing services, since her 
taking care of his children facilitated Mr. Carpenter’s travelling in other Member States. 
In order for the Court to assess whether family reunification rights should have been 
granted, it was necessary to verify firstly whether the situation presented a link with EU 
law and secondly whether the denial of family reunification rights would have 
obstructed the exercise of the EU worker primary EU right of free movement.  
A.G. Stix Hackl found no difficulty in finding a link with EU law. After having 
stated that third country national family members’ right of residence in a Member State 
depended “on the position of the citizen of the Union”19, that is whether or not the 
sponsor is exercising one of the treaty freedoms, she found that the right being exercised 
by Mr. Carpenter was the freedom to provide services.20 In other words another freedom 
apart from the freedom of movement was relevant for the establishment of a link with 
EU law. Once the link with EU law was established, in order to verify whether Mr. 
Carpenter’ right to provide services would have been obstructed by the potential denial 
of Mrs. Carpenter’s residence rights in the UK, she compared the situation to Singh.21 In 
her view the two cases were comparable, despite the different circumstances, first of all 
because both had to deal with the exercise of a treaty freedom, and secondly because the 
Court in Singh did not treat the situation at stake as a returnee case but saw the situation 
as “Mrs. Singh moving to another Member State to exercise her EU rights there, namely 
the freedom of movement for workers”.22 Indeed, the Court in Singh focused on the 
discouragement effect that the denial of family reunification provisions would have had 
on Mrs. Singh’s decision of leaving her Member State of origins and not on the 
deterrent effect that these norms would have had on her returning back home from the 
host Member State. For this reason, the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Singh settled in another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Carpenter opinion, para. 42. 
20 Ibid., para. 59. 
21 Ibid., paras. 59 et seq. 
22 Ibid., paras. 65-66. As explained above with regard to the Singh case, the Court applied the concept of 
deterrence to the movement that occurred from the state of origin and not to the movement that occurred 
from the host Member State back to the state of origin.  
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Member State was not a legally relevant feature of the case23 and, hence, the Singh test 
was applicable to Carpenter too. Having found these similarities between the two, she 
concluded that the situation was not wholly internal and hence it could be solved 
through the utilization of EU law. The outcome was that a right of residence was 
granted to Mrs. Carpenter24 relying on Directive 73/148/EEC, without verifying 
whether or not the possibility of Mr. Carpenter to exercise his right to provide services 
abroad was connected to the presence of Mrs. Carpenter in the UK.25  
Differently from what was stated by the advocate general, the Court ruled out 
the possibility of applying Directive 73/148/EEC on the grounds that both its wording 
and objective implied that it did not govern the right of residence of a service provider’s 
spouse in his Member State of origin.26 On the other hand, the Court found that the link 
with EU law, and hence Mr. Carpenter’s rights, could directly be derived from Art. 49 
EC on the right to freely provide services.27 As the advocate general, the Court argued 
that the deportation of Mrs. Carpenter would have been detrimental to Mr. Carpenter 
family life because it would have been an obstacle to a condition under which he 
exercised his freedom of providing services.28 
It is worth noting that, despite the differences in the factual circumstances, the 
reasoning proposed by the Court in Carpenter is very similar to the one proposed in 
Singh. First of all, in both cases a link with EU law was established, although in Singh it 
was found under the free movement of workers legislation and in Carpenter under the 
treaty article on freedom to provide services. Secondly, in both cases the Court referred 
to the idea of deterrence29 in order to justify the residence right of the third country 
national family member: the denial of the right of residence to Mr. Singh and Mrs. 
Carpenter would have created obstacles, both Mrs. Singh’s right of moving from her 
own state of origins and Mr. Carpenter’s right to provide services outside the UK. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Carpenter opinion, para. 67.  
24 Ibid., para. 73.  
25 A.G. Stix Hackl found of no relevance the circumstance that Mrs. Carpenter cared for Mr. Carpenter’ 
children in order to evaluate whether or not the latter had exercised his rights in such a way to grant his 
spouse the right of residence under EU law. See para. 103.  
26 Carpenter judgment,  paras. 32 et seqq. 
27 Ibid., paras. 30 and 37.  
28 Ibidem, para. 39. The Carpenter judgment raised a lot of criticism. Among the critical literature see See 
Peter Oliver and Wulf Henning Roth, "The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms", Common Market 
Law Review 41, no. 2 (2004); Gareth Davies, "Freedoms unlimited? Reflections on Mary Carpenter v. 
Secretary of State", editorial in Common Market Law Review 40,  (2003); Alina Tryfonidou, "Mary 
Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department: The Beginning of a New Era in the European 
Union?", King's College Law Journal 14, (2003) and Laurent Jadoul, and Frederic Vanneste, “Casenote 
under case C-60/00. Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (ECJ July 11, 2002)", 
The Columbia Journal of European Law 9, no. 3 (2003).  
29	  See Singh paras. 19, 20 and 23 and Carpenter para 39.	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reiterated application of the idea of turning down national measures that can hinder the 
right of free movement suggests that also in Carpenter the concern of the Court lay in 
making free movement more effective and efficient, although this time not with regard 
to the right to move and reside in another Member State but with regard the right to 
provide services abroad.30  
In particular on this second similarity among the two cases it is worth noting that 
the reference to deterrence31 by the Court in Carpenter  was probably the way to take 
into account the UK stances over immigration. The UK government, surprisingly 
supported by the Commission too, pointed out that the right of providing services 
abroad and its derivative right of residence of family members could not be claimed, 
given that there was no link with EU law because Mr. Carpenter did not exercise his 
right of movement and residence in another Member State.32 Hence the situation, in the 
UK view, had to be considered purely internal. Nevertheless, in reply the Court found 
that a link with EU law existed and consisted in Mr. Carpenter’s exercise of the right to 
provide services and that Mrs. Carpenter right of residence in order not to hinder the 
former’s exercise of a fundamental freedom. In this way, the Court was able to protect 
the third country national right of residence but, at the same time, not to extend this 
protection to all the cases in which a third country national is an EU sponsor relative but 
just to those cases in which the denial of his right of residence would create obstacles to 
the primary right of the EU sponsor to provide services abroad. In this way, implicitly, 
the Court confirmed that when a relation of deterrence with EU law does not exist it is 
up to the national Member State to assess whether a third country national is entitled to 
reside within its territory.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Court ruled out the application of Directive 73/148/EEC and relied instead on Art. 49 EC (See 
Carpenter judgment, paras. 28-36).  
31 It has been argued that both the Court and the advocate general failed to give a proper reason on why 
the deportation of Mr. Carpenter could be detrimental to Mr. Carpenter’s family life. The reason that 
grounded these comments is given by the fact that the deterrence argument providing the necessary link 
with EU law was dealt with in the single paragraph 39 of the judgment and the obstacle raised, the 
disturbance of family life, was only described in vague terms without really engaging with the importance 
of the child care provided by Mrs. Carpenter for the success of her husband business. In this way, the 
CJEU “seemingly bypassed any need for the obstacle to be direct and substantial”. On this point see 
Helen Toner, ‘Comments on Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State, 11 July 2002 (Case C-60/00)’, 
European Journal of Migration and Law 5, (2003), 169. Some other scholars even argued that the 
deportation in Carpenter was not a measure that could hinder the freedom to provide services to another 
Member State because the same effect would have happened even if the business of Mr. Carpenter was 
just confined within the UK borders. See in particular Davies, supra note 28, 541; Solvita Harbacevica, 
and Norbert Reich, “Citizenship and family on trial: a fairly optimistic overview of recent court practice 
with regard to free movement of persons”, Common Market Law Review 40, no. 3 (2003), 628.  
32 Carpenter judgment, paras. 22-27. 
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Finally, a last reflection is needed. Unlike Singh, it is worth noting that in 
Carpenter the Court does not seem to attempt to balance free movement and Member 
States’ immigration concerns exclusively. Indeed, it seems that another of Court’s main 
concerns consisted of the fact that the deportation order affected Mr. Carpenter’s right 
to family life as guaranteed by the ECHR.33 Since the UK justified the application of the 
deportation order on grounds of public interest the Court, after having established the 
link with EU law and assessed that the absence of Mrs. Carpenter would have limited 
the right of Mr. Carpenter to provide services,34 scrutinized the deportation order in 
terms of its compliance with the right to family life as enshrined in Art. 8 ECHR and 
protected by EU law by virtue of Art. 6(2) EU. Finally, the Court found that Mrs. 
Carpenter’s deportation would have been disproportionate.35 As Acierno confirmed in a 
case comment “once the Court has determined that the deportation order of Mrs. 
Carpenter constitutes a restriction to Mr. Carpenter’s right to freely provide services the 
judgment moves on to the heart of the matter: the influence of fundamental rights”.36 
Acierno’s reading is bolstered also by the historical circumstances in which the 
judgment was delivered. As a matter of fact, the national limitations of the time in 
which Carpenter was released in terms of Human Rights protection (the Human Rights 
Act was adopted by the UK but not yet enforced) are likely to have led the national 
Court to look into EU law and make use of the preliminary procedure, instead of 
exhausting all the national remedies to make an application to Strasbourg in order to ask 
for protection of the right to family life.37  
In conclusion, it seems that also in Carpenter the Court took into account 
multiple concerns. In particular, the application of the Singh idea of deterrence between 
EU citizens and third country nationals’ rights shows the Court’s aim to prioritize free 
movement protection. However, at the same time, it can be argued that the Court, by 
granting its protection just to those cases in which the denial of his right of residence 
would create obstacles to the primary right of the EU sponsor to provide services, 
implicitly took into account the Member States’ concerns over their right to assess the 
legality of a third country national entry within their territory. Additionally, the Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Eleanor Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards A (Non-) Economic European Constitution”, 
Common Market Law Review 41, no. 3 (2004), 767. The author underlined that the Court failed to 
indicate how the deportation order could have been a barrier to one’s ability to provide services abroad.  
34 Carpenter judgment, paras. 37-39 
35 Ibid., paras. 41 et seqq. 
36 Silvia Acierno, “The Carpenter judgment: fundamental rights on the limits of the Community legal 
order”, European Law Review 28, no. 3 (2003), 405. 
37 Ibid., 402.  
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seems to have taken into account Human Rights stances by granting protection to the 
fundamental right to family life.  
 
4. MRAX38 
The MRAX case involved a challenge, raised by an interest group, on the Belgian 
application of the EU legislation with regards to visa requirements. Among the 
questions that were asked of the Court, the most relevant to this analysis39 was whether 
“Art. 3 of Directive 68/360/EC and Art. 3 of Directive 73/148/EC could be read as 
meaning that the Member States may, at the border, send back foreign nationals subject 
to a visa requirement and married to a EU national who attempt to enter the territory of 
a Member State without being in possession of an identity document or visa”.40  
A.G. Stix-Hackl delivered the opinion in this case. She stated that, according to 
Art. 3 of Directives 68/360/EEC and 73/148/EEC, Member States have the power to 
refuse entry at the frontier if the non-Member State family member does not fulfill the 
condition of the presentation of a valid passport or a valid visa.41 However, in order to 
assess whether or not the Belgian national legislation really did comply with the EU 
directives, it is necessary to analyze whether the measure adopted complies with the 
principles of non-discrimination and proportionality in the first place.42 With regard to 
the principle of non-discrimination, A.G. Stix-Hackl stated that the distinction between 
non-Member State nationals with and without a visa is per se not discriminatory, given 
the fact that the case concerns the difference between two different groups of family 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Case 459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l' antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgian 
State [2002] ECR I-6591.  
39 Apart from this question the others were: - should Member States refuse to issue a residence permit to 
the spouse of a EU national who has entered their territory unlawfully and issue an expulsion order 
against him?; - should Member States neither withhold a residence permit nor expel a foreign spouse of a 
EU national who has entered national territory lawfully but whose visa has expired when application is 
made for the issue of that permit; - should foreign spouses of EU nationals who are not in possession of 
identity documents or a visa or whose visa has expired have the right to refer the matter to the competent 
authority when applying for the issue of a first residence permit or when they have an expulsion order 
made against them? To the first question the Court answered that Member States are not allowed to refuse 
to issue a residence permit or to issue an expulsion order to the spouse of a EU national who can prove 
his/her identity and the relationship with the EU relative. On the second question the Court answered that 
Member State may neither refuse to issue a residence permit to a third country national married to a EU 
national and entered the territory of that Member State lawfully, nor issue an order expelling him from the 
territory, on the sole ground that his visa expired before he applied for a residence permit. Finally, on the 
last question, the Court answered that foreign national married to a national of a Member State has the 
right to refer to the competent authority a decision refusing to issue a first residence permit or ordering 
his/her expulsion before the issue of the permit, including where he/she is not in possession of an identity 
document, or has entered the territory of the Member State without a visa or his/her visa has expired. 
40 MRAX judgment, para. 37.   
41 MRAX opinion, para. 54.  
42 MRAX opinion, paras. 55-56.  
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members: third country nationals and EU national family members.43 With regard to the 
principles of proportionality instead, she stated that the refusal of entry to a third 
country national family member at the border must be presumed as an interference with 
the right to respect for family life, unless the measure satisfies the requirement of Art. 
8(2) ECHR.44 She finally concluded that Member States can refuse entry to a third 
country national family member who is not in possession of a visa only if that measure 
is compatible with the right to respect family life and, in particular, with the principle of 
proportionality.45  
The Court reached the same conclusions although through different arguments. 
First of all, the Court repeated what it had already stated in Carpenter, namely that the 
EU legislature had recognized the importance of ensuring protection for the family life 
of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.46 Then the Court went on to hold that 
“the right of a third country national married to a Member State national to enter the 
territory of the Member States derives under EU law from the family ties alone”.47 
Subsequently the Court stated that, although the wording of Art. 3(2) of Directive 
68/360/EEC and 73/148/EEC made the right of entry conditional to the possession of a 
visa, the same provisions accorded every facility to the third country national relatives 
for obtaining the necessary visas, which means that these documents have to be issued 
without delay.48 Finally, the Court stated that it would have been “disproportionate and 
therefore prohibited to send back a third country national married to a national of a 
Member State where he is able to prove his identity and the conjugal ties and there is no 
evidence to establish that he represents a risk to the requirement of public policy public, 
security, and public health […]”.49 
Looking at the submissions reported in the judgment before the findings of the 
Court it seems that, once again, the Court had to make choices between promoting free 
movement and  taking into account Member States’ concerns over third country 
national’s immigration. On one side, the submission of the Belgian state regarding the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 MRAX opinion, paras. 59-60. 
44 MRAX opinion, paras. 65-66. Art 8(2) states that “there shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law an is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and the freedoms of others”. 
45 MRAX opinion, para 72.  
46 MRAX judgment, para. 53. 
47 Ibid., para. 59; emphasis added. 
48 Ibid., para. 60. 
49 Ibid., para. 61.  
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obligation for a third country national to apply for a visa before entering its territory was 
clearly connected to immigration concerns towards third country nationals, as the words 
of paragraph 44 clearly testify: “the Belgian State submits that the obligation to apply 
for a visa before entering the territory of a Member State provides the Member States 
with means of checking both whether a third country national who wishes to enter their 
territory as the spouse of a Member State national fulfils the requisite conditions and 
whether he does not fall within the category of persons liable to be refused entry on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health […]”.  On the other side, the 
Commission’s submission gave priority to the free movement legislation provisions on 
residence rights of family members of EU migrant workers. According to the 
Commission reading, which was shared by the Court, when “a person establishes family 
ties with a migrant EU worker, the visa has a merely formal character and must be 
issued virtually automatically by the Member State through which he enters the EU. His 
right to enter the EU is not founded in any way on the visa but derives, pursuant to EU 
law, from the family ties alone.”50  
However, unlike the previous Singh and Carpenter, the reasoning of the Court 
this time did not seem to contemplate any possible hypothesis in which a Member State 
could be allowed to refuse the entry of a third country national EU family member. As a 
matter of fact, the Court did not make any reference to the idea of deterrence and to the 
fact that the right of entry should be granted to the third country national family member 
in order not to discourage the primary right of free movement of the EU worker. The 
Court simply stated that family residence rights were granted because they derive from 
the family ties alone. In more technical terms, through the statement that the right of a 
third country national family member to enter the territory of a Member State are given 
by the family ties alone, the Court engaged explicitly just with the scope ratione 
personae, assuming without further discussion that the case would have fallen under the 
EU law umbrella.  The position of the Court therefore seems simply focused on 
protecting the right of free movement of the EU sponsors and their derivative rights of 
family reunification with third country national family members.51  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid., para. 51.  
51 For a clarification on this point see Alina Tryfonidou, “Jia or Carpenter II; the edge of reason”, 
European Law Review 32, no. 6 (2007), 911. The author defines MRAX as a generous interpretation of 
family rights because, once the family link is established, EC law applies an automatic right to 
accompany the EU sponsor into the host Member state despite showing the link to the exercise of one of 
the fundamental freedoms.  
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This case is a clear example of how the Court, despite the evident contrasting 
claims between free movement and immigration concerns, did not take into account the 
Member State’ concerns over immigration issues and built its reasoning only around the 
aim of protecting free movement. The reasoning proposed by the Court in MRAX is 
surprisingly bold and consistent with the literal meaning of the family reunification 
provisions contained in the free movement legislation.   
 
5. Akrich52 
Less than one year after the Court pronounced itself on Carpenter and MRAX 
the Court changed its approach in Akrich. Mr. Akrich was a Moroccan national who 
was deported from the UK and prohibited from re-entry and residence due to being 
convicted of criminal offences. He however returned to the UK and, while being present 
there unlawfully, he married a UK national. His subsequent application for a residence 
permit as the spouse of a British citizen was refused and Mr. Akrich was deported to 
Ireland, where his spouse had meanwhile taken up residence rights. After having 
worked in Ireland for a few months, the couple claimed a EU law right of residence for 
Mr. Akrich in the UK, relying on the CJEU’s ruling in Singh.  
It is interesting to look first at the opinion of A.G. Geelhoed. In his view this 
particular case posed a dilemma in terms of the approach that the Court had to take with 
regards family reunification between EU citizens and third country nationals. In his 
view, following the Singh reasoning would have meant that anytime a third country 
national was married to a Member state national, regardless being legally or illegally 
present within the territory of the Union, the national migration rules could have been 
overcome.53 In other words, according to the advocate general, granting the right of 
family reunification to a European worker who wants to rejoin with a third country 
national relative without the previous assessment of the host Member State constituted a 
legal anomaly54 which the Court needed to deal with.55After having argued how the 
Court, in previous freedom of movement cases, applied a “friendly” interpretation of 
family reunification,56 A.G. Geelhoed posed the question that was crucial for the 
solution of the case: “must the Court's extensive case-law, as expressed, inter alia, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Case 109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607.  
53 Akrich opinion, para. 10. 
54 Ibid., para. 62. The advocate general underlined the difference with third country nationals that reunify 
with a national of a Member State that has never exercised his right to move and that, therefore, have to 
comply with the national more stringent immigration rules.  
55 Ibid., para. 125. 
56 Ibid., paras 65 to 108. (summary from 109 till 112). 
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Singh judgment, entail the consequence that national immigration legislation must 
always remain inapplicable where spouses from outside the European Union are 
involved who are married to Community nationals but are not lawfully on the territory 
of the European Union?”57 In his view, Singh created both a right to move and reside in 
another Member State with the third country national relative, and a right to be 
accompanied and reside in the Member State of the EU national on the way back. In this 
second hypothesis, the third country national relative should not be subject to any 
previous individual assessment by the Member State of origin.58 However, according to 
his reading of the case, Singh did not create a right in favor of the third country national 
to enter the territory of the European Union.59 Based on these grounds, the solution of 
the dilemma was straightforward: “the right conferred on the spouse of the migrant 
worker under Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68/EEC may be limited60 in a case 
involving a spouse who is a national of a non-Member State and has not been granted 
entry to the European Union in conformity with immigration law.”61 
The Court started by stating that the situation at stake could amount to a 
legitimate exercise of the right of freedom of movement of workers. On this 
background, the Court pointed to the fact that Regulation 1612/68/EEC only covered 
freedom of movement within EU law and was silent regarding the right of first entry.62 
The Court concluded that a third country national, in order to be able to exercise the 
rights stemming from Regulation 1612/68/EEC and enjoy the favorable family 
residence rights provided by it, had to be lawfully present in a Member State first.63 In 
order to justify this assertion the Court proposed a new and stricter interpretation of the 
ancillary role between free movement and third country national residence rights. 
According to the Court, “if the citizen’s spouse has a valid right to remain in another 
Member State, Art. 10 of Regulation 1612/68/EEC applies so that the citizen of the 
Union is not limited from exercising his or her rights to freedom of movement on 
returning to the Member State of which he or she is a national. If, conversely, that 
citizen’s spouse does not already have a valid right to remain in another Member State, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., para.108. 
58 Ibid., para.133. 
59 Ibid., para. 134. 
60 It has been argued that the opinion of the advocate general lacked of persuasiveness because it failed to 
explain how a non-limited right could be limited. See on this point Eleanor Spaventa, “Case C-109/01, 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. H. Akrich, judgment of the Full Court of 23 September 
2003”, [2003] ECR I-9607”, Common Market Law Review 42, no. 1 (2005), 230 et seq. 
61 Akrich opinion, para. 136. 
62 Akrich judgment, para. 49 
63 Ibid., para. 50. 
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the absence of any right of the spouse under Art. 10 aforesaid to install himself or 
herself with the citizen of the Union does not have a dissuasive effect in that regard”.64 
In other words, if the third country national relative is not legally resident within the 
territory of the Union, according to this reading of the relationship between family 
member residence rights and free movement rights, the denial of granting family 
reunification between the latter and the EU worker is not considered a dissuasive factor 
that could hinder the decision of the worker to install himself in another Member State.  
A strong criticism65 underlined the difficulty of placing this judgment within the 
background of the previous case law. For this reason, Akrich has been classified as 
“surprising judgment that created uncertainty as the position of family members from 
third countries”.66 This uncertainty was triggered in particular because the Court, in 
plain contrast to MRAX 67 and Carpenter68, did not apply a broad reading of free 
movement provisions and, on the contrary, even characterized the right of first entry as 
a matter of national competence.69 By acting in this way however the Court ended up 
making up the condition of the previous lawful residence, which was not contemplated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid., para. 54. For a clarification of this point see also Tryfonidou, supra note 6, 637-638.  
65 This judgment triggered also few positive reactions. See for example see Tryfonidou, supra note 6, 
637-638. Tryfonidou praised the approach of the Court by defining Akrich a “rationalizing judgment”. 
According to her, the introduction of the requirement of the previous lawful residence complies with the 
deterrence factor: if no right of previous lawful residence is enjoyed by the third country national family 
member in the territory of the State from which he/she moved with his/her European sponsor it seems that 
“the refusal of a right of residence for family members in the receiving State would not have any impact 
on the exercise of the freedom to move and, thus, would not have a sufficient link with the economic aims 
of the market freedoms”. Nevertheless, the deterrent effect was also criticized. See on this point Steve 
Peers, “Free movement, immigration control and constitutional conflict”, European Constitutional Law 
Review 5, no. 5 (2009), 181. He considered the deterrence argument profoundly unconvincing given that 
the whole point of moving to Ireland was to avoid the more restrictive national law on family reunion. If 
the same advantage was not granted on the way back to the UK this would be a great deterrent for the EU 
citizen to move back. 
66 Samantha Currie, “Accelerated justice or a step too far? Residence rights of non EU family members 
and the court’s ruling in Metock”, European Law Review 34, no. 2 (2009), 321. 
67 Cathryn Costello, “Metock: free movement and normal family life in the Union”, Common Market Law 
Review 46, (2009), 593. In regard to this point Professor Peers argued that since Art. 10 Regulation 
1612/68/EEC did not mention at all the requisite of the previous lawful residence it was not the task of 
the Court to introduce it. Indeed, the question of the initial admission of Mr. Akrich to join a UK citizen 
in the United Kingdom was outside the scope of Art. 10. See Peers, supra note 65, 181. See also 
Spaventa, supra note 60, 232. She hinted at the possibility that in Akrich the Court overruled MRAX 
without even mentioning it in the latter case. 
68 As a matter of fact, in this case, the marriage between Mrs. and Mr. Carpenter practically rectified an 
illegal status by avoiding immigration deportation. On this point see Matthew Elsmore, and Peter Starup, 
“Case C-1/05, Yunying Jia v. Migrationsverket”, Common Market Law Review 44, no. 3 (2007), 196.  
69 It seems that the distinction of competences established by the deterrence principle was blurred by a 
statement made by the Court. In its view the Member State, when making the first assessment on whether 
or not family reunification rights should be granted by national law, should have regard to the need to 
respect to family rights (Akrich judgment, para. 58). On this point see Cristophe Schiltz, “Akrich: A Clear 
Delimitation without Limits”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 12, no. 3 (2005), 
250–251. On the same point see also Niamh N. Shuibhne, “Margins of Appreciation: national values, 
fundamental rights and EC free movement law”, European Law Review 34, no. 2 (2009), 235.  
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in the previous case law –in the Carpenter case Mrs. Carpenter was in fact illegally 
resident and in MRAX the Court did not make any distinction between lawfully and 
unlawfully family members as the right to entry of the third country national derives 
from the family ties alone- and that a literal interpretation of the provision excluded 
anyway.70 Moreover, as seen before, after creating the condition of the previous lawful 
residence the Court linked it to a stricter interpretation of the ancillary relationship 
between residence rights of third country nationals and free movement rights. In simple 
terms, whereas the Court in Carpenter held that also the denial of granting residence 
rights to an illegal third country national family member could have hindered the rights 
of the EU relative to provide services abroad, in Akrich the illegal residence of the third 
country national family member within the territory of the Union did not count as being 
a hindering factor on the decision of the sponsor to move to another Member State.  
What did trigger the special focus of the Court on the previous right of lawful 
residence? Surely, from the case analysis above presented, a strong free movement 
rationale is at the base of this judgment. In fact, as before in Singh and Carpenter, the 
Court did not renounce to refer to the idea of applying article 10 Regulation 
1612/1968/EEC in order not to deter the EU sponsor from exercising his right of free 
movement.71 However, the strict interpretation of the ancillary relationship between free 
movement and family reunification provisions showed how the reasoning of the Court 
was likely driven by the sense of protecting Member States’ sovereignty on 
immigration. This was expressed by affirming the UK’s right of assessing the right of 
first entry of a third country national within its territory in accordance to its national 
rules. The claim of the United Kingdom, as summarized by A.G. Geelhoed in his 
opinion, fundamentally expressed the fear that, were the Court to decide that Mr. Akrich 
had a right under EU law to remain in the UK, that would have made possible for all 
spouses from non-Member States to evade national law with impunity and marginalize 
Member States' right to adopt measures to combat abuse.72 The Court endorsed this 
claim by basically filling the silence of the legislation with the specific requirement of 
previous lawful residence and by supporting it with a stricter explanation of the 
ancillary relationship between free movement and family residence rights.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Peers, supra note 65, 181. On the literal interpretation he stated that while Regulation 1612/68/EEC set 
out a condition relating to accommodation of family members, it made no reference to any condition 
relating to their prior residence in another Member State. For this reason, the requirement of the previous 
lawful residence of the third country national was completely made up, in contrast with the legislation 
and the previous line of law cases.  
71 See in particular paras. 53 and 54.	  	  
72 Akrich opinion, para. 114. 
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The decision to endorse this approach was probably bolstered by the concrete 
circumstances of the case. It is important to remember that, unlike Carpenter for 
example, Mr. Akrich did not just become illegal after having overstayed in the UK but 
rather managed to elude the UK immigration laws several times.73 Moreover, Akrich 
was pronounced “when the 2004 enlargement and the connected sensitivities around 
free movement were particularly prevalent in discussion and discourse at Union and 
Member State level”.74 As seen before, the EU enlargement provoked serious fears 
towards immigration of third country nationals75, which were exorcised by the 
continuous strengthening of the external borders through stricter measures on illegal and 
legal immigration. In other words, it is likely that the several attempts of Mr. Akrich of 
entering illegally in the UK and the increasing states’ concerns over third country 
nationals likely pushed the Court to completely accommodate its decision according to 
Member States’ sovereignty.76  
Finally, there is a last aspect that is worth exploring further. The border 
protection approach endorsed in Akrich was blurred by a statement of the Court 
concerning the right to family life. Although the CJEU had ruled out the possibility of 
granting to Mr. Akrich a right of residence, it nevertheless stated that “regard must be 
had to respect for family life under Article 8 of the [ECHR]”.77 Is this simply a 
statement to remind the Member States of their obligations as parties to the ECHR? An 
indicator militating against such an interpretation is the fact that the CJEU underlined 
that the right to family life as established by Art. 8 ECHR was among the fundamental 
rights protected in the EU legal order by virtue of the Court’s settled case law and Art. 6 
(2) EU.78 There is not a definitive answer to this question but it seems that, with this 
cryptic referral to Art. 8 ECHR, the CJEU to a certain extent managed to limit the 
Akrich strict interpretation just to cases that involved a convicted criminal.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Mr. Akrich was deported to Algers after having been convicted for attempted theft and possession of a 
stolen identity in 1991. The year after he re entered the UK illegally and was re arrested and deported 
again.  
74 Currie, supra note 66, 321, footnote 56. 
75 Jacek Wieclawski, “The Eastern Enlargment of the European Union: Fears, Challenges and Reality”, 
Globality Studies Journal, (2010), 22.  
76 Clifford J. Carrubba, and Matthew Gabel, “Do Governments Sway European Court of Justice Decision-
making?: Evidence from Government Court Briefs”, in IFIR Working Paper Series, 2005, paper no. 6, 
accessed March 2012, available at <http://www.ifigr.org/workshop/fall05/gabel-workshop.pdf>. In this 
paper the authors elaborated an empirical test of Member State influence on CJEU decisions over the time 
span of three years and demonstrated that the Court really takes into account the concerns and the views 
of Member States in order to ponder its decisions.   
77 Akrich judgment, para. 58. 
78 Ibid. 
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In conclusion, also in the Akrich case it is possible to see in the Court’s 
reasoning a tension between free movement and Member States’ immigration concerns. 
Unlike the previous cases though, the Court utilized for the first time an utterly strict 
and peculiar interpretation of the ancillary relationship between family residence and 
free movement rights. In this way this time the free movement rationale was not capable 
of determining the outcome of the judgment and the Court instead opted for taking into 
account Member States’ concerns over immigration. On the other side however, the 
reference to Art. 8 ECHR was indicative of the fact that this strict approach had to be 
curtailed within particular boundaries and of the fact that an approach willing to 
prioritize again free movement over immigration had not been completely ruled out for 
future cases.  
 
6. Jia79 
Ms. Jia, a Chinese national, sought right of residence in Sweden in order to 
rejoin her son and her German daughter-in-law who were working and residing there. 
Coming directly from China, Ms. Jia entered the Swedish territory with a tourist visa 
and subsequently applied for a permanent residence permit. The central question 
submitted to the Court consisted of whether she could rely on Art. 1 of Directive 
73/148/EEC.80 Once again it was A.G. Geelhoed who was required to face the sensitive 
issue of family reunification between third country nationals and European workers. 
The point that he recognized as crucial for the solution of the case was whether a 
situation in which the applicant was not illegal, but nevertheless trying to reside 
according to the EU rules without going through the first assessment of the Member 
State, had to be ruled by the more recent Akrich case or by the previous more liberal 
MRAX case.81 The advocate general answered this question by referring to the issue of 
division of competences. First of all he underlined that, whereas freedom of movement 
was fully governed by EU law, in immigration issues the Treaty “does not confer 
directly effective rights but provides for the legal bases for a legislative program for the 
harmonization of national legislation.”82 After that he stated that Member States 
retained competence on most aspects of immigration and, in particular, they still had the 
right to decide, according to their legislation, the first admission of a third country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Case 1/05 Jia v. Migrationsverket [2007] ECR I-1.  
80 Jia judgment, para. 24. 
81 Jia opinion, para. 1.  
82 Ibid., para. 32.  
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national within their territory.83 For this reason, the fact that relevant secondary 
legislation to the case, Regulation 1612/68/EEC and Directive 73/148/EEC, was silent 
as to the first entry requirement did not mean that there was a vacuum that had to be 
filled by a generous interpretation of the Court on family reunification but simply that, 
in line with the division of competences, the first entry assessment was a matter that had 
to be decided upon by the Member State itself.84 Moreover, allowing third country 
nationals to enjoy automatic right of residence by virtue of EU provisions on freedom of 
movement and on the basis of the family relationship alone would make it possible for 
them to circumvent national immigration laws.85 For all these reasons, in the view of 
A.G. Geehoeld, Akrich and not MRAX was the convincing judgment.  
The CJEU however did not follow this path and, instead of engaging with the 
issue of division of competences preferred to endorse the MRAX approach by stressing 
the factual differences between the circumstances of this case and Akrich. In pointing to 
the fact that Ms. Jia neither resided unlawfully in Sweden nor did she seek to evade 
national immigration law,86 the Court stated that the condition of prior lawful residence 
as formulated in Akrich could not apply to her.87 
This case was, not surprisingly, an object of profound criticism. One of the main 
reasons consisted in the fact that, according to many, the Court missed the occasion to 
clarify whether the first entry within the European Union of a third country national EU 
family member was a matter left to the competence of the Member States or of the 
EU.88 Furthermore, another significant shortcoming was that the Court in Jia, by trying 
to step back from the strictness of Akrich, ended up contradicting both Akrich and all 
the previous more liberal readings on the issue of family reunification that found their 
apex in MRAX.89 As a matter of fact, the Court distanced itself from Akrich because, 
instead of using the reasoning applied in it, it preferred to stress the differences of their 
factual circumstances: since Mrs. Jia never resided unlawfully the Akrich logic could 
not be applied.90 Moreover, the Court distanced itself from the automatic right of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ibid., paras. 32-33. 
84 Ibid., para. 66. 
85 Ibid., para. 67. 
86 Jia judgment, paras 31-32. 
87 Ibid., para. 33. See Ben Olivier, and Jan H. Reestman, “Yunying Jia v Migrationsverket–Court of 
Justice of the European Communities”, European Constitutional Law Review 3, no. 3 (2007), 471. 
88 Peers, supra note 65, 183. 
89 Olivier, and Reestman, supra note 87, 475 and Elsmore, and Starup, supra note 66, 801.  
90 Alina Tryfonidou, “Jia or ‘Carpenter II’: the edge of reason”, European Law Review 32, no. 6 (2007), 
910. The author highlighted the position of the advocate general, that stated that the approach of the Court 
in Akrich should be the general principle used in all family reunification cases and not only cases whose 
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admission granted in MRAX too, because it implicitly accepted that, in case of unlawful 
presence in the Member State the Akrich logic could still be applied. 
It is difficult to fully understand the rationale behind the decision adopted by the 
Court. For the reasons described above Jia could just be considered as a happy medium 
solution. Nevertheless, surely it cannot be denied that this judgment shows well, once 
again, the tension between protection of borders from third country national 
immigration and free movement. The submissions of the UK and of the Netherlands 
highlighted how the concerns of the Member States over third country nationals being 
granted first access and residence rights within their territory as family members of a 
EU moving worker were still very much an issue. As summarized in the opinion of 
A.G. Geelhoed, they remarked that “the Member States are responsible for the first 
admission of third country nationals to the territory of the Community on the basis of an 
individual assessment” and how it is crucial the EU law “must not be interpreted in such 
a way that third country nationals who do not have a valid residence permit can escape 
the application of national immigration law.”91 It is probably in order to take into 
account Member States’ concerns that the Court in Jia was not bold enough to state that 
it is the EU that can claim its total competence to assess the right of first entry of third 
country national EU family members into the territory of a Member State, as it did in 
the later Metock case. 
At the same time however, the fact that the Court restricted the ruling of Akrich 
just to cases of illegal residence, practically turning it into an exception, it shows how 
the Court’s attempt was to give priority to protection of free movement by granting a 
corollary and automatic family residence right to third country nationals EU family 
members, as the previous MRAX did. The attention to free movement can also be found 
in the second part of the judgment when referring to the issue of dependency. On the 
question submitted by the national court on the real meaning of dependence (Mrs. Jia 
claimed the right to stay as dependent ascending relative of a EU citizen) the Court 
answered that there was no need to determine the reason for the recourse of the EU 
relatives’ support, that the Member States should assess whether, having regard to the 
financial and social conditions of family members claiming dependence, the applicant is 
not able to support himself/herself and that the material support should exist either on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
facts are similar to the Akrich’s ones. This is because Akrich “accords fully with [the] division of 
competences between the Community and the Member States”.  
91 Jia opinion, para. 19.  
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the state of origin or in the state in which the family members file the application.92 
Such an interpretation of the concept of dependence should be applied by the Member 
State in order to “ensure both the basic freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty and the 
effectiveness of directive containing measures to abolish obstacles to free movement”.93 
It seems that, despite the attempt of following a more literal interpretation of the right of 
free movement as in MRAX, also in Jia the Court did not renounce considering the right 
of free movement as the fundamental priority to fulfill, to the extent that even the 
concept of dependence in the family reunification provisions should be interpreted as 
finalized to the full exercise of this basic freedom.  
In conclusion, it seems that the Court in Jia had to deal both with free movement 
and immigration concerns. However, as in the previous Singh, Carpenter and MRAX, 
the Court once again made the choice of prioritizing free movement, curtailing Akrich 
to a mere exception.  
 
7. Eind94 
Soon after Jia the Court of Justice delivered the Eind judgment. Mr. Eind, a 
Dutch national, moved to the UK in order to work. His Surinamese daughter, coming 
directly from her home country, later joined him there. As established in the order for 
reference, Ms. Eind enjoyed a right of residence in the UK under Art. 10 of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC. Mr. Eind and his daughter then decided to go back to the Netherlands, 
however Ms. Eind was refused a residence permit. The essential question was whether 
she could rely on EU law to grant her a right of residence in her father’s state of origin. 
In order to answer to the question A.G. Mengozzi, at first, further qualified the meaning 
of the requisite of lawful residence introduced by Akrich. He stated that the fact that she 
had been accorded the right to reside lawfully in the UK by Art. 10 of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC did not mean that she had to be granted automatically the same right in 
the Netherlands since the effect of this article “is clearly limited to the territory of the 
issuing Member State”.95 However, given that the third country national has to be 
lawfully resident within the Union before being able to enter the host Member State, it 
is nevertheless not important whether the source of lawful residence in the first Member 
State is granted by national law or by EU law.96 However, A.G. Mengozzi continued by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Jia judgment, paras. 36-37. 
93 Ibid., para. 40.  
94 Case 291/05 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v Eind [2007] ECR I-10719. 
95 Eind opinion, para. 35. 
96 Ibid., para. 48.  
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stating that before Ms. Eind could be entitled under Regulation 1612/68/EEC the right 
to reside in the Netherlands, it was necessary to verify whether the return home of Mr. 
Eind could be classified as workers’ right of free movement, i.e. whether the situation 
could fall under the EU law, granted by the Treaty and by the above mentioned 
regulation, given that he was no longer engaged in an economic activity.97 On this issue, 
A.G. Mengozzi concluded that the right to return to the national Member State should 
not be made “conditional upon the performance, upon his return, of an economic 
activity […]”.98 The status of a migrant worker in fact also includes the right to re-enter 
the Member State of which he is a national after employment in the host Member State 
has come to an end99 because, if this would not be the case, the useful effect of the 
provisions guaranteeing free movement of workers would not be ensured.100After 
having established that the return of an EU worker, although not engaged anymore in a 
working activity, was granted by Art. 39 TEC and Art. 1 Regulation 1612/68/EEC,101 
and therefore that the situation fell under EU law, the advocate general focused on the 
right of residence of Ms. Eind. He held that Mr. Eind could enjoy the family rights in 
accordance to Art. 10 of the same Regulation because “the Community right of the 
worker to return to his state of origin would not be effective if he could be dissuaded 
from exercising it by obstacles raised in that state to the residence of his closest family 
members”.102 On the deterrent effect to the exercise of free movement by the EU citizen 
the advocate general, in answering to the contentions raised by the Dutch and the 
Danish governments103, specified that free movement rights can be hindered by the 
denial of residence rights to the third country national even when the latter became a 
family member after the EU worker moved into the host Member State.104  
The Court initially followed the opinion of A.G. Mengozzi. It stated as well that 
the fact that Ms. Eind was granted a resident permit in the UK under Regulation 
1612/68/EEC did not require the authorities of the Netherlands to automatically grant 
her the same right.105 However, in a departure from the advocate general’s opinion, the 
Court did not consider the option of encompassing the circumstances of the case under 
Art. 10 Regulation 1612/68/EEC, but it referred to the idea of European citizenship. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid., para. 72. 
98 Ibid., para. 97.  
99 Ibid., para. 99. 
100 Ibid., para. 101.  
101 Ibid., para. 102.  
102Ibid., para. 103.  
103Ibid., para. 104.  
104Ibid., paras. 105-106. 
105Eind judgment, paras. 25-26. 
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Firstly the Court stated that “under Art. 18(1) EC the right of every citizen of the Union 
to reside in the territory of the Member States is recognized subject to the limitations 
and conditions imposed by the Treaty and by the measures adopted for its 
implementation”.106 Then however, instead of suggesting that Art. 1(1) of Directive 
90/364/EEC had to be applied to the circumstances of the case107, it pointed out that the 
right of Mr. Eind to return to his state of origin could not be made conditional to the fact 
of being engaged in an economic activity: being a Dutch citizen was enough to allow 
him to re-enter to the Netherlands although he was not actively working anymore.108 In 
simple terms, the Court found that the link with EU law was given simply by the fact 
that Mr. Eind was an EU citizen returning home, although he was not working anymore. 
This right was conferred to Mr. Eind by EU law “to the extent necessary to ensure the 
useful effect of the right to free movement for workers under Article 39 EC and the 
provisions adopted to give effect to that right, such as those laid down in Regulation No 
1612/68”109. After having underlined the right of Mr. Eind to return to his country, the 
Court answered the contention raised by the Netherlands and Denmark on the 
relationship of deterrence between the right of free movement and family reunification 
rights110. The Court, repeating the Singh doctrine,111 stated that barriers on family 
reunification were liable “to undermine the right to free movement which the nationals 
of the Member States have under Community law […].”112 In particular, the national of 
a Member State could be deterred from leaving his Member State of origin in order to 
take up an economic activity in another Member State “if he does not have the certainty 
to be able to return to his Member State of origin”113, certainty that can be given by the 
faculty of continuing living with his closest relatives in that same state.114 Finally, the 
Court denied that the fact that Ms. Eind did not previously enjoy residence in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid., para. 28. 
107	   According to this provision the Member States may require citizens of the Union who are not 
economically active and wish to enjoy the right to reside in their territory, to ensure that they themselves 
and the members of their families are covered by sickness insurance in respect of all risks in the host 
Member State and have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system 
of the host Member State during their period of residence. See para. 29.	  	  
108 Ibid., paras. 28 ss.  
109	  Ibid., para. 32.	  	  
110 Ibid., para. 33. The Dutch government, in particular, claimed that “Mr. Eind could not have been 
deterred from exercising that freedom, through moving to the United Kingdom, by the fact that it would 
be impossible for his daughter to reside with him once he returned to his Member State of origin, given 
that at the time of the initial move Miss Eind did not have a right to reside in the Netherlands”.   
111 Jeremy B. Bierbach, “European Citizens' Third-Country Family Members and Community Law”, 
European Constitutional Law Review 4, no. 2 (2008), 353. 
112Eind judgment, para. 37.  
113 Ibid., para 35. 
114 Ibid., para. 36. 
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Netherlands could have a negative effect on the granting the same right now, first of all 
because such a requirement was not provided in any provision of EU law115 and, 
secondly, because “such a requirement would run counter to the objectives of the EU 
legislature, which has recognized the importance of ensuring protection for the family 
life of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of 
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty”.116  
Once again one can notice that the judgment of the Court found as background 
the interplay between immigration concerns and free movement. The submission of the 
Dutch and Danish governments showed how concerns about immigration of potential 
third country national family members in the same situation of Ms. Eind were quite 
heated. In particular, in the written observations of the Dutch and Danish government 
they contented that a EU national is unlikely to be deterred from moving to a Member 
State in the prospect of not being able, once back in the Member State of origin, to 
continue the family life established in the host Member State.117  
On the other side, with regard to the right of free movement, in the judgment the 
Court again pointed out the primacy of this right by stating that “barriers to family 
reunification are liable to undermine the right to free movement which the nationals of 
the Member States have under EU law, as the right of a Community worker to return to 
the Member State of which he is a national cannot be considered to be a purely internal 
matter.”118 Also the advocate general stressed this point by observing that “the right of 
residence conferred by EU law on family members of a person who takes advantage of 
freedom of movement for persons is intended to remove any obstacle to the exercise of 
that right by such a person deriving from the inability of members of his family to 
accompany him or join him in that host Member State […]”.119  
As seen before in Singh and in other following cases, the application of the 
market access rationale has been capable of prioritizing the protection of the right of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Ibid., para. 43 
116 Ibid., para. 44. 
117 Ibid.,para. 33.  
118 Eind judgment, para. 37. 
119 See Eind opinion at para. 55. At rec. 56 the advocate general supported this point by quoting the 
preamble to Regulation 1612/68/EEC: “the fifth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 1612/68/EEC 
states that the right of freedom of movement, in order that it may be exercised by objective, standards in 
freedom and dignity requires that obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated as particular as 
the worker’s rights to be joined by his family and the conditions for the integration of that family into the 
host country”. The advocate general finished by stating that “the right to family reunification provided for 
by Community law within the scope of the EC treaty provisions on the free movement of persons within 
the Community therefore aims at guaranteeing the effective exercise of that freedom and presupposes the 
existence of a situation in which it can be said that that freedom has been exercised” (Eind opinion, para. 
57.) 
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free movement and, at the same time, has preserved the sovereignty of the Member 
States over immigration in circumstances in which a relation of deterrence between free 
movement and family reunification rights does not occur. However, it is worth noting 
that the way in which the Court applied the Singh logic to the Eind’s facts ended up 
reaching broader consequences as far as protection of free movement is concerned.120 In 
replying to the Netherlands and Denmark submissions, the Court denied the 
governments’ assertion by stating that deterrence indeed operates in the original 
decision of the EU worker to move from the Member State of origin. Hence, if in Singh 
the obstructing effect of the denial of residence rights to family members could play a 
role only when the family was established in the home Member State at the time the 
family decided to move, with Eind the Court considered that the denial to family 
reunification could determine an obstructive role on the decision of Mr. Eind of moving 
from the state of origin even if Ms. Eind, at the time of Mr. Eind’s initial move from the 
Netherlands, did not have a permit to reside there.121 The fact that the denial of family 
reunification is, since Eind, openly considered to be obstructive to the exercise of the 
right of free movement also in cases in which the EU sponsor decided to move 
regardless of his/her family bonds, suggests that any movement of the latter could be 
obstructed by the denial to family reunification at any time he/she takes the decision to 
migrate to another Member State. Therefore it seems that, according to the Court, the 
right to family reunification should be always granted in order to preserve the primary 
family right of free movement.   
In conclusion, once again this case has been built upon free movement and 
immigration concerns. However, overall, it seems that the Court’s main aim was driven 
by achieving the protection of the primary right of free movement. The broad 
interpretation offered by the Court to the ancillary relationship between free movement 
and family reunification rights seems to have turned the latter into corollary rights that 
should always be granted in order to preserve the right of free movement. Hence, even 
if family reunification are still conceived as functional to the exercise of the right of free 
movement, the broad interpretation of their relationship offered by the Court seems to 
have reduced the hypothesis in which the Member States could still have a say in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Peers, supra note 65, 184.  
121 See Eind judgment from paras. 33 till 37. This understanding of deterrence also attracted a lot of 
criticism. Tryfonidou pointed out that in reality, the right of family reunification was granted on the 
grounds of a not existing link with EU law. In fact Ms. Eind did not enjoy a right of residence in the 
Netherlands before Mr. Eind exercised his freedom of movement to the UK and, therefore, it was 
perfectly right that, on Mr. Eind’s return to the Netherlands, the Dutch authorities applying Dutch law did 
not grant her a right of residence. See Tryfonidou, supra footnote 6, 645.  
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deciding whether the third country national family members should be granted the right 
to reside.   
 
8. Metock122 
In the previous case the Court hinted to the fact that free movement was not 
simply a right to be enjoyed by workers but also by EU citizens. Soon after, the 
protection of the right of free movement of citizens was crystallized in Metock. The case 
was brought before the CJEU by a reference from the Irish High Court, which had to 
deal with four third country national applicants challenging Irish national law 
implementing Directive 2004/38/EC. The third country nationals had entered Ireland 
coming directly from outside EU and subsequently married migrant Union citizens 
residing there. Their applications for residency cards were refused on the grounds that 
they did not meet the requirements laid down in the Irish implementing law, namely 
prior lawful residence in another Member State and having obtained the status of family 
members before entering the host Member State of the Union citizen. The four 
applicants applied for judicial review before the Irish High Court. The latter sent a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU asking whether Directive 2004/38/EC precluded the 
legislation of a Member State from requiring the previous lawful residence in another 
Member State and whether the third country national spouse could benefit from the 
Directive irrespective of when and where the marriage took place and of the 
circumstances in which he/she entered into the host Member State. 
With regard to these two questions it is worth analyzing the opinion of A.G. 
Maduro in detail. The advocate general started his opinion by focusing on a crucial 
question: “does Directive 2004/38 guarantee for non-EU nationals who are family 
members of a Union citizen only freedom of movement within the territory of the Union 
or also, in certain cases, access for them to the territory of the Union?”123 In order to 
answer this question, since this piece of legislation was silent on this point, it was 
necessary to look at the general scope of Directive 2004/38/EC which was, as Maduro 
clearly underlined, the “primary and individual right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States’ conferred on Union citizens directly by Article 18 
EC.”124 Having regard not just to the right of free movement but also to the right of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Case 127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2008] ECR I-6241.	  
123 Metock opinion, para. 4.  
124 Ibid., para. 5. 
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residence of the European citizen, A.G. Maduro reassessed the interpretation of the 
ancillary relationship between free movement and family residence rights. He pointed 
out that applying the Akrich logic125 -requirement of previous lawful residence- also to 
Directive 2004/38/EC would end up infringing “the right of the Union citizen to lead a 
normal family life and, therefore, his right to reside in the host Member State.”126 In 
fact, not allowing the applicants the right to be rejoined by their third country national 
family members coming directly from outside the EU would obstruct the applicants free 
choice of living in Ireland and would, consequently, push them to move to another state 
in which family reunification is guaranteed.127 For all these reasons he concluded that 
“the effectiveness of the right of a Union citizen to reside in a Member State other than 
his State of origin requires that the consequential right of residence conferred on non-
EU national members of his family by Directive 2004/38/EC must be construed as 
entailing the right to join him, including directly from outside the Union”.128 Finally, 
using the same functional interpretation A.G. Maduro, on the question on whether a 
national of a non-member country could rely on the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC 
to obtain the right to reside in the host Member State with the Union citizen who is 
his/her spouse, even though the Union citizen entered the host Member State before the 
marriage took place, answered that, since Directive 2004/38/EC was meant to protect 
not just the right of free movement but also the right of residence of the Union citizen, 
not allowing him/her to reunify with his/her third country national family member 
would hinder his/her right of residence regardless of the time in which the third country 
national became a member of his/her family.129 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 It is interesting to see how the advocate general dismissed the contention of Ireland and the other 
intervening states that the entry of the family members had to be based on the requirement of the previous 
lawful residence as set out in Akrich. First of all, A.G. Maduro underlined the fact that Akrich could not 
be considered the right solution in cases involving EU citizens and third country nationals because it 
conflicted with a trend of case law that conferred the right of residence of a third country national EU 
family member based only on the family relationship (see Metock opinion, para. 11). Moreover, the 
subsequent Jia case linked the condition of the previous lawful residence only to the specific factual 
circumstances of the case in Akrich (see Metock opinion, para. 12). Finally, even contemplating the 
possibility that Akrich was not linked simply to the specific circumstances of the case (abuse of rights), 
the case was decided in the light of Regulation 1612/68/EEC that has as a scope the only freedom of 
movement of European workers. On the other side, Metock was decided in the light of Directive 
2004/38/EC which relates, “to the right of Union citizens not only to ‘move’ but also to ‘reside’ freely 
within the territory of the Member States”(see Metock opinion, para.13). Therefore, if before the 
introduction of Directive 2004/38/EC emphasis was put more on the deterrent effect of entering or 
leaving the Member State, with the introduction of this new piece of legislation equal emphasis is placed 
on the right to reside and on the stability of the permanence of the European citizen in another Member 
State. 
126 Ibid., para. 9. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Metock opinion, paras. 16 et ss. 
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The CJEU’s approach was very similar to the one endorsed by A.G. Maduro, 
although less expeditious and incisive.130 With regard to the first question the CJEU, 
like the advocate general, argued that no provisions in the Directive made its application 
conditional on prior lawful residence in another Member State131 and this was supported 
by previous case law.132 To this respect, the Court boldly stated that the decision in 
Akrich had to be reconsidered on the grounds that “if Union citizens were not allowed to 
lead normal family life in the host Member State the exercise of the freedoms they are 
guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed”.133 Unlike the explanation 
given by A.G. Maduro, who suggested that it was a result of the introduction of the 
Citizen Directive that the right of residence in another Member State -and not just the 
right of movement- became a distinct right134 (and, owing to this new piece of 
legislation, Metock could be decided differently from Akrich), the Court simply singled 
out Akrich as the odd case and stated that, since the right to reside was granted to third 
country nationals despite their lawful residence even before through Regulation 
1612/68/EEC,135 “the same interpretation must be adopted a fortiori with respect to 
Directive 2004/38 EC […] as Union citizens cannot derive less rights from that 
directive than from the instruments of secondary legislation which it amends or 
repeals”.136 In this way the Court did not have to refer, as Maduro did, to the scope of 
the Directive as conferred by the then Art. 18 of the Treaty, that is the right to move and 
reside of Union citizens. Nevertheless, although the Court did not openly address the 
right to reside of the EU citizen in the host Member State, it subtly approached the issue 
anyway by suggesting that, in order “to lead a normal family life in the host Member 
State”,137 the Union citizen should be allowed to move to and reside in that Member 
State. Indeed, more precisely, the Court stated that “the refusal of the host Member 
State to grant rights of entry and residence to the family members of a Union citizen is 
such as to discourage that citizen from moving to or residing in that Member State 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 This fact should not surprise because the judgment was approved on an accelerated hearing. Art 23a of 
the statute of the Court of Justice states that the Court will rule after hearing the advocate general anyway. 
This probably explains why the content of the judgment is in accordance with the advocate general 
although not as accurate. For a detailed explanation of the accelerated procedure adopted in Metock see 
Currie, supra note 66, 317-318. 
131 Metock judgment, paras. 49 et ss. 
132 Ibid., see para. 56. Apart from Carpenter, MRAX and Eind, the Court quoted also Case 157/03 
Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I 2911, para. 26; Case 503/03 Commission v. Spain [2006] ECR I 1097, 
para. 41; Case 441/02 Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I 3449, para. 109. 
133 Metock judgment, para. 58.  
134 Metock opinion, para. 13. 
135 Metock judgment, paras. 56-57.  
136 Ibid., para. 59. 
137 Ibid., para. 62. 
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[…]”.138 On these grounds the Court then reached the same conclusion endorsed by 
A.G. Maduro: since the refusal of a Member State to grant the right of entry end 
residence to a third country national family member, regardless the fact that he/she is 
not already present within the borders of the EU, would discourage the European citizen 
from moving or residing in that Member State, the EU legislature has the competence to 
regulate the entry and residence of third country national EU family members who are 
not already lawfully resident within the Member State.139 Finally on the second question 
the Court, consistently with Maduro opinion,140 stated that a national of a non-member 
country can accompany or join the Union citizen in the host Member State irrespective 
of when their marriage took place and of how the national of a non-member country 
entered the host Member State.141 
The approach of the Court was both criticized and praised. Among the numerous 
critiques, some argued that the Court was too liberal. For instance, Professor Dashwood 
denounced the detachment of the right of residence to the right of entry and movement. 
In his view the right of movement should be asserted before the right of residence can 
arise in order to avoid the “perverse consequence of enabling third country nationals to 
circumvent Member States’ immigration rules”.142 Metock was also perceived as part of 
a cumulative build up of judgments on free movement and this triggered, as Currie 
underlined, serious dissatisfaction in the Member States.143 Some others instead 
underlined that the approach of the Court was too narrow. It was pointed out that the 
Court was guilty of “fundamental rights reticence” as the only fundamental right 
referred to the judgment was the “[…] right of residence of Union citizens in a Member 
State other than that of which they are national”144 and the final reference to 
fundamental rights at paragraph 79 “serves simply to remind the Member States of their 
duties when they act purely in internal situations”.145 On the other side, Metock was 
praised because it clarified the ambiguities introduced by Akrich by clearly setting the 
limits between state and EU competences:146 the CJEU concluded in fact that the EU is 
in charge of regulating the entry and the residence in the Member States of third country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Ibid., para. 64.  
139 Ibid., paras. 64-65. 
140 Ibid., paras. 81 ss.  
141 Ibid., paras. 64-65.  
142 Alan Dashwood, “Judical Activism and Conferred Powers – Is the CJEU Falling into Bad Habits?”, 
10th IEL (Institute of European Law) Annual Lecture, Birmingham University, 27th June 2012. 
143 Currie, supra note 66, 326. 
144 Metock judgment, para. 89. 
145Costello, supra note 67,  611.  
146 Nathan Cambien, “Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform”, Columbia Journal of European Law 15, (2008), 332-333.  
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national EU family members and that Member States therefore cannot impose any 
condition of prior lawful residence.  
Despite these lines of praise and criticism it can be noted that also in this 
judgment both Member States’ concerns over immigration and free movement concerns 
underpinned the activity of the Court. The concerns of the Member States over their 
sovereignty upon migration are clear from their submissions to the Court. The Irish 
Minister for Justice plus several other governments147 submitted that, in a contest 
characterized by a strong pressure over migration, it is fundamental for the Member 
States to be able to require prior lawful residence in another Member State in order not 
to undermine their capacity to control migration at their external borders.148 At the same 
time it is evident from the reference to Directive 2004/38/EC that the circumstances at 
hand were based on a free movement issue.  
The Court took into account both these stances by referring, as in Singh, to the 
ancillary relationship between free movement and family reunification provisions and, 
going beyond Eind, finally ended up prioritizing free movement over immigration 
concerns. By looking at the judgment as a whole, it is evident how protection of free 
movement plays the most important role in the Court’s reasoning. As a matter of fact, 
the Court in Metock interpreted the role of family reunification provisions as functional 
not just to the primary right of movement but also to the right of residence of the EU 
sponsor in the host Member State. The extension of the interpretation of the Singh test 
also to the right to reside is potentially inclusive of an indefinite amount of 
circumstances because, no matter when and how the relationship begun, it is always 
possible to argue that the denial to grant family residence rights would interfere with the 
right to reside of the sponsor in the host Member State.149 Hence, the extension of the 
“obstacle to free movement” approach also to the right of residence of the EU worker, 
together with the reconsideration of the Akrich case with the repealing of the requisite 
of the previous lawful residence of the third country national family member within the 
territory of the EU, seems to have finally reduced the sovereignty of the Member States 
over immigration of third country national family members to a pure theoretical 
hypothesis.  
In conclusion in Metock, once again, the Court’s reasoning was built up on free 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Czech, Danish, German, Greek, Cypriot, Maltese, Dutch, Austrian, Finnish and the UK governments 
made submissions.  
148 Metock judgment, para. 71.  
149 Bierbach, supra note 111, 360. “But the reasoning behind the ‘dissuasive effect’ remains extremely 
conjectural, and could creatively be extended to cover almost any situation”. 
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movement and immigration concerns. The new broad application of the Singh test also 
to the right to reside, together with the fact that finally the Court dismissed openly the 
requirement of third country national family members previous lawful residence, shows 
how the Court was mostly aiming toward protection of the EU citizen’s rights to move 
and reside in a host Member State by granting him/her family reunification rights. 
Although the Court tried to take into account the Member States’ claims over third 
country national immigration by pointing to the fact that national governments still had 
the possibility of controlling the entry of family members into their territory owing to 
the conditions of public policy, public security and public health and Art. 35 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, 150 it is evident how finally in Metock the protection of the 
fundamental right of movement and residence of the EU sponsor has been prioritized 
over Member States’ immigration concerns.  
 
9. Conclusions  
 After the oil crisis of 1975, the ongoing development of Common Market and of 
the right of free movement in particular clashed with Member States’ goals to enhance 
migration control and reduce inward immigration. From the eighties151 the Court started 
to deliver its first judgments, reaching its apex in the first decade of the new 
millennium. In this chapter, I have shown how free movement and Member States’ 
immigration concerns were not just playing their role in the background but determined 
the shape of the Court’s reasoning. It was in Singh that the Court decided to apply the 
market access model for the first time to cases involving free movement and third 
country national family reunification rights by interpreting family residence rights as 
functional to the exercise of the primary right of free movement. This interpretation 
seems to seriously take into account both the priority of the right of free movement and 
the states’ concerns over immigration of third country nationals, based as it was on 
family residence rights being functional to the enhancement of free movement. The 
Singh interpretation of the ancillary relationship between free movement and family 
reunification was adopted by the Court in Carpenter, in which we saw that the Court 
did not just have to deal with free movement and immigration concerns but also with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Metock judgment, paras. 74-75. It is interesting to note that on the contentions of the Member States 
over border controls the Court also stated that that the issue of migration of third country national EU 
family members had little dimension because it affected just the family members within the meaning of 
Art. 2(2) and related to a citizen who exercised his/her right to free movement (Ibid., para. 73). 
151	  As mentioned earlier in this chapter the very first case on family reunification was Morson and 
Jhanjan v. The Netherlands which dates back to 1982.	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the protection of the fundamental right of family life. The same reading was applied in 
later cases such as Akrich, Jia, Eind and Metock.  
 Looking at CJEU’s reasoning in family reunification cases at the interplay 
between free movement and Member States’ attempt to reduce inward immigration can 
help us to better understand the rationale behind certain decisions. For this reason, as 
seen before, the reference to Art. 8 ECHR in the Akrich case should not strike us as 
something extemporaneous but as a way to temper the strictness of the Member States’ 
immigration control rationale in favour of future interpretation of free movement cases. 
In the same way, the fact that in Jia the Court avoided the problem of deciding the issue 
of to whom the competence of the first entry assessment of third country nationals 
belonged is probably indicative of the reluctance of the Court to decide whether 
Member States’ sovereignty over migration should be restricted. Similarly, the 
reference to Art. 35 Directive 2004/38/EC with regard to the possibilities left to the 
national Member States to avoid the entry of third country national family members is a 
specification inserted in Metock to probably balance the definitive decision of the Court 
to deny the Member States’ competence over third country national family members 
first entry immigration assessment.  
 Looking more closely to the cases that have been analysed above, it is also 
evident that the application of the Singh test has been expanded from case to case.152 To 
this end, whilst in Singh the ancillary relationship between free movement and family 
reunification was applied in returnees cases, in Carpenter the same principle was 
extended also to citizens that never left their state of origins and that just provided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 After the ruling in Singh, nearly all of the following cases on family reunification opted for the Singh 
test rather than for a literal application of the family reunification provisions contained in the free 
movement legislation. This choice can be explained, as argued in this chapter, by the Court’s attempt to 
take into account both free movement and Member States’ immigration concerns. Beyond this reason 
another explanation could be based on path dependency theory. This theory has been borrowed from 
economics and applied to law. The path dependency theory in a law context is the idea that history 
matters and that choices made in the past can affect the choices that will be made in the future. One of the 
implications of this theory is that, as argued by Hathaway, “once a court makes an initial decision, it is 
less costly to continue down that same path than it is to change to a different path” (On this point see 
Oona A. Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: the Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System”, 2003, John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working 
Papers, Paper 270, accessed October 2013, available at 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/lepp_papers/270>, 107). One perhaps could see a path dependency 
trend in the post Singh case law. On path dependency see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, 
Institutions and Social Analysis, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); William H. Sewell, 
“Three Temporalities: toward a sociology of the event”, October 1990, CSST Working Paper 58, paper 
presented at a conference on “The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences” at the University of Michigan, 
accessed October 2013, available at 
<http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/51215/448.pdf?sequence=1>; Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, “Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-dependence”, International Review of Law and 
Economics 12, no. 2 (1992).  
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services abroad. The broadening of the Singh test continued in the Eind case where the 
“obstacle to free movement” language was applied to grant to the third country national 
daughter the right of residence on the territory of father’s state of origin despite the fact 
that the family bounds did not affect the first movement of the latter in the first place. 
Finally, the Singh test has been further developed in Metock too by connecting the 
functional relationship between family reunification provisions and free movement 
rights also to the right of residence. In this way, the Court overcame the anomalous 
Akrich case and granted a complete protection of free movement and family residence 
rights. Owing to the Metock ruling, potentially, it can be always possible to argue that, 
despite when and where the family relationship was born, denying the third country 
national the right to reside in the host Member State would hinder the exercise of the 
right of residence of the EU sponsor.   
Tryfonidou suggested that over these years the CJEU has moved back and forth 
between liberal and less liberal positions. In her words “over the years, in the case-law 
of the European Court of Justice determining the availability of family reunification 
rights for migrant Member State nationals, the pendulum has swung back and forth, 
from a ‘moderate approach’ in cases such as Morson and Jhanjan (1982) and Akrich 
(2003), towards a more ‘liberal approach’ in cases such as Carpenter (2002) and Jia 
(2007)” while the most recent judgments of Eind and Metock “appear to have decidedly 
moved the pendulum towards the ‘liberal approach’ side”.153  However, in the light of 
this analysis, rather than an intermittent approach it seems instead that the Court has 
opted since the beginning for a liberal approach towards family reunification. As a 
matter of fact, by applying the Singh test to different circumstances, the Court ended up 
prioritizing free movement and the right of residence of third country national family 
members over immigration issues on a broader and broader spectrum of scenarios to the 
extent that now, after Metock, family residence rights are guaranteed despite when and 
where the family relationship was born and regardless the previous lawful residence 
within the European Union of the third country national family member.  
 The overall liberal approach of the Court with regard to free movement and third 
country national residence rights can also be seen as a reversal of the original intentions 
of the European legislator. As hinted before when analyzing the Singh case, it was the 
Court that introduced the idea of interpreting family reunification rights as functional to 
the right of free movement in accordance to the market access model originally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Tryfonidou, supra note 6, 634. 
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developed in the free movement of goods cases. This interpretation, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, was probably not in the original plans of the European legislator. It is very 
likely that the first family residence provisions inserted in the free movement legislation 
of the sixties, given the historical contingencies of the time, were drafted as bonus rights 
to be automatically granted once the primary right of free movement was exercised by 
the European sponsor.154 Hence, as suggested already, the utilization of the Singh 
interpretation of the ancillary relationship between free movement and family 
reunification might have simply been a device in order to accomplish Member States’ 
concerns, that developed after the oil crisis, over immigration of third country nationals. 
In other words, the Court preferred “buying umbrellas instead of mending the roof”155 
that means that, instead of referring to the literal significance of the free movement 
legislation, it preferred to follow a compromise solution in order to give the Member 
States an assurance that their sovereignty over immigration of third country national EU 
family members was still respected.  
In the light of this analysis I propose these conclusions. From all the case law 
that has been analysed it is possible to note that the Court has been faced with free 
movement and immigration concerns. From the Court’s reasoning it is seems that in all 
the cases, with the exception of MRAX, European judges have attempted to take into 
account both free movement and immigration stances, also by reading residence family 
rights as functional to free movement. The inconsistencies among these judgments are 
better understood if seen in the light of the Court’s attempt to deal with this tension. 
However, overall, with the exception of Akrich (which however was soon repealed), the 
Court made the choice of prioritizing free movement and third country national 
residence rights over Member States’ complains and concerns. This choice, as it will be 
soon seen, it very different from the one adopted by the Court in the cases involving 
static EU citizens.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  As seen before in the chapter the MRAX case was the only third country national family residence 
right case in which the Court refused to apply a functional reading between free movement and family 
reunification provisions and simply recurred to a literal interpretation.	  	  	  
155 Alina Tryfonidou, “Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens' 
Europe”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 35, no. 1 (2008), 43. 
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Chapter 4: EU static citizens law cases  
 
1. Introduction  
The idea of EU citizenship, which was considered by many scholars an empty 
concept, soon after its introduction in the Maastricht Treaty revealed itself to be much 
more than a simple academic exercise owing to the activity of the Court. Indeed, the 
Court to use the concept of EU citizenship in order to grant family protection also to EU 
citizens that never crossed their state of origin’s borders. With Garcia Avello and Chen 
the Court started to grant several rights to EU citizens despite them not having exercised 
their right of free movement. In Chen, in particular, the Court for the first time accorded 
residence family rights to third country national family members despite the lack of 
cross border movement of the EU sponsor. As mentioned before, the expansion of the 
concept of EU citizenship developed after the oil crises, when the Member States 
already started to adopt stricter immigration policies compared to the years immediately 
following the Second World War. The aim of this chapter is to look at family 
reunification cases concerning EU static citizens and third country nationals in order to 
show how the Court’s rulings have been shaped both by immigration concerns and the 
goal of strengthening the concept of EU citizenship. Indeed, it will be shown that the 
reasoning of the Court’s most recent cases can be better understood if looked at in terms 
of the interplay between Member States’ concerns over immigration and the idea of 
enhancing the EU citizenship status. As opposed to what occurred in cases involving 
EU moving citizens, in this strand of case law, overall, the Court let the aim of 
enhancing the concept of EU citizenship to be overtaken by Member States’ concerns 
over losing their control on assessing the right of residence of third country national 
family members of EU static citizens.  
This chapter will be divided into seven parts. After this brief introduction, parts 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 will be dedicated respectively to the Zambrano, McCarthy, Dereci, O 
and S and Ymeraga, and Iida cases. In this analysis I will explore how the reasoning of 
the judgments are based on the interplay between Member States’ concerns over 
immigration and the development of the concept of EU citizenship as a source of 
independent family residence rights. Finally, part 7 will be dedicated to the conclusions. 
This analysis will point out that the judgments’ inconsistencies and incongruities can be 
explained in the willingness of the Court to take into account both EU citizenship and 
Member States’ concerns over third country nationals immigration. I will also show that 
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overall, unlike the strand of case law analysed in the previous chapter, the Court 
preferred to endorse a strict approach that consisted in prioritizing Member States’ 
concerns over immigration over the enhancement of the concept of EU citizenship as a 
source of independent family residence rights. I will suggest the reasons why this 
approach has been endorsed and that, nevertheless, the Court’s approach has left 
significant space for future jurisprudential manoeuvres to further develop the concept of 
EU citizenship in favour of  third country national family members.
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2. The final detachment of the concept of EU citizenship from the right of movement: 
Zambrano1  
The outcome of Metock was welcomed by many2, quoted in later cases3 and is 
likely to develop further in the future.4 Nevertheless, Metock did not have a general 
application to all the European citizens. Family rights in Metock were in fact tied to the 
cross border movement of EU citizens: the case in fact reflected the transnational 
conception of European citizenship that is enshrined in Directive 2004/38/EC. While in 
2001 the CJEU itself had proclaimed that “Union citizenship is destined to be 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for”,5 Directive 
2004/38/EC only emphasized the transnational/cross border dimension of European 
citizenship.6 Nevertheless, some years later, the Court seemed to overcome Metock’s 
limitations with Zambrano. Zambrano is the first case in which the Court openly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Case 34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-1177. 
2 The approach of the Court in Metock was highly praised within the academic community. Professor 
Peers considered Metock as a highly welcomed judgment since it was able to restore clarity after the 
uncertainties introduced by Akrich and for its practical implications on national legislation and 
proceedings. On this point see Steve Peers, “Free movement, Immigration Control and Constitutional 
Conflict”, European Constitutional Law Review 5, no. 5 (2009), 191-196. See also Nathan Cambien, 
“Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform”, 
Columbia Journal of European Law 15, (2008), 321, 334 and Catryn Costello, “Metock: Free Movement 
and Normal Family Life in the Union”, Common Market Law Review 46, no. 2 (2009), 587. 
3 In some cases Metock constituted the line of reasoning and in some others it was just quoted. In Sahin 
(Case 551/07 Sahin v. Bundesminister für Inneres [2008] ECR I-1043), the outcome of Metock was used 
to allow a third country national pursuing asylum in Austria to derive her right of residence within the 
territory of state after marrying a German national residing there. In Ibrahim (Case 310/08 London 
Borough of Harrow v. Nimco Hassan Ibrahim and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] 
ECR I-1065) and Teixeira (Case 480/08 Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2010] ECR I-1107), while granting under art. 12 of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC the right of residence in the host Member State of a child in education and therefore the 
right of the parents to reside, the CJEU used Metock to underline the fact that Directive 2004/38/EC did 
not repeal art. 12 Regulation 1612/68/EEC because the scope of the directive is to simplify and strengthen 
the right of residence (for a deeper account of this case see Helena Wray, “Teixeira and Ibrahim: Looking 
back, looking forward or inward?”, FMW: Online journal on free movement of workers in the European 
Union 2, (2011). In Chakroun (Case 578/08 Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010] ECR I-
01839) Metock was applied in a case involving Directive 2003/86/EC on the right of family reunification 
in order to forbid the discretion of Member States in deciding whether or not to introduce a distinction 
based on the time of marriage of the spouse. Finally in McCarthy (Case 434/09 Shirley McCarthy v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] ECR I-3375) the Court used the reasoning of Metock 
on the applicability of Directive 2004/38/EC and on the fact that it meant to enhance freedom of 
movement and residence of Union citizens in order to forbid family reunification rights to Mrs. 
McCarthy, who wanted to reunify with her Jamaican husband despite the fact that she had never moved to 
another Member State. This case will be analyzed later in this chapter.  
4 See Diego Acosta Arcarazo, “Immigration in the European Union: family Reunification after the 
Metock Case”, in University College Dublin Law Review 9, (2009). The author wishes Metock to be 
applied also to cases involving family reunification just between third country nationals.  
5Case 184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies – Louvain la Neuve [2001] ECR I-
6193. 
6 Costello, supra note 2, 616-617. 
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detached the protection granted to EU citizens and their third country national family 
members from the exercise of the right of free movement.  
For the purpose of clarity, and in order to understand the significant change that 
occurred in Zambrano, it is necessary to recall the previously mentioned Chen case. In 
this part therefore I will begin by recalling the facts of Chen and looking more in detail 
at the reasoning endorsed by the Court in this case. This is not meant to be a mere 
repetition of concepts but a way through which I will be able to better highlight the 
elements of novelty introduced by Zambrano. 
Pursuant on the peculiarities of Irish citizenship law at the relevant time, the 
daughter of a Chinese couple who was born in Belfast, i.e. UK territory, acquired Irish 
nationality and was thus a Union citizen. After some months, the mother and the little 
daughter decided to move to Cardiff and the former applied for a long-term residence 
permit as the mother of a EU citizen residing in another Member State. The national 
Court referred two interdependent questions to the CJEU: could little Catherine derive 
the right to reside in the UK in force of her Irish nationality and, in case of a positive 
answer, could the right to reside of the mother derive from it as well? A.G Tizzano, first 
of all, answered to the preliminary objection of the UK, which submitted that the facts 
at stake amounted to a purely internal situation. Basing his reasoning on Garcia Avello 
he dismissed the UK’s claim on the grounds that “Catherine’s Irish nationality is 
sufficient to establish that the proceeding between her, with her mother, and the 
Secretary of State are not purely internal to the United Kingdom law.”7 After this 
clarification he focused on Catherine’s right of residence. He started his reasoning by 
saying that “the fact that a minor cannot exercise a right independently does not mean 
that he has no capacity to be an addressee of legal provisions on which that right is 
founded.”8 After having dismissed the original idea of protecting Catherine’s right of 
residence under Directive 73/148/EEC on the right of establishment and the provision 
of services given that, under this piece of legislation, she could only claim a temporary 
right of residence9, he asked whether the long term right of residence could derive from 
the now Art. 21 TFEU on EU citizenship and Directive 90/364/EEC, that set limits and 
conditions to the right of residence of a non-economically active person in another 
Member State. He found that the child, since she was covered by sickness insurance and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Chen opinion, para. 34.  
8 Ibid., para. 44. 
9Ibid., para. 61. The right of residence was temporary because it could be granted just for the period 
during which the services were provided. 
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possessed, through her parents, sufficient resources not to become a risk on the UK 
welfare system, could meet the requirements laid down by Directive 90/364/EEC and 
could therefore reside for an indeterminate period in the UK in force of her European 
citizenship status.10 Finally, A.G. Tizzano concentrated on Mrs. Chen’s right of 
residence. He found that Mrs. Chen could not be described as a dependent member of 
Catherine’s family therefore neither Directive 73/148/EEC nor 90/364 EEC could be 
applied to grant her residence in the United Kingdom.11 However, recalling Baumbast, 
he stated the mother’s right to stay derived from the daughter’s right of residence, being 
her primary carer.12 
The Court followed entirely, but more synthetically, A.G. Tizzano’s opinion. As 
Tizzano the Court in its preliminary considerations pointed out, quoting Garcia Avello, 
that the mere fact that a person did not exercise the right of freedom of movement does 
not necessarily mean that the situation does not fall under the competence of EU law.13 
With regard to the question of Catherine’s residence, as suggested by Tizzano, the now 
Art. 21 TFEU and Directive 90/364/EEC conferred the little girl the right to reside for 
an indefinite period in the UK.14 Finally, with regard to the right of residence of Mrs. 
Chen, the Court as well derived her right to reside from the right of her daughter by 
stating that “a refusal to allow the parent, whether a national of a Member State or a 
national of a non-member country, who is the carer of a child to whom Article 18 EC 
(now Art. 21 TFEU) and Directive 90/364/EEC grant a right of residence, to reside with 
that child in the host Member State would deprive the child’s right of residence of any 
useful effect.”15 
From the reconstruction proposed it is possible to note that in this case the Court 
initially was concerned in finding a link between the situation at stake and EU law. 
According to the advocate general and the Court the link lay in the entitlement arising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., paras. 63-78. 
11 Ibid., paras. 86-87. 
12 Ibid., paras. 91. More recently the Court employed a similar reasoning to Baumbast in Case 529/11 
Alarpe and Tijani v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] not yet reported.  
13 Chen judgment, paras. 20-21. 
14 Ibid., paras. 24 et ss. 
15 Chen judgment, para. 45. Chen was the object of an intense debate among scholars. On one side it was 
highly praised for recognizing children as full legal personalities and for the refusal to rely on a definition 
of citizenship that would entail economic aspects. On this point see Caroline Sawyer, “Civis Europeanus 
sum: the citizenship rights of the children of foreign parents”, Public Law, (2005). On the other side it 
was also underlined how the Chen judgment was “family reunification friendly” simply because there 
was no risk that the parties could become a burden on the social welfare state, given Catherine’s health 
expenses were covered by a health insurance and her parents were able to look after her economically. On 
this point see Jean Y. Carlier, “Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department”, Common Market Law Review 42, no. 4 (2005), 1131. 
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from the status of EU citizenship alone. Once the link was found with EU law, given 
that the provisions on family reunification of the secondary legislation could not be 
applied because the right of the sponsor was granted at treaty level and not by the 
secondary legislation on free movement, the Court derived family residence rights from 
the status of EU citizenship itself by stating that the departure of Mrs. Chen would have 
deprived the little Catherine of her primary right of residence within the Union. In this 
light it is worth pointing out that, although no objective physical movement from a 
Member State to the other occurred,16 a fictional cross border element given by the 
mismatching of nationalities (little Catherine was an Irish national living in UK 
territory) was still present. Even the parties who submitted the question on whether the 
minor citizen of a Member State could claim the right of entry and residence in another 
Member State based their reasoning on this idea. For this reason, although a real cross 
border movement did not really occur, the reasoning of the Court was still based on the 
application of Art. 21 TFEU, which protects the right to move and reside.17 It is exactly 
here that the main difference with Zambrano occurred. Indeed, as it will be soon 
pointed out the Court in Zambrano, owing in particular to the Rottman case which was 
decided some years after Chen, managed to untie the knot that still kept the concept of 
European citizenship attached the idea of free movement by relying on the application 
of Art. 20 TFEU.18 
In Zambrano, the CJEU was faced with a situation involving the non-EU parents 
of two EU-citizen/children, born and resident in Belgium and that had never left that 
Member State. The facts of the case resembled Chen but this case took the ruling in 
Chen a step forward. Unlike the circumstances of Chen, in Zambrano the nationality 
matched the country of residence (the children involved, son and daughter of 
Colombian nationals, were born in Belgium and acquired Belgian nationality). The 
question referred to in this case by the parents was significant: can third country 
national EU family members enjoy the right of residence within the territory of a 
Member State due to their blood link to European citizens although the latter never 
exercised their right to move to another Member State? Eight Member States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Alina Tryfonidou, “Chen: Further Cracks in the Great Wall of the European Union”, European 
Public Law 11, (2005), 539.  
17 Sara Lorenzon, “Cittadinanza europea e principio di attribuzione delle competenze: l’integrazione 
Europea alla prova del test di proporzionalita”, in Dieci casi sui diritti in Europa: uno strumento 
didattico, ed. Marta Cartabia, (Bologna: Il Mulino publishers, 2011), 173.  
18 Ibid., at 176.  
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intervened19 in the case and argued that the situation at stake had to be labeled as wholly 
internal so that EU law on citizenship was not applicable. Both A.G. Sharpston and the 
Court did not agree. 
A.G. Sharpston, in a frank and detailed account suggested two feasible options 
to the Court.20 In the first one she challenged the legitimacy of the wholly internal rule 
in general and in the particular circumstances at stake. The advocate general started by 
pointing out that, although in many citizenship cases a clearly identifiable cross border 
element could be found,21there were some other cases in which the “element of true 
movement is either barely discernable or frankly not existent”.22 In the light of this 
backdrop, she questioned the real meaning of the core right of European citizenship, i.e. 
the “right to move and reside”.23 Reading the previous Rottman and Chen cases in 
conjunction, A.G. Sharpston concluded that European citizenship at Artt. 20 and 21 
TFEU conferred a right to reside, which was independent from the right to move.24 The 
facts of Zambrano could not therefore constitute a purely internal situation, even though 
the two little Zambranos did not make use of their right of free movement.25 The little 
Zambranos were citizens of the Union and, therefore, entitled to reside wherever within 
the boundaries of the Union. However, given that the little Zambranos could not 
exercise their right of residence without the support of their parents, due to their young 
age, the refusal to grant a derivative right of residence to Mr. Zambrano would 
constitute an interference with their right of residence in their national state as Union 
citizens.26 
With the second option, in case the first one was not accepted, she challenged the 
legitimacy of reverse discrimination. She started by defining the concept of reverse 
discrimination, which occurs when “static factors of production will be left in a worse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland. 
20 In truth A.G. Sharpston advanced also a third option in case the first two were not accepted. She 
foresaw that the solution of the case could have been given by the application of fundamental rights in 
subjects covered by unique or shared competence of the Community, even in cases in which that 
competence was not applied yet (para. 163). However she underlined that this was not a feasible solution. 
Making the application of EU fundamental rights dependent solely on the existence of exclusive or shared 
competence would have introduced a federal element in the EU political system (para. 172). This is not a 
decision that can be taken unilaterally by the Court but it requires a political decision at its roots.  
21 Zambrano opinion, paras. 75-76.  
22 Ibid., para. 77. At paras. 78-79 she gave also some examples such as Garcia Avello, Chen and Rottman.  
23 Ibid., para. 80. 
24 Ibid., paras. 94-96.  
25 Ibid., para. 97.  
26 Ibid., para. 102. The advocate general referred also to the concept of proportionality (paras. 109-122). 
For a more detailed discussion on this point see Chapter 5.  
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position than their mobile counterparts”,27 and wondered whether in the context of the 
citizenship of the Union the application of reverse discrimination was an acceptable 
result.28 After having considered some cases including Carpenter, Chen and Metock she 
concluded that all these cases offered a broad interpretation of Art. 21 TFEU but ended 
up creating legal uncertainty.29 Therefore, she proposed to avoid the temptation of 
stretching Art. 21 TFEU in order to cover the situations of those that did not exercise 
freedom of movement30 and to start interpreting Art. 18 TFEU “as prohibiting the 
reverse discrimination caused by the interaction between Art. 21 TFEU and national law 
that entails a violation of a fundamental right protected under EU law where at least 
equivalent protection is not available under national law.”31  
The Court dismissed both of the A.G. Sharpston’s clear reconstructions.32 The 
reasoning of the Court focused solely on Art. 20 TFEU. The Court, by quoting Rottman, 
introduced the new test of the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the citizenship 
rights” by stating that “Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the 
effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.”33 It then 
concluded that the deportation of Mr. Zambrano would have had as a consequence the 
deprivation of the substance of the rights34conferred to the children by virtue of the 
citizenship of the Union because, due to their young age, they should have been forced 
to follow their family and, therefore, to leave the Union.35 Hence, “Art. 20 TFEU is to 
be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from refusing a third country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., para. 133.  
28 Ibid., para. 134. 
29 Ibid., para. 141. 
30 Ibid., para. 143. 
31Ibid., para. 144. However, she underlined that Art. 18 TFEU had to be used just under three cumulative 
conditions: 1) the claimant would have to be a citizen of the EU, resident in his member State of 
nationality who had not exercised free movement rights under TFEU but whose situation was comparable 
to that of the other citizen of the Union in the same Member State who were able to invoke rights under 
21 TFEU; 2) a violation of a fundamental right under EU law should have occurred; 3) Art. 18 would be 
only a subsidiary remedy in case there were no adequate forms of protection (see paras. 146-147-148) 
32 It has been pointed out how the reasoning of the Court is particularly short compared the very well 
analyzed Sharpston’s opinion. On this point see Elspeth Guild, EUDO comment 2011, accessed 
September 2011, available at <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/453-the-court-of-justice-of-
the-european-union-and-citizens-of-the-union-a-revolution-underway-the-zambrano-judgment-of-8-
march-2011>; see also Niamh N. Shuibhne, "Seven questions for seven paragraphs", European Law 
Review 2, (2011).  
33 Zambrano judgment, paras. 40-42. 
34 Some scholars showed perplexity in decrypting the real meaning of the phraseology “substance of 
rights” used by the Court. Among all see Shuibhne, supra note 32, 161-162, Van Eiken, Sybe De Vries, 
“A new route into the promised land? Being a European citizen after Ruiz Zambrano”, European Law 
Review 36, (2011), 713. See also Alicia Hinarejos, “Extending the scope of EU citizenship without the 
cross border”, Cambridge Law Journal 10, no. 2 (2011).  
35 Zambrano judgment, paras. 41-44. 
	   113	  
national upon whom his minor children, who are European Union citizens, are 
dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and nationality of 
those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third country national, 
in so far as such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen.”36 
As seen before, the Court in Chen used Art. 21 TFEU in order to grant the right of 
residence to little Catherine in the UK. Although a physical movement between the two 
Member States did not occur, the Court regarded the mismatching of nationalities as 
enough to constitute a link with EU law under Art. 21 TFEU. As well, A.G. Sharpston 
seemed to prefer, in the first solution proposed for the Zambrano case, to follow this 
same reconstruction. As seen, she suggested relying on a combination between Artt. 20 
and Art. 21 TFEU but, eventually, broadening the meaning of Art. 21 to cover also 
situations in which there was no mismatch of nationalities -like in Zambrano- by 
detaching the right to move from the right to reside. The Court however refused to go 
down this line of argument and preferred to create the new “enjoyment of the substance 
of citizenship rights” test, basing its reasoning only on Art. 20 TFEU, instead of 
extending Art. 21 TFEU to situations of pure residence and no movement. 
Suggesting the reasons why the Court decided to rely on Art. 20 TFEU alone, 
rather than holding on the same line of reasoning as Chen and extending Art. 21 also to 
mere situations of pure residence, might sound a bit speculative.37 However, without 
attempting a definitive answer, some interesting considerations can be made. It is worth 
noting that also in this pronouncement the Court had to deal with the concerns of the 
Member States over third country national immigration. The Court indicated Member 
States’ concerns at recital 37, where it pointed out the content of their submissions:38 
“all governments which submitted observations to the Court and the European 
Commission argue that a situation such as that of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano’s second and 
third children, where those children reside in the Member State of which they are 
nationals and have never left the territory of that Member State, does not come within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., para. 45. 
37 It is likely that if the Court had decided to adopt the broadened interpretation of Art. 21 TFEU proposed 
by Sharpston, the outcome of this approach would have probably been that other citizenship rights rather 
than family one could be invoked against the home Member State even in absence of movement or 
mismatching of nationalities and this would have brought a clear fracture in the Member State 
competences. See on this Ania Lansbergen, and Nina Miller, “European citizenship rights in internal 
situations: an ambiguous revolution? Decision of 8 March 2011, Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEM)”, European Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 2 (2011), 296.  
38 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands, Austria and Poland made submissions 
to the CJEU.  
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the situations envisaged by the freedoms of movement and residence guaranteed under 
European Union law. Therefore, the provisions of European Union law referred to by 
the national court are not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings”. These 
words showed clearly the Member States’ intention to protect their sovereignty over 
immigration from possible friendly interpretations on family rights pursued by the 
CJEU. Following the first solution proposed by A.G. Sharpston to recognize an 
independent right of residence, detached from the right movement, through a combined 
interpretation of Artt. 20 and 21 TFEU would have probably put an end to wholly 
internal situations and, therefore, shrunk further the area of Member States’ sovereignty 
over immigration. It is perhaps for this reason that the Court decided not to go down 
this line but to create a sort of exception39 to the wholly internal rule. As in Rottman, 
also in Zambrano purely internal circumstances could be encompassed within the 
umbrella of EU law40 when the threat to the status of European citizenship is too high to 
leave the situation outside the protection of EU law:41 in Rottman the risk was to lose 
the European citizenship status, in Zambrano the risk was to lose the effective 
enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights. In other words, since in this case the 
substance of citizenship rights was in jeopardy,42 a purely internal situation could 
become exceptionally encompassed within the protection of EU law owing to the 
application of Art. 20 TFEU which, alone, could grant the right of residence to the EU 
citizens and to their third country national family members. To sum up, the more 
limited approach of the Court in comparison to the first solution proposed by Sharpston 
was likely endorsed in order to respect Member States’ concerns over immigration.43  
This choice does not turn the status of EU citizenship into an automatic source of 
residence rights for third country national family members. In this way, Member States’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Many scholars defined Zambrano as an exception to the principle of the wholly internal rule. Among 
all see Hinarejos, supra note 34, 311; Niamh N. Shuibhne, “Case Law: (Some of) the kids are alright”, 
Common Market Law Review 49, no. 1 (2012), 365; Kay Hailbronner, and Daniel Thym, “Case C-34/09, 
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEM)” , Common Market Law Review 48, no. 
4 (2011),1260-1262. 
40 Since none of the children exercised the treaty right to move and reside in a Member State other than 
the one they were nationals it was crucial for the Court to determine whether a connecting factor, apart 
from the free movement one, could be established. On this point see Shuibhne, supra note 39, 365.  
41 Alicia Hinarejos, “Citizenship of the EU: clarifying genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship 
rights”, Cambridge Law Journal 71, no. 2 (2012), 280.  
42 Hinarejos, supra note 34, 311.  
43 Since Zambrano Belgium attempted to change its national legislation with regards to EU static citizens. 
A legislative proposal of 2012 introduced more burdensome rights for static nationals when compared to 
other Union citizens, but made an exception for minor children and their parents. On this point see 
Nathan Cambien, “Union Citizenship and Immigration: Rethinking the Classics?”, European Journal of 
Legal Studies 5, no. 1 (2012), 23.   
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sovereignty still remains protected in all the situations that do not clearly fall within the 
Zambrano exception.  
At the same time however, it is worth noting how the decision of the Court has 
also been shaped around the enhancement of the concept of European citizenship as a 
source of independent family residence rights. In her opinion in Zambrano A.G. 
Sharpston asked “[I]s Union citizenship merely the non-economic version of the same 
generic kind of free movement rights as have long existed for the economically active 
and for persons of independent means? Or does it mean something more radical: true 
citizenship, carrying with it a uniform set of rights and obligations, in a Union under the 
rule of law in which respect for fundamental rights must necessarily play an integral 
part?”44 Looking at Zambrano the pendulum seems to have swung more toward the 
second position. Indeed, the right of residence of the third country national family 
member was granted, despite the absence of legislative provisions at treaty level, as an 
ancillary right to the status of European citizenship that is when the former right is 
functional to the scope of preserving the substance of citizenship’s rights.45 Unlike the 
free movement cases in which the ancillary relationship between free movement and 
family reunification depends on the whether the denial to family reunification would 
create an obstacle to free movement, in cases concerning family residence rights and the 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights of EU citizenship this functional relationship 
applies when between the EU citizen and the third country national family member 
occurs a relation of dependence. Indeed in Zambrano, a functional relationship between 
family residence rights and the enjoyment of the substance of the rights of EU 
citizenship existed because the EU children were dependent on the third country 
national family member and, therefore, they could have never enjoyed their status of EU 
citizens without the presence of their father within the Belgian territory.46 Through the 
dependency relationship applied to the enjoyment of the substance of citizens’ rights the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Zambrano opinion, para. 3.  
45 For the sake of clarity it is worth pointing out that the rights granted to the third country national family 
members in Chen and Zambrano were slightly different. In the case of Chen, the EU law granted the 
child’s third country national caregiver the derivative right to reside in the host Member State as long as 
the former was covered by sickness insurance and both the child and the third country national parent had 
sufficient resources not to become a burden on the Member State. In Zambrano instead, the Court granted 
the father of two European children of the same nationality of the state of application the right of 
residence in the Member State as the refusal would have forced the children to leave the territory of the 
European Union. For the same reason the father was also granted a work permit because, without it, the 
risk would have been the lack of sufficient resources for himself and the family (Zambrano judgment, 
para. 44). On these two different paths see Van Eijken, and Sybe A. de Vries, supra note 34, 714. 
46 Zambrano judgment, para. 43.  
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simple status of EU citizenship, without free movement being involved, was turned into 
the source from which protection of the family unit stemmed.47  
In conclusion, it seems the reasoning adopted by the Court in Zambrano was 
shaped around both Member States’ immigration concerns and the pursuit of citizenship 
rights of static citizens. Overall, its outcome struck a balance in favour of EU 
citizenship’s rights rather than immigration concerns. The precedent of Zambrano could 
have pushed the boundaries of the Member States national immigration laws in ways 
that states would have found challenging.48 Nevertheless, as it will be soon seen, the 
activity of the Court was immediately focused in trying to narrow down the Zambrano 
principle and its future implications as much as possible.  
 
3. The first Zambrano curtailment: McCarthy49 
 Zambrano was welcomed by many scholars for the solution proposed to the 
factual circumstances of the case. Some, however, hoped that one of the issues that the 
Court left unanswered, i.e. whether or not the new test should be limited to the simple 
parent-child physical dependency relation,50 might lead to a more extensive application 
in future judgments and put an end to the wholly internal rule. The Court managed to 
clarify its position, in particular, in the following cases of McCarthy and Dereci. These 
two cases ended up curtailing the scope of Zambrano and did not put an end to the 
wholly internal rule. In this part I am going to analyse the approach of the Court in the 
first Zambrano curtailing case: McCarthy. 
Shirley McCarthy was a British national who was born and had always resided 
in the United Kingdom. She also held Irish nationality. The case stemmed from a 
refusal from the Secretary of State and Home Department, in 2004, to issue a residence 
permit to her on the basis of EU law as an Irish national residing in the UK. That refusal 
was grounded on the basis that she was not a qualified person (a worker, self-employed 
person or self-sufficient person) and, accordingly, that Mr McCarthy was not the spouse 
of ‘a qualified person’. The decision of applying for a residence permit from her home 
state on the basis of EU law was taken not because of doubts about her own entitlement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Catherine Barnard, “Citizenship of the Union and the Area of Justice: (Almost) the Court’s Moment of 
Glory” in The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years 
of Case Law, eds. Allan Rosas, Egils Levits, and Yves Bot, (New York: Springer, 2012), 510-511. 
48 Jo Shaw, “Has the European Court of Justice challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality 
Law?”, EUI working papers, 2011/62, accessed March 2012, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-the-european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-state-
sovereignty-in-nationality-law>, 38.  
49 Case 434/09, McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-3375. 
50 Lansbergen, Miller, supra note 37, 296. 
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to live in the UK but because her husband, George McCarthy, was a Jamaican national 
who was not entitled to live there. Mrs. McCarthy was therefore hoping to be granted a 
residence permit in the UK through EU citizenship so that her husband would gain the 
automatically derived right to reside with her. The House of Lords referred two 
questions to the CJEU: 1) is a person of dual Irish and British nationality who has 
resided in the United Kingdom for her entire life a “beneficiary” within the meaning of 
Article 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC? 2) has such a person  resided legally within the host 
Member State for the purpose of article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC in circumstances 
where she was unable to satisfy the requirements of Art. 7 of that Directive (self 
sufficiency)?51 
On the first question regarding the application of Art. 3(1) Directive 
2004/38/EC, A.G. Kokott stated that this provision and therefore the entire Directive 
could not apply, given that the Union citizen had never moved from her state of origin.52 
She continued by stating that this right could not be derived from primary law either 
and, in particular, from Art. 21 TFEU, given the fact that in her view this primary law 
provision does not protect the right of residence of Union citizens vis a vis the Member 
States of which they are nationals.53 After having dismissed the applicability of Art. 
3(1) Directive 2004/38/EC and Art. 21 TFEU, A.G. Kokott went on considering 
whether dual nationality instead could be the link to EU law on which rely in order to 
obtain family reunification.54 Recalling the decision in Garcia Avello in order to verify 
whether the same rationale (using the citizenship of another Member State in order to 
overcome national rules for the sake of not being discriminated on the grounds of 
nationality) was applicable in a case involving the right of residence and family 
reunification,55 she suggested that the question at stake was whether or not “the position 
of Union citizens differs, in view of their dual nationality, in a legally relevant way from 
the situation of other Union citizens who are nationals of the Host member State 
only.”56 Looking at the circumstances of the case she pointed out that “no particular 
factors arise from the dual nationality of a Union citizen in Mrs. McCarthy’s position. 
From the point of view of the law on residence, she is in the same situation as all other 
British nationals who have always lived in England and never left their country of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For a more precise summary of the facts of the case see Shuibhne, supra note 39, 353-354. 
52 McCarthy opinion, para. 30.  
53 Ibid., para 31. Note that this position is exactly the opposite of the one supported by A.G. Sharpston in 
her first solution offered in the Zambrano case. 
54 Ibid., para. 32.  
55 Ibid., para. 34. 
56 Ibid., para. 35. 
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origin […]. In fact, Union citizens such as Mrs. McCarthy neither suffer prejudice to 
their right of free movement nor are discriminated against compared with other British 
nationals who are in a comparable situation”.57 Finally, addressing the second question 
on whether Mrs. McCarthy resided legally within the host Member State for the purpose 
of article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC in circumstances where she was unable to satisfy 
the self sufficiency requirements, she stated that allowing Mrs. McCarthy to establish 
permanent residence in the UK as an Irish citizen without requiring to meet the 
conditions of movement and self sufficiency  “would ultimately result in cherry picking 
which does not accord with the spirit and purpose of the provisions of EU law on free 
movement and the right of residence.”58 A.G. Kokott concluded that Mrs. McCarthy 
could not rely on EU law at all and that, therefore, the situation had to be considered as 
wholly internal.  
The Court, while reaching the same decision, differentiated itself from the 
advocate general’s reasoning. Initially the line of reasoning was identical. The Court, as 
well as A.G. Kokott, did not consider that Art. 3(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC could 
bring the situation of a citizen who never moved to another Member State within the 
scope of EU law, irrespective of that citizen’s dual nationality.59 Unlike A.G. Kokott the 
Court reformulated the second question and asked instead whether the rights of Mrs. 
McCarthy could derive from Art. 21 TFEU even though she never exercised her right of 
movement.60 The Court started by stating that the situation of a Union citizen that “has 
made no use of the right of freedom of movement cannot, for that reason alone, be 
assimilated to a purely internal situation”.61 In order to support this statement the Court 
recalled the previous Zambrano case that not just underlined that the concept of EU 
citizenship was destined to become the fundamental status of the nationals of the 
Member States but also pointed out “that national measures which have the effect of 
depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of that status” have to be dismissed.62 The Court then considered 
Art. 21 TFEU as a substantive core right encompassed within the status of European 
citizenship. As a matter of fact it stated that “as a national of at least one Member State, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., paras. 37-38.  
58 Ibid., para. 56.  
59 McCarthy judgment, paras. 31-43.  
60 Ibid., para. 44. Note that, unlike Zambrano, the Court formulated its discussion under Art. 21 and not 
Art. 20. Art. 21, in this case, was meant to protect the potential right of free movement of Mrs. McCarthy 
that, in the view of the applicant, could be hindered in the event that her husband had to be sent back to 
Jamaica.  
61 Ibid., para. 46. 
62 Ibid., para. 47. 
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a person such as Mrs. McCarthy enjoys the status of a Union citizen under Article 20(1) 
TFEU and may therefore rely on the rights pertaining to that status, including against 
his Member State of origin, in particular the right conferred by Article 21 TFEU to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.”63 Nevertheless, in the 
circumstances at stake, the Court found that “[…] no element of the situation of Mrs. 
McCarthy indicated that the national measure at issue in the main proceedings had the 
effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights or 
impeding her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States”.64 The Court concluded saying that the national measure at stake, unlike 
Zambrano, did not have the effect of obliging Mrs. McCarthy to leave the territory of 
the European Union.65  
Comparing McCarthy to Zambrano we can note that the Court, in this case, 
seems to have explained the content of Zambrano by suggesting that the right of 
exercising free movement ex Art. 21 TFEU among the Member States had to be 
considered a substantive EU citizenship right.66 In this way free movement became a 
right pertaining to the status of EU citizenship.67 However, the Court did not just 
specify the content of Zambrano but also ended up curtailing its scope. As a matter of 
fact the Court in McCarthy, on one side, confirmed the principle created in Zambrano 
by applying it but, at the same time, “stripped it out” by finding that there was no 
deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the rights attached to EU citizenship in the 
circumstances at stake.68 This conclusion was delivered without real consistency with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid., para. 48. 
64 Ibid., para. 49.  
65 Ibid., para. 50. The Court, in order to support its argument, contrasted it with the previous two cases 
Garcia Avello and Grunkin and Paul. It stated that in both cases the serious inconvenience that stemmed 
from the double nationality situation was liable to constitute an obstacle to free movement. This was not 
the case in McCarthy. On this point see Shuibhne, supra note 39, 358.  
66 See again McCarthy judgment, para. 48.  
67 At para. 48 the Court seems to suggest that also the potential future exercise of the right to move and 
reside are crucial for the determination of whether or not the situation falls within the scope ratione 
materiae of EU law. Concretely this means to verify whether or not the possibility of exercising free 
movement in the future could be considered as a core substantive EU citizenship right. On this point see 
Peter Van Elsuwege, and Dimitry Kochenov, “On The Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship 
and Family Reunification Rights”, European Journal of Migration and Law 13, no. 4 (2011), 450-452. 
Nevertheless, some scholars offered a different interpretation and suggested that free movement was not a 
specification of the Zambrano test but an additional test to the enjoyment of the substance of citizenship 
rights. The idea of double step can be found in the piece of Shuibhne, supra note 39, 366. See also 
Roderic O’ Gorman “Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and the purely internal rule”, Irish Jurist 46, (2011), 
225. Following this interpretation that could lead to a great deal of confusion especially considering the 
fact that in the next Dereci case, as it will be seen, there is no reference to free movement whatsoever. On 
this point see Shuibhne, supra note 39, 367. New reference to movement and to the double test will be 
seen in the following Iida case that will be analysed later on in the chapter. 
68 Lansbergen, and Miller, supra note 37, 298-299. Some argued that the argument over the unconditional 
right to reside should have been faced referring also to the principles of International Law. It would have 
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the previous Zambrano case. As a matter of fact in McCarthy the Court relied on 
International law in order to bolster the fact that the national measure would not force 
Mrs. McCarthy to leave the territory of the Union but this reasoning was not endorsed 
in Zambrano.69  
In the light of the factual circumstances of these two cases it is difficult to 
understand why the Court reserved to them such a different treatment. Moreover, also 
the last part of the reasoning in which differences between Garcia Avello and 
Zambrano, on one side, and McCarthy on the other were underlined,70 the Court was 
not capable of proposing a convincing explanation of the reasons why the national 
measure provoked a serious inconvenience to free movement for the Union citizens 
concerned in Garcia Avello and Zambrano and did not create such inconvenience for 
the enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights in McCarthy.71 As Shuibhne 
underlined, the fact that Mrs. McCarthy might have had to be forced to live in the UK 
without her husband, move to another Member State in order to invoke family 
reunification rights according to the more favorable EU free movement legislation or 
leave the territory of the Union to go to Jamaica are all situations in which the substance 
of citizenship rights could have been violated.72 
How can the inconsistencies between the McCarthy reasoning and the Zambrano 
one be explained? Once again the path taken by the Court can be seen as a compromise. 
The need for a compromise can be traced to Member States’ concerns over third 
country national residence rights, on one side, and EU citizenship on the other. With 
regard to immigration concerns, although neither in the judgment nor in the opinion it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
been possible to argue simply that all nationals have the right to reside in the state by virtue of 
International Law. See on this point Helen Oosterom-Staples, “To What Extent Has Reverse 
Discrimination Been Reversed?”, European Journal of Migration and Law 14, no. 2 (2012), 170. See 
also Shuibhne, supra note 39, 367; Van Elsuwege, Kochenov, supra note 67, 454. Authoritative doctrine 
however specified that McCarthy, although curtailed Zambrano, did not contradict it. This doctrine 
underlined the importance of European citizenship as a focal source of several substantive rights that the 
applicant could claim in front of his own Member State too at the condition, nevertheless, that the 
applicant was a minor. See Stephen Coutts, “Case C- 434-09: Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department”, in EUDO blog, 2011, accessed January 2012, available at <http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/eu-citizenship>.  
69 Zambrano judgment, para. 50. 
70 McCarthy judgment, paras. 51-53.  
71 Anya Wiesbroke, “Disentangling the Union Citizenship Puzzle? The McCarthy case”, European Law 
Review 36, no. 6 (2011), 869. Some criticism was raised on this point. Because of the open formulation of 
the test, its exact meaning will have to be formulated on a case by case basis. See on this point Sandra 
Mantu, “Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci”, Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 26, no. 
1 (2012), 52. 
72 See Shuibhne, supra note 39, 368. In the first option her right to family right would be hindered, in the 
second option, although her right to free movement could theoretically be exercised, there could be some 
practical inconveniences that would prevent her from enjoying it. In the last circumstance, having to leave 
the territory of the Union, automatically hinders the substance of EU citizenship rights.  
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possible to find any reference to the submissions presented by the UK or by any of the 
Member States that joined its complaints, it seems that both the Court and the advocate 
general intentionally decided not to go down the broad route opened by Zambrano in 
order to preserve the Member States’ sovereignty in the field of legal immigration. 
Indeed, the Court in McCarthy ended up referring to the old theory on internal and 
external situations started with Morson and Jianhan73 and confirmed Zambrano as an 
exception.74 At the same time the CJEU managed also to reap the Zambrano test as tight 
as it could be by stating, not very convincingly, that a situation such as the McCarthy 
one would not be at risk of seeing Mrs. McCarthy’s substance of citizenship right 
violated or of seeing her right to free movement among Member States hindered. Unlike 
Zambrano no explicit reference to the concept of dependence was made. However, 
despite the lack of direct reference to dependence, it seems that the functional 
relationship between the genuine enjoyment substance of citizenship rights and the 
residence family rights of third country national family members did not apply since 
Mrs. McCarthy was an adult and not dependent on Mr. McCarthy.  
Despite this strict reasoning the approach of the Court seems also to have been 
shaped by the idea of preserving and developing a concept of EU citizenship as a source 
of independent family rights. To this end, it can be noted how the Court explicitly 
extended the EU law competence to cases in which a cross border movement did not 
occur yet, such as cases of potential or future movement.75 When in fact the Court 
considered Art. 21 TFEU as a substantive core right encompassed within the status of 
European citizenship clearly referred to a potential and future right of free movement, 
given that, from the facts submitted, it was evident that Mrs. McCarthy never exercised 
that right among Member States before the judgment. In other words, the Court 
considered that the right of exercising future and potential free movement should be 
protected as a substantive EU citizenship right by Art. 20 TFEU. This same point will 
be repeated in the following Iida case.  
In conclusion, also in this case it is evident how the reasoning of the Court has 
been shaped around the willingness to protect Member States’ sovereignty and to 
develop even further the concept of EU citizenship as a source of self-standing family 
rights. Indeed, on one side, the Court referred to the wholly internal rule theory and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 McCarthy judgment, para. 45.  
74 Ibid., para. 47. Shuibhne pointed out that the language used by the Court was particularly ambiguous. 
Hence, it is difficult to understand immediately that Zambrano is perceived as an exception to the wholly 
internal rule. See Shuibhne, supra note 39, 366.  
75 See Wiesbroke, supra note 71, 866.  
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reduced Zambrano to a mere exception. Simultaneously, on the other side, the Court 
managed to also preserve the concept of EU citizenship as a source of self-standing 
rights specifying that even potential and future free movement amounted to substantive 
citizenship rights. Looking at the outcome of the case itself, overall it seems that the 
reference of the Court to the wholly internal rule in the application offered to the 
Zambrano test in McCarthy showed how the interest of the Court was to strike a 
balance in favor to the protection of Member States’ sovereignty over immigration. 
Indeed it is very likely that, once it realized the potentially vast effect that Zambrano 
could have had in cases involving static EU citizens and third country nationals, the 
Court resolved to shrink as much as possible its consequences for the sake of preserving 
Member States’ sovereignty over national immigration. However, as hinted before, the 
specification that even potential and future movements to another Member State have to 
be encompassed within the protection granted by Art. 20 TFEU shows the willingness 
of the Court to continue to expand the substantive rights amounting to the concept of 
EU citizenship regardless the strict position adopted in this case. This fact could suggest 
that the strict approach endorsed might be just temporary while the seeds for the 
creation of a full- bodied concept of EU citizenship are being planted.  
 
4. The second curtailment of Zambrano: Dereci76  
The second case that had an impact on Zambrano was Dereci. Dereci started 
with a series of refusals to grant residence permits to third country national family 
members of Austrian nationals who had never exercised EU free movement rights. In 
rejecting all of the applications the Ministry for the Home Affairs ruled out the 
application of EU law on the basis that the situation was purely internal. Nevertheless 
the referring court sought a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in order to clarify the 
scope of Zambrano.77  
A.G. Mengozzi agreed with the referring court that “it is necessary to gain a 
better understanding of the implications of the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano”.78 He 
started by ruling out the application of Directive 2004/38/EC to any of the situations of 
Dereci.79 After a brief exposition of the points of Zambrano and McCarthy,80 he found 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Case 256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] not yet reported.   
77 For a more detailed summary of the case see Shuibhne, supra note 39, 358-360. 
78 Dereci opinion, para. 17. 
79 Ibid., paras. 32 et seq. The advocate general stated that Directive 2004/38/EC was not applicable at 
none of the situations of Dereci simply because none of the applicants exercised his/her freedom of 
movement. 
	   123	  
that none of the cases at hand were characterized by a risk of deprivation of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights81 because, as pointed out in the two above 
mentioned cases, the enjoyment of the substance of the rights test does not include “the 
right to respect for family life”.82 Moreover, with regard to the issue of family life, he 
then recalled the old free movement logic in order to bolster the view that no rights of 
residence could be granted to the third country national applicants. He stated that an 
European citizen, in order to be able to enjoy a family life in accordance with EU law, 
has to exercise one of the freedoms of movement laid down in the TFEU, something 
that the applicants in the situation at stake did not do at all. He concluded that “at the 
stage of development of Union law, the Court answer should be that Art. 20 must be 
interpreted to the effect that it does not apply to a Union citizen who is the spouse, 
parent or minor child of a national of a non-member country, where that union citizen 
has never exercised his right to move freely between the Member State and has always 
resided in the Member State of which he is a national, in so far as the situation of that 
Union citizen is not accompanied by the application of national measures which have 
the direct effect of depriving him of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights attaching to his status as a union citizen or as impeding the exercise of his right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member State”.83 
The Court started from questioning whether the provisions concerning the 
citizenship of the Union precluded the national state from refusing a residence permit to 
a third country national family member of a EU citizen who had never exercised his/her 
right to move.84 Firstly, as well as A.G. Mengozzi, the Court ruled out the application of 
Directive 2004/38/EC85 and, recalling McCarthy, stated that “a Union citizen, who has 
never exercised his right of free movement and has always resided in a Member State of 
which he is a national, is not covered by the concept of ‘beneficiary’ for the purposes of 
Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC, so that that directive is not applicable to him”.86 
Secondly, as in McCarthy, the Court addressed the applicability of the EU citizenship 
treaty provisions. Basing its reasoning on Art. 20 TFEU, it reiterated the formulation of 
McCarthy that the non-exercise of movement rights did not imply assimilation to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid., paras. 18-30.  
81 Ibid., para. 33. 
82 Ibid., para. 37. 
83 Ibid., para 50. 
84 Dereci judgment, para. 37. 
85 In reality the Court ruled also out the application of Directive 2003/86/EC (see paras. 46-49).  
86 Ibid., paras. 54 et seq.  
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purely internal situation87 and reconfirmed the Zambrano genuine enjoyment test.88 
Significantly the Grand Chamber then stated overtly what was already implied in 
Zambrano and McCarthy: the deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
citizenship rights is triggered when a Union citizen “has, in fact, to leave not only the 
territory of the Member State of which he is a national but also the territory of the 
Union as a whole”.89 The fact that it might appear desirable for the family to live 
together it is not enough to support the view that the European citizens will be forced to 
leave the territory of the Union if the right of family reunification was not granted.90 
Finally, with regard to the right to respect for family life, in line with A.G. Mengozzi, 
the Court recalled Art. 51(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and pointed that the 
respect of the right to family life should be assessed only if the circumstance of the case 
fell within the EU competences. It then stated that it was up to the national court to 
determine whether or not the circumstance would fall within the umbrella of EU law 
and, consequentially, whether or not Art. 7 of the Charter had to be applied.91   
Unlike McCarthy, the Court in Dereci did not try to specify the content of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the citizenship rights test. Indeed also in this 
case, as it was before in Zambrano, it is not clear which rights pertain to the core 
substance of the EU citizenship. Despite the lack of specification of the rights that 
amount to the substance of EU citizenship, the Court in Dereci has the merit to have 
made clear when a national measure should be considered violating substantive EU 
citizenship rights. The Court underlined that a national measure has to be considered 
violating the substance of EU citizenship rights when it triggers the departure of the EU 
citizen not just from the Member State but also from the territory of the Union as a 
whole. This position, which was already hinted vaguely in Zambrano and in McCarthy, 
clarified finally the Zambrano principle and curtailed it even more. Indeed, if in reading 
McCarthy it seems that the Court proposed a distinction based on the age of the EU 
citizen -where being a minor would entail a violation of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of EU citizenship rights whereas the same violation would not occur if the 
one enjoying the EU citizenship status was an adult- the Court in Dereci dismissed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ibid., para. 61.  
88 Ibid., para. 64.  
89 Ibid., para. 66.  
90 Ibid., para. 68. 
91 Ibid., para. 72. On the other hand, if the national court takes the view that that situation is not covered 
by European Union law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) of the ECHR. 
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totally this line of interpretation92 and made clear that the outcome of a case should be 
based on whether the denial of residence rights to third country nationals would force 
the European citizen to leave the territory of the Union.93 Therefore, potentially also in a 
case in which a EU minor is involved but he/she is not forced to leave the territory of 
the Union by a national measure applied to his/her third country national relative, this 
case will not be protected by the more favorable EU treaty provisions on EU citizenship 
but would fall within the competence of the Member State.  
The Dereci case was subject to a lot of criticism with regard to its interpretation 
of the enjoyment of the substance of EU citizenship rights. First of all, it was argued 
that the Zambrano test was interpreted very strictly by the Court and that this 
interpretation would have limited its application to cases of absolute dependence of the 
citizen upon a third country national.94 Dereci’s application of Human Rights was also 
strongly criticized. On one side the uselessness of the Human Right’s reference in the 
Dereci judgment was pointed out. According to Professor Shaw, referring to 
fundamental rights after having ruled out that the circumstances fell under the umbrella 
of EU law is odd because, in order to grant protection to the family unit, it would be 
sufficient to conclude that the genuine enjoyment criterion is satisfied, without need for 
issues of family life to be engaged.95 On the other side excluding the right to family life 
from the genuine enjoyment test was considered limitative to the development of the 
idea of EU citizenship as the fundamental status of the nationals of the Member 
States96. Another critique is related to the idea of reverse discrimination. Since the Court 
in Dereci interpreted the substance of citizenship rights in such a restrictive way this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Dereci judgment, para. 74. On one side, the Court underlined that even if it appears desirable for 
economic or family reasons to grant residence to the third country national family members this does not 
mean that, without this concession, the European citizen would risk leaving the territory of the Union. On 
the other side, it conferred this assessment to the national courts. In simple terms, now the right to stay of 
the European citizen is determined neither by age nor by the economic situation but by an assessment of 
the national court that has to establish whether or not, on the circumstances at stake, the person should be 
forced to leave the territory of the Union. 
93 Stanislas Adam, and Peter Van Elsuwege, “Citizenship rights and the federal balance between the 
European Union and its Member States: Comment on Dereci”, European Law Review 37, no. 2 (2012), 
182. The authors underlined how this criterion is more consistent, considering the fact that there is no 
automatic connection between the age of a person and the “genuine enjoyment” of his rights: in principle, 
a minor child with the nationality of a Member State may, under certain circumstances, be able to conduct 
an autonomous life in the Union without the presence of his/her parents, whereas certain adults may 
require the support of other persons. 
94 Hinarejos, supra note 41, 281. See also Dimitry Kochenov, and Sir Richard Plender, “EU Citizenship: 
from an incipient form to an incipient substance? The discovery of the treaty text”, European Law Review 
37, no. 4 (2012), 395. The authors underlined that the substance of rights test should not be milder or 
stricter of the cross border situation test (the functional relationship between free movement and family 
reunification).  
95 Shaw, supra note 48, 39.  
96 Oosterom Staples, supra note 68,168 
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test, against the hopes of many scholars, did not put an end to the phenomenon of 
reverse discrimination but simply shrunk the area of what accrues to purely internal 
situations.97 Finally, another source of criticism was related to the fact that the Court, 
instead of determining directly whether the action of the Member State amounted to a 
violation of the substance of citizenship rights, decided to delegate such a scrutiny to the 
national courts. This decision seems quite odd compared to Zambrano in which the 
Court took a much more directive approach by deciding itself, and not leaving to task to 
the national court, whether the children would be unable to exercise their Union 
citizenship rights if the parents had to leave.98 
These copious criticisms can be taken as a symptom of the fact that, once again, 
the Court throughout its reasoning tried to find a solution of compromise between 
Member States’ immigration concerns and enhancement of the concept of EU 
citizenship as a source of independent family residence rights. On one side, the Court 
had to take into account the Member States’ claims. The Austrian, German, Irish, 
Dutch, Polish and UK governments submitted that the principles laid down in the 
Zambrano case apply to very exceptional circumstances in which EU citizens are at risk 
of leaving the territory of the Union or not being able to exercise their right of free 
movement and residence within the territory of the Member States.99 The most evident 
way in which the Court managed to take into account the Member States’ stances was 
by specifying overtly what was hinted already in Zambrano and McCarthy: the 
deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights is triggered 
when a Union citizen has not just to leave the territory of the Member State but also the 
territory of the Union as a whole.100 Being forced to leave the territory of the Union 
embodies in fact a much higher threshold under which the Court decided that EU law 
could not be of any help and the sovereignty of the Member States had to be preserved.  
On the other side, as in McCarthy, the idea of protecting the substantive rights 
stemming from the status of EU citizenship was reiterated and preserved. The proof of 
this fact is that, despite the outcome of the judgment, the Court did not repeal101 what 
stated in Zambrano and McCarthy that is, firstly, that the situation of a Union citizen 
who has not made use of the right to freedom of movement cannot, for that reason 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Mantu, supra note 71, 53.  
98 Shaw, supra note 48, 39.  
99 Dereci judgment, para. 40.  
100 Ibid., para. 66.  
101 The Court is not new in reconsidering the outcome of previous judgments. See for example Akrich and 
Metock.   
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alone, be assimilated to a purely internal situation102 and, secondly, that the citizenship 
of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States 
and, therefore, they can rely on the citizen rights pertaining to this status against the 
Member States by Art. 20 TFEU.103  
To conclude, it seems that the reasoning of this judgment can be read once again 
as an attempt of the Court to find a solution at the interplay between Member States’ 
concerns on third country national immigration and the idea of developing a concept of 
EU citizenship as a source of independent rights. Overall, it is apparent from the 
outcome of the judgment that, as well as in McCarthy, the Court preferred to swing the 
pendulum more towards the idea of not overriding the sovereignty of the Member States 
over immigration. The solution proposed by the Court ended up drawing safe and strict 
borders for the circumstances that could pierce the veil of the purely internal situations. 
As Shaw pointed out, the Court’s approach in Dereci appears to be close to the 
guidance issued by the United Kingdom border agency on the applicability of 
Zambrano104 and this shows that perhaps the Court, after Zambrano, was trying to 
reconcile its previous approach to the more stringent one endorsed by the national 
authorities.105 Despite this change of route from Zambrano, the Court however was still 
keen to confirm and refer to the idea of EU citizenship as a source of self-standing 
rights and this choice perhaps, as suggested previously in McCarthy, could be the 
ground from which to develop more liberal solutions in the future. 
 
5. O and S106 and Ymeraga107 
 In late 2012, the Court of Justice delivered another judgment on the position of 
the third-country national family members of EU citizens that challenged the 
application of the Zambrano test. The joined cases of O and S v. Maahanmuuttovirasto 
and Maahanmuuttovirasto v. L involved, once again, static EU citizens and their third 
country national family members.   
In the case of O and S, Ms. S was a citizen from Ghana who migrated to Finland 
and lived there on the basis of a national permanent residence permit. In 2001, she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Dereci judgment, para. 61. 
103 Ibid., paras. 62-63.  
104 See http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/chp8-annex/ex1-
guidance-1.pdf?view=Binary 
105 Shaw, supra note 48, 39. See also Mantu, supra note 71, 51. 
106 Joined Cases 356/11 and 357/11, O and S v.Maahanmuuttovirasto [2012] not yet reported.  
107 Case 87/12 Kreshnik Ymeraga and Others v Ministre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration 
[2012] not yet reported. 
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married a Finnish national with whom she had a child in 2003 who had Finnish 
nationality. In 2005 Ms. S and her husband got divorced and she was granted the sole 
custody over the child. In 2008 Ms. S married Mr. O, a national of Côte d’Ivoire. In 
2009 Ms. S and Mr. O had a child, who was granted Ghanaian nationality. Since then, 
Mr. O  lived with Ms. S and her two children. In 2009 Mr. O applied for a residence 
permit on the basis of the marriage that was, however, rejected on the grounds that he 
did not have secure means of subsistence. Mr. O then challenged that decision in front 
of the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court of Helsinki), which dismissed 
the action. O and S therefore appealed against the judgment to the Korkein hallinto-
oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court), which referred questions to the CJEU. 
In the case of L, Ms. L was a national of Algeria who resided lawfully in Finland 
since 2003 owing to a national permanent residence permit obtained through her 
marriage to a Finnish national. In 2004 a child was born to Ms. L and her first husband; 
this child was granted Finnish nationality. The child had always resided in Finland. Ms. 
L and her first husband divorced in 2004 and Ms. L was granted sole custody of the 
child. In October 2006 Ms. L married Mr. M, a national of Algeria who arrived legally 
in Finland as an asylum seeker in March 2006. At the end of October 2006, Mr. M was 
returned to his country of origin. In November 2006 Ms. L applied for Mr. M to be 
granted a residence permit in Finland on the basis of their marriage. This request was 
rejected in 2008 on the grounds that Mr. M did not have any secure means of 
subsistence. In the meantime, in January 2007, a child was born to Ms. L and her 
second husband; this child was granted  Algerian nationality. The Maahanmuuttovirasto 
(Immigration Office) rejected M’s application for a residence permit. Subsequently, this 
decision was annulled by the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus. After the annulment, the 
Maahanmuuttovirasto brought an appeal against that decision before the Korkein 
hallinto-oikeus, which referred the case to the CJEU. 
By order of the President of the Court, the two cases were joined. The first 
question that the referring national court asked was whether the Treaty provisions on 
EU citizenship should be interpreted “as precluding the Member State from refusing to 
grant a third country national a residence permit on the basis of family reunification 
where that national seeks to reside with his spouse, who is also a third country national 
and resides lawfully in that Member State and is the mother of a child from a previous 
marriage who is a Union citizen, and with the child of their own marriage, who is also a 
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third country national”.108 Moreover, the referring court also asked whether, in case of a 
negative answer, the fact that the third country national lives together with his spouse, is 
not the biological father and does not have the custody of the child may affect the 
interpretation given to these provisions.109 
A.G. Bot immediately ruled out the applicability of Directive 2004/38/EC on the 
grounds that, since the children of S and L never exercised their right of free movement 
outside Finland and, therefore, they could not be covered by the concept of beneficiaries 
ex Art. 3(1).110 Once excluding the application of Directive 2004/38/EC, the Court 
focused on the application of Art. 20 TFEU. After having recalled the Zambrano test 
according to which “national measures that have the effect of depriving citizens of the 
Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union are precluded”,111 he found that the cases in the 
main proceedings are significantly different from the ones characterizing the Ruiz 
Zambrano case.112 First of all, the applicants are not the parents of the EU children and 
do not exercise any authority on them.113 Moreover, in case the EU children had to 
leave the territory of the Union, this would not be imposed under implementation of the 
national legislation but it would be dictated by simply by the free choice of their 
mothers.114 In this regard, in his view, according to Dereci the reasons linked to the 
departure of a citizen of the Union from his territory are particularly limited to 
circumstances in which “the Union citizen has no other choice but to follow the person 
concerned, whose right of residence has been refused, because he is in that person’s 
care and thus entirely dependent on that person to ensure his maintenance and provide 
for his own needs”.115 These situations can cover the hypothesis of third country 
national parents on whom EU children are dependent or even adult children on whom a 
parent is dependent because of illness or disability but do not cover situations 
concerning third country nationals who do not exercise any parental or financial 
responsibility over the Union citizen116 because, in this case, the risk would be to create 
a right of residence to any third country national on the sole basis of Art. 20 TFEU 
outside the provisions of secondary law expressly provided for by the Union 	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legislature.117 In light of this account the advocate general analysed both judgments in 
order to show the reasons why neither of them could be covered by the Zambrano 
exception. With regard to the O and S case, it is true that the presence of a second child 
with the third country national could influence the mother to follow her spouse to his 
state of origin. However, such a decision, as seen above, would arise from the free will 
of the mother and not as the consequence of an imposition imposed by the national 
authority.118 Likewise, in the case of M and L, considering in particular the fact that the 
couple lived together for a very short period of time and that, since the baby was born, 
the father never came to visit him, it is evident that whether the Union child is deprived 
of the substance of his rights deriving from the concept of EU citizenship “depends, 
above all, on the whims and vagaries of his mother’s married life rather than a 
constraint imposed by the implementation of the national legislation”.119 Finally, he 
concluded that Art. 20 TFEU should be interpreted as not precluding the refusal of the 
Member State to grant a residence permit to a third country national because he does not 
have sufficient means of subsistence to reside in the Member State with his third 
country national spouse, mother of a EU citizen. The same provision should not be 
interpreted differently even if the third country national spouse lives together with the 
mother of the EU citizen.120 Although the advocate general found that no protection 
could be granted under Art. 20 TFEU, he nevertheless stated that the circumstances at 
stake could be covered by Directive 2003/86/EC. The extent to which Directive 
2003/86/EC can grant protection to third country national family members in the 
circumstances at stake is an assessment that the national courts themselves should be 
called to make. It is for the national court to assess whether “in the implementation of 
the criteria laid down in Directive 2003/86/EC and within the limits of the Member 
State’s margin of discretion in the area, the competent national authority carried out a 
fair and balanced assessment of the competing interests at issue, seeking, in particular, 
to respect the family life of the parties concerned and to determine the best solution for 
the child” and to carry out “an in-depth examination of the family situation and take due 
account of the particular circumstances of the case, whether they are of a factual, 
emotional, psychological, or financial nature.”121 
As well as the advocate general, the CJEU immediately excluded the possibility 	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that Directive 2004/38/EC could find application over the circumstances at stake. 
Indeed, since the EU citizens concerned never made use of their right of free movement, 
they were not covered by the concept of “beneficiary” ex Art. 3(1) and, hence, Directive 
2004/38/EC could not apply to either of them or to their third country national family 
members.122 Following the steps of the advocate general, after having ruled out the 
relevance of Directive 2004/38/EC, the Court focused on the application of Art. 20 
TFEU. The CJEU started recalling what was already stated in the previous 
pronouncements of Zambrano, McCarhty and Dereci. Nevertheless, unlike the advocate 
general who listed precisely the situations that should be covered by the Zambrano test, 
the court limited itself to a simple explanation of the outcome of the previous law cases. 
To this extent, the Court recalled that the simple fact that an EU citizen never made use 
of his/her right of free movement does not necessarily mean that the circumstances at 
stake have to be assimilated to a purely internal situation.123 EU citizens can rely on the 
rights pertaining to their status, even against their state of nationality, if the national 
measure has the effect of denying the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship 
rights.124 Such denial occurs when the national measure forces the Union citizen not just 
to leave the territory of the Member State of which he/she is a national but also the 
territory of the Union as a whole.125  Once again, contrarily to the advocate general that 
decided to assess directly the non applicability of Art. 20 TFEU to the circumstances at 
stake, the Court pointed out, on the same line of the previous Dereci, that it is for the 
referring Court to establish whether the refusal of granting the right of residence to the 
third country national family member entails a denial of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights conferred by the status of EU citizenship.126 To this extent, 
unlike its previous judgments,127 the Court engaged in a thorough analysis of the factors 
that the national court should take into account in order to deliver its decision. Unlike 
the advocate general, the court did not use as an argument the fact that even if the 
children had to leave the territory of the Union the decision would be the result of the 
free wills of their mothers and not of an obligation of the national authority but it looked 
at other aspects. In particular, according to the CJEU, first of all, the national court 	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should consider that the mothers of the Union citizens hold permanent residence permits 
in Finland and, therefore, there is no obligation for them or for the Union citizens to 
leave the territory of the Union.128 On the other side, also the custody of the children 
and the fact that the latter are part of reconstituted families are also circumstances that 
should be taken into account. Indeed, the decision of Mr. S and Ms. L to leave the 
territory of the Union would deprive the EU children of their contacts with their 
biological fathers. On the contrary, if they decided to stay in Finland, such a decision 
would also harm the relationship of the third country national children with their 
biological fathers.129 After having recalled the Dereci statement according to which the 
mere fact that it might appear desirable to preserve the family unit “is not sufficient in 
itself to support the view that the Union citizen would be forced to leave the territory of 
the Union if such a right of residence were not granted”130, the CJEU continued to list 
other factors to which the national court should pay attention in its assessment. In 
particular, it pointed out that whether the person does or does not live together with the 
EU sponsor is not decisive in the assessment of the national court.131 Moreover the 
Court also pointed out that, although the Zambrano test should be applied just in 
exceptional circumstances132 this does not mean, in contrast with what the German and 
Italian governments submitted, that its application is confined to situations in which 
there is a blood relationship between the third country national and the EU sponsor.133 
Finally, the CJEU openly underlined, referring also to the opinion of the advocate 
general, that the national court should also take into account that the third country 
national step-fathers are not the ones on whom the EU children are “legally, financially 
or emotionally dependent”, since it is precisely the dependency relationship that can 
force the EU citizen to leave the territory of the Union as a whole.134 It also specified 
that, from the information available, it seemed that this dependency relationship in the 
circumstances at stake did not subsist.135 The Court finally concluded by stating that 
Art. 20 should not be interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing to grant a 	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third country national a residence permit in the circumstances of these cases, provided 
that this refusal did not entail, for the EU citizen concerned, the denial of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the citizenship rights.136 Nevertheless, the Court 
suggested that the admission of the step-fathers of the EU citizens might possibly be 
required pursuant to Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification between third 
country nationals. The last part of the judgment points out that the restrictions set out in 
this directive must be interpreted in accordance with the Charter, including respect of 
the rights of the children.137  
As one can notice, this judgment completely fits within the approach adopted by 
the Court since the McCarthy case. In fact, despite the positive outcome reached in the 
second part of the judgment through the application of Directive 2003/86/EC, the Court 
decided to endorse once again a strict approach with regards the application of the 
Zambrano test. In doing so the Court endorsed the classic scheme of the previous 
McCarthy and Dereci case, which foresees first looking at the case potential 
applicability of Directive 2004/38/EC and secondly, in case of a negative answer, 
looking at the possible application of Art. 20 TFEU.  Moreover, as well as in Dereci, 
the Court decided that the final assessment over the applicability of the Zambrano test 
was a task that needed to be left in the hands of the referring court.  
Most importantly, once again as in the previous cases, it is evident how also in 
this occasion the Court delivered a judgment in which both Member State’s concerns 
with regard to the right of entry of third country nationals and the idea of continuing to 
put flesh on the bones of the concept of EU citizenship as a source of self standing 
rights have been taken into account. Member States’ concerns over a too liberal 
interpretation of Art. 20 can be found in the submissions of the Finnish, Danish, 
German, Italian, Netherlands and Polish governments. In their submissions they argued 
that the open interpretation of Art. 20 TFEU offered by the Zambrano case can be 
utilized only in exceptional situations in which the application of a national measure 
would lead to the denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
accruing to the concept of EU citizenship. The Court answered positively these claims 
and upheld the position of the Member States and the Commission. Although, the CJEU 
specified that the final assessment on whether Art. 20 TFEU should be applied was a 
decision that had to be taken by the referring judges, nevertheless it reported a list of 
factors regarding the concrete circumstances at stake that suggested how the application 	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of Art. 20 TFEU could not be claimed. Among the several factors above listed, the 
Court highlighted that the mothers have a long term residence permit in the EU citizens’ 
Member State and they have the sole custody of the children, as if to say that the latter 
will never be forced to leave the territory of the Union, and therefore to fall within the 
area of protection offered by Art. 20 TFEU, unless the mothers decided to leave the 
Union themselves. On the other side, the Court also underlined how it is the relationship 
of dependency between the Union citizen and the third country national that is able to 
jeopardize the substance of the rights of the EU citizen in cases in which the third 
country national is granted the right to stay in the Member State and, consequentially, 
the EU citizen is forced to leave the territory of the Union.  On this issue, although by 
leaving the last word to the national court, the CJEU highlighted that the information 
available suggested that such dependency relationship did not exist in the circumstances 
at hand.  
On the other hand, despite the outcome of the case, it is evident how the Court 
worked on the enhancement of the concept of Art. 20 TFEU as a source of independent 
rights, perhaps for future applications. First of all, the Court stated that the exceptional 
circumstances covered by the Zambrano test could also encompass cases in which there 
is no blood relationship between the EU citizen and the third country national seeking a 
right of residence. This clarification is quite remarkable because it could lead, in the 
future, to granting the right of residence to third country nationals that perhaps would 
not be linked to the EU citizen by “official” family bonds, as long as the lack of the 
third country national’s presence within the territory of the Member State concerned 
would hinder the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights accruing to 
the EU citizen involved, due to the dependence of the latter upon the former, and would 
force the EU citizen to leave the territory of the Union. If this reading will be seriously 
developed, it may be able one day to open the door to third country national step-
parents or even potentially to de facto couples not registered in civil partnerships 
composed of an EU citizen and a third country national, as long as a relation of 
dependency between the two occurs.138 Moreover, the Court for the first time also 
described in more detail the relationship of dependency that should subsist, in order for 
the Zambrano test to be applicable and for the circumstances to fall into the competence 
realm of EU law, between the EU citizen and the third country national. In the previous 
cases, the Court did not offer a precise explanation of the meaning of this dependency 	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requirement. Only in Zambrano itself did the Court openly refer to the word 
“dependent” in its reasoning, probably meaning economic dependence. 139  As already 
mentioned in the O and S case, the CJEU, recalling the advocate general, highlighted 
that the dependency relationship is another factor that should be taken into account 
when examining whether, in the absence of this relationship, the EU citizen would still 
be capable of exercising the substance of the rights conferred by the status of EU 
citizenship. The Court described the idea of dependency as legal, financial or emotional. 
The fact that the Court used the word “or” could suggest that these conditions are not 
cumulative but alternative. As seen above, when discussing the issue of blood 
relationships between EU citizens and third country nationals, if this is the interpretation 
that will be endorsed for the future, the right of residence for third country nationals 
could potentially be opened not just to core family members but also to those upon 
whose legal, financial or emotional support the EU citizen relies such as legal 
guardians, non registered partners, third country national family members not 
encompassed within the category of beneficiaries according to Directive 2004/38/EC, 
including step parents, and perhaps even friends.140 
Summing up, it can be noted that the outcome of this judgment completely fits 
the strict approach that the Court has decided to endorse since the McCarthy case with 
regards to third country national family members’ rights to reside in a Member State. 
Despite this strict approach however, it is evident that the reasoning of this judgment 
can be read once again not just as an attempt of the Court to allay the Member States’ 
concerns over immigration but also to enhance the development of the concept of EU 
citizenship as a source of independent family rights, probably in the hope of being able 
to endorse more liberal positions in the future.    
Finally, it is just worth adding that a similar approach has been applied by the 
Court also in the more recent Ymeraga and Others case. The applicant, Mr. Kreshnik 
Ymeraga arrived in Luxembourg at the age of 15 to live with his uncle. After his 
situation was regularized in 2001 and he acquired Luxembourg citizenship in 2009, his 
parents and two brothers applied for a residence permit as family members of a citizen 
of the Union. The application was refused but, on appeal, the Administrative Court 
decided to refer the matter to the CJEU. The latter, after excluding the applicability of 
Directive 2003/86/EC and 2004/38/EC because in both cases the applicants could not 
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fall within the concept of a beneficiary,141 took the occasion to remind that there are 
“specific situations in which […] a right of residence cannot, exceptionally, without 
undermining the effectiveness of the Union citizenship that citizen enjoys, be refused to 
a third-country national who is a family member of his if, as a consequence of refusal, 
that citizen would be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European Union 
altogether, thus denying him the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of his status”.142 Nevertheless, the Court found that in the main 
proceedings there were no relevant elements, apart from the intention of Mr. Ymeraga 
to live with the family, to support the view that a refusal to grant the right of residence 
to the third country national family members may have the effect of denying the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizens’ rights.143 Moreover, not even the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could be applied in order to give 
protection to the third country national family members because the situation of the 
applicants in the main proceedings was not governed by European Union law.144   
Like in O and S, the Court found that protection of the third country national 
family members could not be granted because the situation neither fell within the free 
movement scenario nor within the Zambrano test. Whereas in O and S the Court offered 
a detailed account of all the elements to be taken into proper consideration by the 
national referring court in order to make the final assessment, in Ymeraga the Court 
decided to make its own assessment without delegating anything to the referring court. 
However, the criteria used by the Court to reach this conclusion seems a little nebulous 
because they lack of a clear analysis of the factors that potentially prevented Mr. 
Ymeraga from leaving the territory of the Union despite the fact that the family 
reunification did not occur. However, although the reasoning of this case is focused on 
pointing out the circumstances that do not make the situation fall within the Zambrano 
exception, it is not banal. As pointed out before in Dereci, the Court still decided to 
preserve the Zambrano exception. This choice is not necessarily dictated by reverence 
towards precedent decisions but perhaps suggests that the Court, among the numerous 
constraints, is still watering the seed of EU citizenship, while waiting for better times to 
apply the concept fully.  To conclude, it can be argued that also in Ymeraga the Court’s 
reasoning was shaped around Member States’ concerns over immigration and the idea 	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of protecting the concept of EU citizenship as a source of independent third country 
national family rights. It is reasonable to assume that the fact that the applicants were 
adults and not economically dependent on the EU sponsor pushed the Court to opt again 
for a strict decision as far as the protection of these country national family members 
was concerned.  
 
6. An exception: Iida145 
 As hinted in the introduction, unlike the previous cases this judgment concerns 
moving EU citizens and the request to grant a third country national a right of residence 
in their state of origin. Despite the peculiarity of the circumstances that cannot be 
assimilated to any other of the cases seen before, it is worth spending some time on the 
analysis of this case because the Court, although it still adopted a strict approach 
towards third country national family members, decided to utilize and develop the 
Zambrano test. As a matter of fact it will be shown that despite the peculiar 
circumstances, in this case also the Court acted with regard to Member States’ concerns 
over third country national immigration and on the idea of developing the concept of 
EU citizenship as a source of self-stemming rights. 
 Mr. Iida had initially been granted a residence permit in Germany in connection 
with a family reunion (marriage to a German citizen from which a child of Japanese, 
American and German nationality was born). After their marital separation, he was 
instead given a residence permit in Germany because of his employment there. 
However, since the subsequent extension of the permit was discretionary, Mr. Iida 
decided to apply for a residence card as a family member of an EU citizen on the basis 
of Directive 2004/38/EC.  The German authorities refused his application, and 
following his challenge to that decision, the German administrative court referred to the 
CJEU several questions that were summarised in the following one: “Does European 
Union law give a parent who has parental responsibility and is a third-country national, 
for the purpose of maintaining regular personal relations and direct parental contact, a 
right to remain in the Member State of origin of his child who is a Union citizen, to be 
documented by a “residence card of a family member of a Union citizen”, if the child 
moves from there to another Member State in exercise of the right of freedom of 
movement?”146  
In order to answer this question A.G. Trstenjak started questioning whether Mr. 	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Iida’s residence right could be derived from Directive 2004/38/EC. He found that 
neither according to its literal interpretation nor according to a schematic or teleological 
interpretation of the Directive it was possible to derive the right of residence of Mr. Iida 
from this piece of legislation. In fact, first of all, no provisions encompassed in it 
classify the applicant as a beneficiary of freedom of movement and residence rights.147 
Moreover, the scheme of Directive 2004/38/EC did not give any scope for extending the 
right of residence to situations in which the members of the family of a Union citizen 
who are third-country nationals wish to remain in the Member State of origin of the 
Union citizen after the latter himself has moved to another Member State.148 Finally the 
advocate general, rejected a teleological interpretation in accordance to human rights 
principles because it was established that Directive 2004/38/EC did not cover the 
circumstances of the case and “the application of a legal act in a manner consistent to 
fundamental rights cannot be raised outside the scope of that legal act.”149After having 
assessed that Mr. Iida could find no protection in secondary legislation the advocate 
general considered whether the applicant could derive his derivative right of residence 
from Artt. 20 and 21 TFEU. The advocate general, after having referred to previous 
case law,150 found that also the principles developed by the Court in these cases on the 
applicability of Artt. 20 and 21 TFEU could not be applied to the facts of the main 
proceeding because Mr. Iida’s daughter had already exercised her right of freedom of 
movement and the right to reside in the territory of the Union was not under threat.151 
Finally, given that also primary law seemed not to be of any use, the advocate general 
wondered whether, perhaps, protection could be given to Mr. Iida in compliance with 
human rights. The advocate general found that, in accordance with Art. 51(1) of the 
Charter of Human Rights of the EU, there is enough connection with the 
implementation of Union law when the refusal of a resident permit constitutes even a 
small restriction on the right of free movement of the Union minor citizen.152 However, 
whether this restriction had occurred or not, was a matter for the national Court to 
verify.153   
 The Court immediately noted that Mr. Iida could in principle, regardless his 
family situation, be granted the status of long term resident in Germany through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Iida opinion, paras. 32-38.  
148 Ibid., paras. 41-49. 
149 Ibid., para. 54.   
150 Ibid., paras. 62-63.  
151 Ibid., para. 65.  
152 Ibid., para. 73.  
153 Ibid., para. 75. 
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application of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third country nationals 
who are long term residents.154 However, given that Mr. Iida had withdrawn his 
application for an EU long-term residence permit, he could not currently be granted the 
right to reside in Germany on the basis of that directive.155  
After having ruled out the application of Directive 2003/109/EC, the CJEU 
followed the steps of the advocate general and focused on the possibility of applying 
Directive 2004/38/EC. To this end, the Court considered that Mr. Iida could not fall 
within the category of “beneficiaries”156 of the Directive, without finding it necessary to 
explore whether or not the Directive could be object of a teleological interpretation.157 
According to the Directive, being granted the right of residence as a family member in 
the ascending line of an EU citizen presupposes that the potential beneficiary of the 
right of residence is dependent on the EU citizen.158 Mr. Iida however did not satisfy the 
condition of dependency as it was his daughter who was dependent on him.159 On the 
other side Mr. Iida could not be considered a beneficiary of the directive as a family 
member of his spouse, given that he did not satisfy the condition of the Directive of 
having accompanied her to the Member State other than that of which she was a 
national.  
After having exhausted all the possibilities of applying secondary law provisions 
to the circumstances at stake the CJEU, like the advocate general, explored whether Mr. 
Iida could be granted protection by means of Art. 20 and 21 TFEU. The Court stated 
that any rights conferred by the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship to third country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Iida judgment, para. 45.  
155 The Court did not comment on whether he would still be able to apply for that status, although at para. 
75 of the judgment it appears to assume that he can.  
156 The Court specified that he could not be a beneficiary with regard to the principal right of his daughter 
because the family member in the ascending line allowed to join the European citizen must be dependent. 
On the other hand, he could not be considered a beneficiary with regards to his wife either because Art. 3 
(1) Directive 2004/38/EC requires family members of a Union citizen moving or residing in another 
Member State to accompany him.  
157 Iida judgment, paras. 52-55. On the other hand A.G.Trstenjak, despite reaching the same conclusion, 
questioned whether Mr. Iida’s residence right could be derived from Directive 2004/38/EC. She found 
that neither according to a literal interpretation nor according to a schematic or teleological interpretation 
of the Directive it was possible to derive the right of residence of Mr. Iida from this legislation. First of 
all, no provisions classify the applicant as a beneficiary of freedom of movement and residence rights 
(Iida opinion, paras. 32-38). Moreover, the scheme of Directive 2004/38/EC does not give any scope for 
extending the right of residence to situations in which the members of the family of a Union citizen who 
are third-country nationals wish to remain in the Member State of origin of the Union citizen after the 
latter himself has moved to another Member State (Iida opinion, paras. 41-49). Finally, the advocate 
general excluded the idea of applying a teleological interpretation in accordance with human rights since 
it was established that Directive 2004/38/EC did not cover at all the circumstances of the case and “the 
application of a legal act in a manner consistent to fundamental rights cannot be raised outside the scope 
of that legal act” (Iida opinion, para. 54).  
158 Iida judgment, para. 54. 
159 Ibid., paras. 55-56.  
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nationals “are not autonomous rights of those nationals but rights derived from the 
exercise of freedom of movement by a Union citizen.”160 It quoted the previous Chen, 
Eind and Dereci judgments,161 and pointed out that the common factor that 
characterized the situations in these judgments was an “intrinsic connection with the 
freedom of movement of a Union citizen which prevents the right of entry and residence 
from being refused to those nationals (third country nationals) in the Member State of 
residence of that citizen, in order not to interfere with that freedom”.162 Given the 
circumstances at stake, i.e. Mr. Iida was not seeking the right to reside in the new 
Member State of his daughter and wife, he had always resided in Germany in 
accordance with national law (without his status impeding his wife and daughter from 
moving to another Member State) and his national permit was renewable (and he could 
“in principle” obtain EU long-term resident status),163 the Court found that there were 
no valid arguments to support the view that Mrs. Iida and her daughter were denied the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights deriving from their status as EU 
citizens or were impeded in the exercise of their right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States.164  The CJEU furthermore reiterated that the purely 
hypothetical prospect of exercising the right of freedom of movement does not establish 
a sufficient connection with European Union law, applying this principle equally to a 
purely hypothetical prospect of such rights being obstructed.165  
Finally, the Court stated that Mr. Iida could not rely on the protection granted by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. According to Art. 51(1) of 
the Charter, it applies to Member States only when they are implementing EU law.166 
Since Mr. Iida did not satisfy the conditions of Directive 2004/38/EC and had not 
applied for a right of residence as a long-term resident within the meaning of Directive 
2003/109/EC, his situation showed no connection with EU law, so the Charter could not 
apply. It is worth noting that the solution adopted by the Court is in deep contrast with 
the approach endorsed by the advocate general. According to the latter, Art. 51(1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the EU could, in fact, apply. This is because it 
was suggested that there is enough connection with EU law when the refusal of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Ibid., para. 67.  
161 Ibid., paras. 69-71.  
162 Ibid., para. 72.  
163 Ibid., paras. 73-75. 
164 Ibid., para. 76.  
165 Iida judgment, para. 77.  
166 Ibid., para. 78. Obviously, outside the scope of EU law, Member States are still obliged to comply 
with the human rights standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR.  
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resident permit constitutes even a small restriction on the right of free movement (ex 
Art. 21 TFEU) of the Union minor citizen.167  
The Iida case, as all the previous ones, is again a case that seems to be shaped 
around a desire to take into account Member States’ immigration complaints and 
develop further the concept of EU citizenship as a source independent family rights. 
The attention to Member States’ concerns over immigration is evident, in particular, 
from the reasoning endorsed by the CJEU. Iida displays clearly the Court’s reluctance 
to accord residence rights to third country national family members through the 
application of the concept of EU citizenship. Indeed, the Court did not just rule out the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC because Mr. Iida did not belong to the group of 
beneficiaries of the right of residence in the host Member State as family member, but 
also the application of Art. 20 TFEU. With regard to the application of the Treaty 
concept of EU citizenship, as seen, the Court labeled the cases of Chen, Eind and 
Dereci, in relation to its explanation of the Zambrano test, as sort of exceptions to 
situations that would have normally fallen within the competence of the Member 
States168 and concluded that, in the circumstances at hand, these exceptions could not be 
applied.169 In particular, the fact that the claimant’s wife and daughter had decided to 
move from Germany to Austria without him, together with the fact that he was not 
looking for a permit to reside in the same Member State to which they had moved and 
that he potentially could have been already granted the right to reside in Germany 
pursuant to Directive 2003/109/EC, were considered factors which ruled out a possible 
impediment to the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with 
their status of Union citizens.  
Despite the outcome and the Court’s reasoning, as well as the previous O and S, 
the Court continued to put flesh on the bones of the newly born Zambrano test. If in 
Dereci the Zambrano test was clarified by stating that a violation of the substance of 
citizenship rights occurs when the EU citizen is forced to leave the territory of the 
Union as a whole, in Iida the Court seems to have managed to indicate more clearly 
what the substantive rights accruing to the status of EU citizenship consist of. Indeed, in 
Iida the Court enriched the meaning of the Zambrano test by finding a fil rouge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Iida opinion, paras. 73-75.  
168 Once again it is worth recalling Iida judgment, rec. 72 “The common element in the above situations is 
that, although they are governed by legislation which falls a priori within the competence of the Member 
States, […] they none the less have an intrinsic connection with the freedom of movement of a Union 
citizen which prevents the right of entry and residence from being refused to those nationals in the 
Member State of residence of that citizen, in order not to interfere with that freedom”. 
169 Iida judgment, para. 76.  
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between the case at hand and some previous pronouncements of the Court. As briefly 
mentioned the Court, in order show that the right of residence of Mr. Iida could not be 
derived by Artt. 20 and 21 TFEU, quoted some of its previous judgments. In particular, 
the Court referred to the cases of Chen, Eind and Dereci and found that the common 
element that united these very different situations was the intrinsic connection with the 
freedom of movement of the Union citizen. Through this statement, which surprisingly 
addressed also the Dereci case although, in the circumstances of that case, the EU 
citizens concerned did not move from their Member State of origin, the Court implicitly 
linked the test of the enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights to the right of free 
movement.  
Translated in more simple terms, through this statement the Court seems to 
suggest that when the national measure denying the right of residence to a third country 
national family member forces the EU citizen to leave the territory of the Union, the 
substantive right accruing to his/her status that is being violated is the right of free 
movement. It could be argued that referring to Dereci as intrinsically connected to Chen 
and Eind through the element of free movement is a wrong reading of the Court of its 
own case law, since Dereci had nothing to do with the exercise of this right. However, it 
should be remembered that already in McCarthy the Court seemed to imply that one of 
the core substantive rights encompassed within the concept of EU citizenship was the 
right of free movement and residence.170 The precedent of McCarthy therefore makes 
this interpretation less likely to be a mistake and more likely to be intentional.171 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 See McCarthy judgment, para. 48: “As a national of at least one Member State, a person such as Mrs. 
McCarthy enjoys the status of a Union citizen under Article 20(1) TFEU and may therefore rely on the 
rights pertaining to that status, including against his Member State of origin, in particular the right 
conferred by Article 21 TFEU to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”.  
171 Peers, and Berneri, supra note 138, 171. The authors pointed out that this statement seemed to be 
blurred by the Court in recital 76, which seemed to add the violation of free movement and residence 
rights to the Zambrano test. They argued that, despite the layer of confusion, if it was really in intention 
of the CJEU to connect the right of free movement and residence with the test of the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of citizenship rights, it is preferable to do it by adding the violation of free movement 
and residence rights as an alternative test to the Zambrano one, instead of characterising free movement 
as the core substantive EU citizenship right. In this way the core substantive rights accruing to the status 
of EU citizenship would not just be limited simply to free movement rights but could, in the future, be 
extended even to the fundamental right to family life and to human rights more generally. Moreover, by 
adding a free movement alternative test to the enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights, third 
country nationals could surely find a better ground of protection. If the alternative test is applied so that 
the Court had also to assess whether the denial of the right of residence to the third country national 
family member would hinder the right of free movement and residence of the Union citizen within 
Member States, it is more likely that the third country national EU family member would see his/her right 
of residence protected because, practically speaking, he/she would have another, perhaps easier, 
alternative to fulfill rather than only having to prove that the national measure would force the EU citizen 
to leave the territory of the Union as a whole. In other words, having an alternative free movement test 
will make it possible that, when the high threshold posed by the Zambrano test is not reached, the lower 
threshold (consisting of verifying whether the national measure has obstructed the right of free 
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Characterizing the core substance of EU citizenship rights with the right of free 
movement, potentially, could be applied in the future as a way to lower the high 
threshold posed by the interpretation of the Zambrano test offered by Dereci and, 
perhaps, will be able to encompass within the protection granted by Art. 20 TFEU not 
just situations in which the EU sponsor should be forced to leave the territory of the 
Union but also more common situations in which his/her right of free movement could 
be obstructed.  
In light of the analysis proposed we can conclude that the Member States’ 
concerns over immigration issues seem, once again, to have driven the reasoning and 
determined the outcome of the case. However, on the other side, the Court also focused 
its reasoning of the concept of EU citizenship by adding free movement as a substantive 
right that characterizes the status of EU citizenship. This approach might be able to 
bring, in the future, a more generous protection to EU sponsors and their third country 
national partners.  
 
7. Conclusions  
 After the oil crisis of the 1970s, the Member States’ concerns over their borders 
did not just clash with the enhancement of free movement but also with the 
development of the application of the EU citizenship concept as a source of independent 
rights. The Court has recently been involved in several judgments debating the right of 
EU static citizens to live in their state of origin with their third country national family 
member according to EU law as opposed to Member States’ sovereignty over 
immigration. As it is evident from the above analysis, the reasoning of the Court at 
times has lacked clarity. To this end, for example, it is difficult to understand why 
McCarthy refers to free movement as a substantive EU citizenship right whereas Dereci 
does not mention this feature at all and, finally, in Iida free movement is mentioned 
again. It is also difficult to understand why Dereci is mentioned in Iida as a free 
movement case, considering that the right of free movement was not involved. 
Moreover, it is not easy to understand the reasons that moved the Court to refer to 
international principles in order to confirm that Mrs. McCarthy had a right to live in the 
UK, despite the presence of her third country national husband, whereas this reference 
was not adopted for Mr. Zambrano’s children.  
 The inconsistencies that can be found in the case law however should not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
movement) can apply and the circumstances can fall within the scope of EU law. 
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considered the last word on the Court’s activity. As shown above, also in this line of 
cases it seems evident how the Court was driven by the aim of finding solutions that 
would meet Member States’ concerns over immigration and would, at the same time, 
favour the development of the concept of EU citizenship as a source of independent 
family residence rights. In Zambrano, for example, the Court did not utilize Art. 21 
TFEU to cover situations in which the EU citizen never exercised his/her right of free 
movement, as A.G. Sharpston originally suggested but, instead, preferred to rely on Art. 
20 TFEU, basically creating an exception to circumstances that otherwise should have 
been governed by Member States national legislation. Indeed, this choice did not turn 
the status of European citizenship as an absolute source of residence rights for third 
country national family members and the Member States’ sovereignty over immigration 
remains protected in all the situations that do not clearly fall within the exception. At 
the same time, Zambrano managed to fit within the previous EU citizenship case law as 
a natural continuation of the process of creating a concept of European citizenship as a 
source of self-standing rights. Also the McCarthy’s reasoning can be seen as a 
compromise between Member States’ immigration concerns and the development of the 
concept of EU citizenship. With regards to the concerns over immigration, the Court in 
McCarthy ended up referring to the old theory on internal and external situations and 
confirmed Zambrano as an exception. On the other side, with regard to the development 
of the concept of EU citizenship as a source of self-standing rights, the Court tried to 
put flesh on the bones of the concept of substance of citizenship rights by identifying 
the substance of the EU citizenship rights with the right of free movement. Moreover, 
also in Dereci on one side the Court took into account the Member States’ claims by 
limiting the Zambrano principles. The deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of citizenship rights is triggered when a Union citizen has to leave the 
territory of the Union as a whole and not just a single Member State. On the other side 
however the Court, despite the outcome of the judgment, reiterated the idea of 
protecting the substance of citizens’ rights stemming from the status of EU citizenship 
and that citizens can rely on the rights pertaining to that status against the Member 
States by Art. 20 TFEU.172 Furthermore, in the O and S case, the restrictive approach 
toward residence rights of third country nationals was nevertheless accompanied by an 
open description of the concept of blood relationship and dependence that potentially in 
the future could extend the application of Zambrano to a broader category of third 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Dereci judgment, paras. 62-63.  
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country national family members. Finally, also Iida’s strict reasoning seems likely 
grounded on the Member States’ immigration concerns with regard to their competence 
in assessing the right of entry of third country nationals, as it can be noticed by the fact 
that the Court labeled the cases of Chen, Eind and Dereci as sort of exceptions to 
situations that would have normally fallen within the competence of the Member States. 
However, on the other side, it has been seen that the Court was also focused on the 
development of the concept of EU citizenship. As a matter of fact, as before in 
McCarthy, in Iida the Court attempted to define the substance of EU citizenship rights 
by referring to free movement as a substantive EU citizenship right to be protected.  
 Overall, unlike the cases on free movement analyzed in the previous chapter, it 
seems that after Zambrano the Court has preferred to propose solutions that would 
swing the pendulum in favour of Member States’ concerns over immigration rather than 
allowing third country national family members to reside through the application of the 
concept of EU citizenship. Considering these cases in more detail, it seems that the 
Court, as opposed to the market access approach adopted in the free movement cases 
(reference to deterrence/eliminating obstacles to the exercise of the right of free 
movement), in the static EU citizens stream of judgments preferred to opt for a much 
higher threshold. In fact, as things now stand, the Court finds the fulfillment of the 
Zambrano principles only in case of forced departure from the territory of the Union 
which, according to the current interpretation granted by the Court, seems to occur just 
in circumstances of absolute dependency of the EU citizen on the third country national 
due to their young age. This approach is peculiar and unique to the specific application 
of EU citizenship rights. On the one hand its potential application is not just curtailed to 
circumstances involving EU static citizens, but it is also clearly opposed to the approach 
endorsed at international law level by the ECtHR. Indeed, the latter opted for the 
application of the so called “elsewhere theory” according to which, in order to 
demonstrate an interference with Art. 8 ECHR, families must show that they will not be 
able to enjoy family life elsewhere173 rather than according an independent right to live 
in one of the signatory states. On the other hand the Zambrano principles, if fulfilled, 
are capable to grant third country nationals further rights in addition to the right of 
residence, if necessary in order to prevent the forced departure from the EU. Indeed, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	   See for example ECHR judgment of 19 February 1996, No 23218/94, Gul v. Switzerland; ECHR 
judgment of 28 November 1996, No. 21702/93, Ahmut v. The Netherlands; App. No. 23938/93, October 
23, 1995, Sorabjee v. United Kingdom, unpublished; ECHR judgment of 13 May 2003, No. 53102/99 
Chandra v. The Netherlands.	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instance, the Court stated that the Member State is prevented from denying a work 
permit to a third country national family member, in so far as such decision deprives the 
EU citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attached to the status 
of European Union citizenship.  
The great potential of Zambrano, which granted residence rights to third country 
national family members without the exercise of the right of free movement by an EU 
sponsor, was immediately realized by the academic world and, for some time, many 
wondered whether Zambrano marked the end of the wholly internal rule and the 
beginning of a full EU competence over issues concerning EU citizens, regardless of 
them being moving or non-moving citizens. However, these hopes were soon dashed by 
the following pronouncements of the CJEU. With McCarthy the Court restricted the 
application of the Zambrano test to situations in which either the right of free movement 
or the genuine substance of the citizenship rights were in jeopardy. The circumstances 
of the case, although debatable, were not considered to fulfill the condition of the test. 
The second curtailment of Zambrano happened in Dereci. In this case the Court finally 
made clear that the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights was 
violated by a national measure where the application of the measure triggers the 
departure of the EU citizen from the territory of the Union. The curtailment endorsed in 
Dereci was, more recently, bolstered by the O and S case too. Finally, also in Iida the 
Court adopted a strict application of the Zambrano test, as interpreted by Dereci, also in 
a case concerning non-static EU citizens. Lingering on the reasons why the Court 
suddenly decided to drastically change route straight after the release of Zambrano 
would amount to speculation. However, perhaps it is not unlikely that the numerous 
complaints and interventions of some Member States pushed the Court to revisit its 
position and curtail the applicability of the Zambrano principles as much as possible.  
 One might wonder why such a different approach from the free movement 
jurisprudential stream has been adopted. Some elements from the analysis proposed 
above seem to suggest that while initially (in Zambrano) the Court regarded EU law “as 
mature enough for mutation, growth and plasticity […]”174 the strong Member States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Kochenov, and Plender, supra note 94, 393. The authors suggested that the general approach of the 
Court over the concept of EU citizenship is fundamentally wrong. In their reconstruction the authors 
started to look at the pre Maastricht era and at its proto citizenship cases (see the already mentioned 
Cowan, Calfa, Konstantinidis) and noted that economic free movement rights constituted an important 
driving factor behind the action of the Court and behind the approach of the Union more in general. 
Nevertheless, they argued that the introduction of the concept of EU citizenship into the Maastricht 
Treaty was not just a simple codification of pre-existing practice but it was more the creation of 
something absolutely new that, somehow, the Court was not able to interpret. To this extent they pointed 
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opposition175may have pushed it to take a step back.176 Nevertheless, as hinted before, 
regardless of the solutions endorsed, the Court has disseminated in the rulings some 
elements of openness in favour of more liberal interpretations of the concept of EU 
citizenship as a source of the self-stemming right of residence for third country 
nationals in the future. Therefore, the strict approach towards family reunification 
between EU static citizens and third country nationals could be just temporary since the 
Court has allowed itself room for future broader interpretations in new fact scenarios.  
To conclude, throughout this chapter the aim has been to show that the decisions 
of the Court on static EU citizens can be better understood in the light of their historical 
background. As in the previous chapter, the judgments in this field can be seen as 
compromises between Member States’ concerns over their immigration sovereignty and 
the EU interest of developing a concept of EU citizenship as the fundamental status of 
Member States’ nationals and as a source of independent family residence rights 
separate from the exercise of free movement. Hence, the discrepancies between the 
various judgments can be better understood in the light of the Court’s effort to balance 
these contrasting interests. These judgments, unlike the free movement cases, display a 
stricter overall approach of the Court towards third country national family members of 
EU static citizens is predominant. However, these cases present various and important 
elements that play in favour of future more liberal solutions.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
out that neither in the preamble nor in the articles of the treaties dealing with European citizenship there is 
a reference to economic activity or cross border movement. For this reason the Court’s interpretation of 
EU citizenship that is based simply on the internal market logic omits to accept the changes that occurred 
between a freedom based on the market to a freedom based on European citizenship. Consequentially, 
such a view is disrespectful of the real division of competences stemming from the Treaty text according 
to which “EU citizenship alongside a handful of other fundamental concepts, unquestionably belongs to 
the realm of EU law, as opposed to the national law of the Member States”. See Kochenov, and Plender, 
supra note 94, 373-393. See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Europa: ‘Nous coalisons des Etats, nous 
n'unissons pas des hommes”’ in La Sostenibilità della democrazia nel XXI secolo, eds. Marta Cartabia, 
and Andrea Simoncini, (Bologna: Il Mulino Publishers, 2009), at 82. 
175 Many Member States opposed the Zambrano interpretation and pushed for a strict post Zambrano 
jurisprudential approach. In Zambrano eight Member States intervened, in McCarthy five, in Dereci 
eight, in O and S six, in Ymeraga six and finally in Iida eight.   
176 Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew Gabel, “Do Governments Sway European Court of Justice Decision-
making?: Evidence from Government Court Briefs”, IFIR Working Paper Series, 2005, paper no. 6, 
available at <http://www.ifigr.org/workshop/fall05/gabel-workshop.pdf>. In this paper the authors 
elaborated an empirical test of Member State influence on CJEU decisions over the time span of three 
years and demonstrated that the Court does take into account the concerns and the views of Member 
States in order to ponder its decisions. 
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Chapter 5: CJEU and ECtHR: a comparison  
 
1. Introduction 
 So far I have looked at the development of the phenomenon of family 
reunification between EU citizens and third country nationals. I pointed out how, after 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the main concern of the EU became the development 
of the Common Market and, in particular, of the idea of free movement of workers. This 
aim was pursued through the drafting of generous secondary free movement legislation, 
such as Council Regulation 15/1961/EEC, 38/1964/EEC and 1612/1968/EEC, which 
granted EU workers specific rights among which also the right to family reunification 
was included. However, after the oil crisis, the socio-economic background 
underpinning the activity of the Union mutated. As seen, Member States began to 
endorse strict immigration policies towards illegal and legal immigration of third 
country nationals. The Member States’ stricter approach towards immigrants, 
accompanied by the continuing EU interest in the promotion of free movement of EU 
persons and the development of the concept of EU citizenship as a source of self-
stemming rights, characterized the background upon which the CJEU built its case law.  
In the analysis offered, it was pointed out how the reasoning of the Court was shaped by 
the interplay of these trends. The reconstruction of the historical background 
underpinning the CJEU’s jurisprudence helped to show how several contradictions of 
the case law were simply an attempt of the Court to build a compromise between 
Member States and free movement or EU citizenship concerns.  
 The purpose of this final substantive chapter is to show that the CJEU’s 
approach is stronger, in terms of family’s protection, than the one that potentially could 
be offered by Art. 8 ECHR in the same circumstances. In order to make this point this 
chapter will be divided into five parts. After this brief introduction, in part 2 I will recall 
how the Court today protects third country national family member residence rights. 
Part 3 will be dedicated to the ECtHR and to how Art. 8 ECHR is applied in family 
reunification cases. Part 4 will be dedicated to the comparison between the CJEU and 
the ECtHR approach in order to highlight the stronger protection granted to family units 
by the CJEU. Finally, part 5 will be dedicated to the conclusions.  
 
2. Family protection granted by the CJEU 
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  In order to understand the sort of protection that the Court has granted to family 
reunification cases between EU citizens and third country nationals it is important to 
recall the approach undertaken both in cases involving free moving and static EU 
citizens. 
As far as free movement cases are concerned, in all the case law apart from 
MRAX, in which the Court adopted a literal interpretation of family reunification, the 
Court took into account both free movement and Member States’ concerns over 
immigration by interpreting family reunification as ancillary to the right of free 
movement. This attempt is particularly evident in Singh when for the first time in a free 
movement-family reunification case the market access model, according to which the 
national rules posing obstacles to the market are always unlawful, was applied. As seen, 
the Court stated that family residence rights had to be granted when they would have 
avoided obstacles to the exercise of the right of free movement of the EU sponsor. The 
utilization of the market access rule through the application of the ancillary relationship 
between family reunification and free movement continued in the post-Singh 
jurisprudence. In Carpenter the same test as Singh was applied, although with regard to 
the freedom to provide services abroad rather than free movement. Consistent to Singh, 
the Court pictured family residence rights as ancillary to the enhancement to the 
freedom to provide services, and for this reason, Mrs. Carpenter was granted the right of 
residence within the UK territory. In Akrich as well the same ancillary relationship 
between free movement and family reunification provisions was applied although, 
unlike the previous cases, the solution proposed by the Court upheld the Member 
States’ immigration concerns rather than the right of free movement. Finally, in Eind 
and Metock the Singh test was applied too. In Eind, the application of the Singh logic to 
those facts ended up granting a broader protection to third country national residence 
rights since the denial to family reunification was considered to be obstructive to free 
movement even in cases in which the relation with the third country national was not 
determinant on the first original decision to move of the EU sponsor. In Metock, the 
application of the ancillary relationship between free movement and family 
reunification granted the right to reside to third country nationals despite the fact that 
they never resided within the EU before and despite the family relationship with the EU 
sponsor started after the latter decided to move to the host Member State.   
As far as cases involving EU static citizens are concerned, it seems that the 
Court tried to find a compromise between the idea of enhancing the concept of EU 
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citizenship as a source of independent family rights and Member States’ concerns over 
immigration by referring to the idea of dependency applied to the enjoyment of the 
substance of citizens’ rights test. Dependency consists in the fact that the EU citizen 
should be “dependent” on the third country national family member in order to be 
allowed to reside in the host Member States otherwise the latter will find this right 
denied. The idea of dependency finds its roots in the already mentioned Baumbast case. 
In the specific circumstances of R., in which R. was an American mother of children 
with French nationality who were enrolled in a UK school, R. was granted the right to 
remain in the EU, although she was divorced from the EU father, as primary carer of the 
children because if she was refused the right to remain in the host Member State during 
the period of her children’s education that would have deprived “those children of a 
right which is granted to them by the Community legislature.”1 The same approach was 
repeated in Ibrahim and Texeira and also in the recent Alarpe2 case, in which the Court 
stated that even reaching the age of adulthood does not have a direct effect on the rights 
of residence of the third country national family member carer of the EU sponsor if the 
latter is still in need of financial and emotional support from the third country national 
carer.3 Dependency has been explored also with regard to extended family members. In 
the Rahman4 case the Court pointed out that it is up to the competent authority to take 
into account the various factors that may be relevant in order to identify whether the 
appellants can be allowed entry and residence within the EU such as to “the extent of 
economic or physical dependence”.5 
As far as cases concerning EU static citizens it can be noted how the idea of 
dependency was first translated into Chen in which, as seen, Mrs. Chen was granted the 
right of residence as carer of her daughter because otherwise the latter’s right of 
residence would have been deprived of any useful effect.6 In Zambrano, the fact the EU 
citizens were minor and economically dependent on their father granted the latter the 
right to reside in Belgium despite the EU children always having resided in Belgium 
and never exercised their right of free movement. The concept of dependence was also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Case 413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002], para. 71.  
2 Case 529/11 Alarpe and Tijani v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] not yet reported.  
3 Ibid., paras. 24-30.  
4 Case 83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman and Others 
[2012] not yet reported.  
5 Ibid., para. 23.  
6 Case 200/02 Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-09925, para. 
45. The Court went on to refer to Baumbast by stating that the “enjoyment by a young child of a right of 
residence necessarily implies that the child is entitled to be accompanied by the person who is his or her 
primary carer and accordingly that the carer must be in a position to reside with the child in the host 
Member State for the duration of such residence”.  
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applied in the post Zambrano cases, although in order to reach the opposite outcome of 
restricting the right of third country nationals to reside within the host Member State. In 
McCarthy, although not openly mentioned, it seems that the fact the she was an adult 
and not dependent on the husband (she was entitled to state benefits) triggered the 
decision of the Court of denying the right to stay in the UK. The Court opted for a 
similar solution in Dereci, since there was no risk that the citizens concerned would 
have been deprived of their means of subsistence and, therefore, forced to leave the 
territory of the Union with their third country national family members.7 Also in Iida 
the Court found that, looking at the circumstances at stake, “it cannot validly be argued 
that the decision at issue in the main proceedings is liable to deny Mr. Iida’s spouse or 
daughter the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with their 
status of Union citizen or to impede the exercise of their right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States”.8 Although no specific reference to 
dependence is expressly made, it is evident that the fact that Mrs. Iida and her daughter 
made a move from Germany to Austria autonomously and lived there with no economic 
problems shows that the latter could easily enjoy the substance of citizens’ rights 
despite the necessary presence of Mr. Iida. Finally, the O and S case explicitly 
mentioned and specified the concept of dependency. In both the situations of S and L 
the Court seemed to suggest to the national referring court that both the respective third 
country national partners were not entitled to gain residence in Finland. Indeed, the 
CJEU openly underlined that the national court should take into account the fact that the 
third country national step-fathers are not the ones on whom the EU children are 
“legally, financially or emotionally dependent”, since it is precisely the dependency 
relationship that can force the EU citizen to leave the territory of the Union as a whole.9  
From this brief summary it seems that in cases concerning free movement and 
EU static citizens the Court relied respectively on two tests: a) ancillary relationship 
between free movement and family reunification rights to avoid barriers to free 
movement and b) the concept of dependency- in order to evaluate whether or not the 
third country national EU family member could be granted the derivative right of 
residence in the host Member State. This approach is completely consistent with scope 
of EU law and with the CJEU’s jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, as opposed to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Case 256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] not yet reported, para. 
32.  
8 Case 40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v. Stadt Ulm, not yet reported., para. 76.  
9 Joined Cases 356/11 and 357/11 O and S v. Maahanmuuttovirasto [2012] not yet reported, paras. 56-57.  
	   152	  
ECtHR, the CJEU is not a human right guardian per se but it has simply to deal with 
any issue related to the interpretation and application of EU law or national law deriving 
from EU law.10 The approach of the CJEU on family residence rights is therefore very 
different from the approach that the Court of Human Rights could potentially give on 
the same issue.  
In order to deepen the understanding of the kind of protection granted by the 
CJEU to third country national EU family members, in the next part I will describe how 
the ECtHR grants protection to families composed of EU citizens and third country 
nationals at risk of not living together in the same state. This analysis will be able to 
highlight the differences and the peculiarities of the CJEU’s approach on the protection 
of family residence rights. 
 
3. The Court of Strasbourg and Art. 8 ECHR 
On the 4th of November 1950 Art. 8 ECHR was formally born after complex 
negotiations within the Council of Europe.11 Art. 8(1) ECHR guarantees the respect for 
private and family life. In turn, Art. 8(2) ECHR allows interference with the right of 
family life on a number of grounds such as public safety, national security, economic 
welfare of the country and prevention of criminality. The article states: “Everyone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The mandate of the Court is also to sort out conflicts among institutions. See Patricia R. Waagstein, 
“Human Rights Protection in Europe”, Spring 2010, accessed June 2013, available at 
<http://spice.stanford.edu/docs/human_rights_protection_in_europe_between_strasbourg_and_luxembour
g/>. On the relationship between the CJEU and Human Rights see, among many, Jospeph H.H. Weiler, 
“Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the 
Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European Communities”, 
Washington Law Review 61, (1986); Armin Von Bogdandy, “The European Union as a Human Rights 
Organization? Human Rights and the Core of European Union”, Common Market Law Review 37, no. 6 
(2000); Andrew T. Williams, “Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: Past and Present 
Tendencies”, Warwick School of Law Research Paper No. 2011/06, accessed December 2012, available 
at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1803138>; Elisabeth F. Defeis, “Human Rights 
and the European Court of Justice: an Appraisal”, Fordham International Law Journal 31, no. 5 (2007).  
11 This article was introduced together with Art. 12 ECHR (right to marry) and Art. 2 of the Protocol to 
the Convention (right of education). Inspired by the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, some of the drafters of the European Convention (including France) proposed that the Convention 
should have offered protection against any interference with family life. They drafted guarantees which 
included the natural rights deriving from marriage, paternity and those pertaining to the family. Some 
objections were raised against the inclusion of those family rights. The UK in particular objected that 
these rights were not essential for the functioning of the democratic institutions. On the position of the 
UK on the drafting of the Convention see Alfred W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: 
Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”  
The first paragraph of Art. 8 ECHR declares the rights to be protected. The 
second one instead lists a number of exceptional circumstances that can justify the 
interference with those rights. Art. 8 ECHR, therefore, is a right that can be inserted in 
the group of qualified rights, which means that the state interference with the rights set 
out by this article is permissible just under specific conditions.  
When the Court of Strasbourg is called to face a case regarding the breaching of 
Art. 8 ECHR, the applicant is required to go through a four stages inquiry.12 Firstly the 
ECtHR will ask whether or not the right of private and family life has been violated by 
the state. In case of a positive answer, the ECtHR will ask whether the action of the 
state violating Art. 8 ECHR could be justified because in pursuit of one of the legitimate 
objectives arising from section 2: national security, public safety or economic well-
being of the country, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Thirdly, again in case of a positive 
answer, the ECtHR will consider whether this restriction is prescribed by law. Finally, if 
the interference is considered to be prescribed by law, the ECtHR moves to deciding 
whether or not the taken measure is necessary in a democratic society.  
The last stage is the most controversial part of the ECtHR’s scrutiny as it deals 
with merits of the case, namely what restraints can a state legally and legitimately 
impose upon its citizens. As a matter of fact the Court of Strasbourg often finds itself 
uneasy in dealing with this requirement and, at the same time, to make sure that it 
respects the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, according to which the signatory 
states are allowed to have a margin of discretion in the way they implement the 
Convention and to take into account their own particular national circumstances and 
conditions.13 Due to the risk of interfering with the margin of discretion left to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For clear explanation see Ian Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 597-600.  
13 The literature on the margin of appreciation is vast. An accurate list of authors is given by Yutaka Arai 
Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR, (Cambridge: Intersentia editions, 2001), see footnote 1 page 1. With regard 
to the case law, the first one that engaged properly with the principle of the margin of appreciation is 
ECHR judgment  of 7 December 1976, No. 5493/72 Handyside v. United Kingdom. In this case the 
ECtHR justified the margin of appreciation doctrine stating: “by reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than 
the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 
necessity of a restriction or a penalty intended to meet them”. 
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signatory states,14 the ECtHR generally believes that the measure is strictly necessary in 
a democratic society only when meets a pressing social need 15 and the interference is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the state.16 Particularly, with regard to 
this second requirement, the Court of Strasbourg has always held that the principle of 
proportionality consists in evaluating the right of an individual vis a vis the general 
public interest of the society.17 This means that the ECtHR has to strike a fair balance 
between these two countervailing values.  
This four-stage test was applied by the ECtHR in cases involving family 
reunifications issues as well. The engagement of the ECtHR in immigration and family 
life issues is quite recent given that, for many years and in line with well-established 
principles of International Law, these problems were seen to be a matter of domestic 
law.18 More recently however, the Court of Strasbourg established its case law with 
regard to immigration control and the right to family life disciplined by Art. 8 ECHR. In 
these years mainly two categories of cases emerged: the first involving the expulsion of 
integrated migrants on grounds of violation of public order or public security and the 
second concerning the decision to expel or to refuse to admit third country nationals 
with strong family ties in the signatory state for the economic interests of the signatory 
state.19 I will focus on this second group of cases because they encompass similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The idea of margin of appreciation varies in accordance to the situation and the nature of the right at 
stake. For a deeper understanding of the issue see Francis G. Jacobs, Robin C. A. White, and Clare Ovey, 
The European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 325-332. 
15 On the concept of pressing social needs see Handyside judgment, para.50.  
16 On proportionality see Takahashi, supra note 13, 11. On this point see also Hugo Storey, “The Right to 
Family Life and Immigration Case Law at Strasbourg”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
39, no. 2 (1990), 330. 
17 Takahashi, supra note 13, 12.  
18 Even though Strasbourg did not want to deal with migration, nevertheless, in September 1963 the 
Fourth Protocol was added to the ECHR. This protocol guarantees the fundamental right of free 
movement within the territory of the state (and not among different states) and the freedom to leave the 
country (see Art 2(1),(2)). For a deeper understanding see Henry G. Shermers, “Human Rights and Free 
Movement of Persons: the Role of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights” in Free 
Movement of Persons in Europe, Legal Problems and Experiences, eds. Henry G. Shermers, Cees 
Flinterman, Alfred E. Kellermann, Joan C. van Haersolte, Gert-Win A. van de Meent, (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). The reason why the Court initially did not act on immigration issues that much 
is because the Council of Europe (CoE) has always been willing to respect the absolute independence of 
every single signatory state to control its own borders and, consequently, the entry, the exit and the 
expulsion of foreigners. See Daniel Thym, “Respect for Private and Family Life under Art. 8 ECHR in 
Immigration Cases: a Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay”, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 57, no. 1 (2008). 
19 Nicola Roger, “Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: are new principles 
emerging?”, European Human Rights Law Review 53, no. 1 (2003), 55. For a complete account of the 
cases see Steve Peers, “Family Reunion and Community Law”, in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, ed. Neil Walker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 145-149. See also Betty de Hart, 
“Love Thy Neighbour: Family Reunification and the Rights of Insiders”, European Journal of Migration 
and Law, 2009, 235.  
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situations to the ones that could occur in front of the CJEU on the issue of family 
reunification between EU citizens and third country nationals. 
In the older cases it can be found that the margin of appreciation left to the 
Member states was quite high. This meant that the Court of Strasbourg did not interfere 
with the activity and the decisions of the signatory states. In many early cases, the four 
stages inquiry stopped at the first step with the ECtHR finding that there was no 
violation of Art. 8 ECHR. A clear example is Abdullazis, Cabales and Blkandali v. The 
United Kingdom20, which was also the first case that dealt with immigration and family 
reunification issues. The applicants, three lawfully and permanently settled residents of 
the UK, sought to challenge the Government’s refusal to permit their husbands to join 
or remain with them on the basis of the 1980 immigration rules in force at the time. The 
Court of Strasbourg stopped the complaints of the applicants at the first step of the four 
stage test by stating that there was not a real violation of Art.8 ECHR because the duty 
imposed by this article did not imply the imposition on the signatory states to accept 
non national relatives in their territory, given the fact that the applicants did not show 
that there were obstacles in establishing their family elsewhere.21 Similarly, in Gul v. 
Switzerland,22 the fact that a Turkish father had attained a residence permit on 
humanitarian grounds in Switzerland was not enough to persuade the ECtHR that there 
were obstacles to him and his wife to return to Turkey in order to enjoy the right to 
family life there with their 12-year-old son. The Court of Strasbourg stated in fact that 
there was not a violation of Art. 8 ECHR since this case concerned immigration and, 
therefore, it could not be considered to impose a general obligation on the state to 
respect the choice of third country national married couples to reside and live in its 
territory.23 The refusal to grant the son permission to join them in Switzerland was thus 
not an interference with family life. The same reasoning can be found in Ahmut v. The 
Netherlands.24 Also in this case the ECtHR followed the reasoning bolstered in Gul and 
stressed as well that, when immigration issues are at stake, Art. 8 ECHR cannot be 
considered to oblige the state to authorize the decision of the migrants to settle within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ECHR judgment of 28 May 1985, No 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali 
v. The United Kingdom. 
21 See Abdulaziz, para. 68. Nevertheless the Court found anyway a violation of Art. 8 ECHR in 
conjunction with Art. 14 ECHR, on the basis of discrimination on the grounds of sex, given that the 
legislation in the UK was more favorable for men that wished to exercise their family reunification rights 
than for women. For a deeper analysis of the elsewhere theory see Roger, supra note 19, 57-61. See also 
Storey, supra note 16, 328. For a more recent account see Peers, supra note 19, 143-197. 
22 ECHR judgment of 19 February 1996, No 23218/94, Gul v. Switzerland. 
23 Gul judgment, para. 38. 
24 ECHR judgment of 28 November 1996, No. 21702/93, Ahmut v. The Netherlands. 
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its territory. Once it considered the circumstances of the case, the ECtHR underlined 
that there were no difficulties for the applicant to keep on nurturing the relationship 
with his son from the Netherlands. Alternatively the applicant could still go back to 
Morocco in order to re-establish his life there with his son. The fact of having also 
Moroccan nationality could facilitate either frequent trips to visit his son in Morocco or 
the option of going back to Morocco for good.25 For all these reasons the Court of 
Strasbourg, also in this case, found no breach of Art. 8 ECHR. In Sorabjee v. United 
Kingdom26 the Commission declared as “manifestly ill-founded” an application made 
on the basis that the removal of a mother to Kenya would constitute a breach of the 
family life rights of her child who was a British citizen since the Commission 
considered that there were no “ insurmountable obstacles” to the mother and child living 
in Kenya since the child was of “an adaptable age”. Finally, in Chandra and Others v. 
The Netherlands,27 the Court of Strasbourg found once again that the Netherlands did 
not fail to strike a fair balance between the applicants’ interests and the state’s interests 
in controlling immigration, given that the circumstances of the case showed that Mrs. 
Chandra’s children were looked after in Indonesia and, if wanted, the mother could still 
go back there to rebuild her family.  
If in the early cases the margin of appreciation left to the Member States was 
high, more recently it seems that the ECtHR, especially in cases involving children, 
decided to enter more within the margin of appreciation of the signatory states. The 
Court of Strasbourg began to find that in the circumstances at stake there was either a 
positive obligation of the state to avoid violation of Art. 8 ECHR or a negative 
obligation of the state to refrain from intervening in the individual’s autonomy.28  In the 
majority of these cases the ECtHR’s assessment found its grounds in the proportionality 
test: the Court of Strasbourg decided the cases by assessing whether or not the state 
managed to strike a fair balance between its interests and the right of the individual to 
respect for his/her family rights. In Sen v. the Netherlands29 for example the ECtHR 
looked at the positive obligations on the signatory state to permit a child to enter in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid., paras. 68- 72.  
26 App. No.23938/93, October 23, 1995, unpublished. 
27 ECHR judgment of 13 May 2003, No. 53102/99 Chandra v. the Netherlands.  
28 It is an established principle of the Court of Strasbourg that Art. 8 entails not only negative duties of 
non interference on the part of the Member States but also positive obligations to provide services, 
facilities or any other step to ensure effective protection of the rights guaranteed in this provision. 
Questions of positive obligations have arisen particularly from issues relating to Art. 8 ECHR. The Court 
of Strasbourg would have to examine both the conditions on which and the extent to which positive steps 
are required to achieve a fair balance between the public end and individual person’s rights under Art. 8. 
See on this point Takahashi, supra note 13, 85.  
29 ECHR judgment of 21 December 2001, No. 31465/96, Sen v. the Netherlands. 
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territory to join his family who left him in the country of origin. 30 The Court of 
Strasbourg, in evaluating whether or not the refusal to grant the child to enter within its 
territory was proportionate, found that the Netherlands failed to strike a fair balance 
between the applicants’ interests and the state interest in controlling immigration and, 
therefore, stated that the Netherlands had the positive obligation to authorize the 
applicant’s daughter to live with her parents, as it was a major obstacle for the rest of 
the family to return to Turkey. In Rodrigues da Silva/Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands31 
the Court of Strasbourg found that the Netherlands was under a duty to allow Mrs. 
Rodrigues da Silva to reside within its territory even though the state never authorized 
her legal stay within its territory.32 The case took its grounds from the application 
submitted by Ms. Rodriguez da Silva, a Brazilian national, and her daughter, a Dutch 
national, to the Court of Strasbourg. The applicants claimed that the refusal of the 
Deputy Minister of Justice to grant Ms. Rodriguez a resident permit was in breach of 
Art.8 ECHR because it could lead to the daughter being separated from her mother. The 
Court of Strasbourg, in contrast to what the Regional Court of the Hague stated before, 
found that Ms. Rodrigues da Silva's expulsion would have had far-reaching 
consequences on her family life with her young daughter and that it was clearly in the 
latter’s best interests for her mother to stay in the Netherlands. The Court of Strasbourg 
therefore considered that the economic well-being of the country did not outweigh the 
applicants' rights under Article 8 ECHR, despite the fact that the first applicant was 
residing illegally in the Netherlands since she entered and even when the daughter was 
born.33 More recently, in Nunez v. Norway,34 the ECtHR concluded that a two years re 
entry ban would amount to a violation of family reunification because the authority’s 
measure, given the circumstances of the case, failed to strike a proportionate balance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid., see para. 40: “Contrairement à ce qu'elle a considéré dans l'affaire Ahmut, la Cour estime qu'il 
existe toutefois dans la présente affaire un obstacle majeur au retour de la famille Şen en Turquie. 
Titulaires l'un d'un permis d'établissement et l'autre d'un permis de séjour du fait de son mariage avec une 
personne autorisée à s'établir aux Pays-Bas, les deux premiers requérants ont établi leur vie de couple aux 
Pays-Bas, où ils séjournent légalement depuis de nombreuses années (voir a contrario, arrêt Gül précité, 
pp. 175-176, § 41) et où un second enfant est né en 1990, puis un troisième en 1994. Ces deux enfants ont 
toujours vécu aux Pays-Bas, dans l'environnement culturel de ce pays et y sont scolarisés (voir arrêt 
Berrehab précité, p. 8, § 7 et p. 16, § 29). Ils n'ont de ce fait que peu ou pas de liens autres que la 
nationalité avec leur pays d'origine (voir notamment, arrêt Mehemi c. France du 26 septembre 1997, 
Recueil 1997-VI, p. 1971, § 36) et il existait donc dans leur chef des obstacles à un transfert de la vie 
familiale en Turquie (voir a contrario, les arrêts Gül, p. 176, § 42, et Ahmut, p. 2033, § 69) […]”.  
31 ECHR judgment of 31 January 2006, Application No. 50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva/Hoogkamer v. the 
Netherlands.   
32 Thym, supra note 18, 87. 
33 See Rodriguez da Silva v. The Netherlands, paras. 38 and 44. 
34 ECHR judgment of 28 June 2011, Application No. 55597/09, Nunez v. Norway. 
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between the interests of the single individual to be with her children and the interest of 
the Community to see its immigration rules respected.35 
To conclude, looking at the first cases on the issue of family reunification, it 
seems that the Court of Strasbourg preferred not to enter into the merits of the case and 
decided to solve the situation by stating that a violation of Art. 8 ECHR did not occur 
because the parties did not show that there were obstacles to install their families 
elsewhere. In other words, as Elswuwege commented, the Court of Strasbourg was of 
the view that “if it is possible for the family to live together elsewhere, it is likely that 
no interference with the right to respect for family life will be found.”36 Later on 
however, especially in cases involving children, the Court of Strasbourg became more 
sensitive to the needs of the families. For this reason, it recurred to the use of the 
proportionality test in order to justify that the family protection outweighed the state’s 
rights of having its immigration controlled. Respect to Art. 8 ECHR was guaranteed 
either by a positive action of the state (the state had an obligation to admit the migrant 
family member) or via a negative action of the state (the state simply had to avoid 
issuing a deportation order). As Roger underlined then, the Court of Strasbourg moved 
from a situation in which it engaged timidly with migration issues, putting the heavy 
burden on the applicants to prove that their family life could not have been settled 
elsewhere, to a situation in which it even recognizes positive obligations on the actions 
of the contracting state to comply with Art. 8 ECHR.37 
 
4. CJEU’s protection to third country national EU family members 
 In this part the approach endorsed by the ECtHR will be compared to the one 
adopted by the CJEU in order to better understand the peculiarities of the latter. 
However, in order to deal with this comparison properly, it is important to bear in mind 
that, as things stand at the moment, the jurisdiction of the ECtHR in terms of ratione 
personae is broader than the CJEU’s one. In particular, the ECtHR can look at all cases 
involving every citizen of the signatory states of the Human Rights Convention, 
regardless the fact of whether they moved or did not move to other signatory states, and 
also non-citizens as long as the issue at stake occurred in the territory of one of the 
signatory states. Instead, the CJEU is at the moment considered to have jurisdiction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., from para. 78 onwards.    
36 Peter Van Elsuwege, and Dimitry Kochenov, “On The Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship 
and Family Reunification Rights”, European Journal of Migration and Law 13, no. 4 (2011), 464.  
37 See Roger, supra note 19, 63.  
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solely over cases of EU citizens that exercised their right of movement or of EU citizens 
that did not exercise their right of movement but whose substance of EU citizenship 
rights would be at risk of being threatened because the denial of family reunification 
could force them to leave the territory of the Union as a whole. For this reason, the 
comments that I propose should simply be taken as a way to highlight the peculiarities 
of the CJEU’s approach, being aware that the two courts belong to two different 
jurisdictions and fulfill two different aims.  
 As seen in the previous part, the ECtHR initially seemed very much conscious 
of not interfering within the margin of appreciation of the Member States. However, 
more recently, the Court seemed more open to use the proportionality test, especially in 
cases concerning children. Through the application of the proportionality test the Court 
accords a family the right to live together in the signatory state when it can be proven 
that the interests of the family outweighed the interests of the signatory state over 
immigration. As suggested proportionality, by its very nature of being a balancing test 
of two or more opposite interests, is very much connected to the idea of state’s 
discretion. As a matter of fact “it is often observed that the principle of proportionality 
is context sensitive in nature. The intensity of judicial review conducted on the basis of 
the principle of proportionality varies in fact depending on a range of variables […]”38 
among which we can find the circumstances of the case in terms of balance of public 
and private interests at stake in any given dispute or the values protected by each state.39 
Therefore, when protection of family reunification is pursued under Art. 8 ECHR, this 
potential right will have to be balanced with the legitimate aims pursued by the state.  
With regard to the jurisprudence of the CJEU instead, as seen before, the Court 
has been dealing both with cases concerning cross border movement and cases 
involving EU static citizens. In cases concerning cross border movement, the Court 
interpreted family reunification as ancillary to free movement. In Metock, the case that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Michael Dougan, “The constitutional dimension of the case law on Union citizenship”, European Law 
Review 31, no. 5 (2006), 624. The literature on the principle of proportionality as applied by the ECtHR is 
vast. Among all see Jeremy McBride, “Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
in The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe, eds. Evelyn Ellis, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1999); Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); Pieter van Dijk, Godefridus 
J.H. van Hoof, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1998).   
39 With regard to the application of the principle of proportionality it is worth underlying that the diversity 
of values embraced by Member States makes it hardly conceivable for the Court of Strasbourg to 
establish a common meaning for the notions of morals and public interest. The idea however is that the 
Court is not trying to promote a uniform standard over Europe. Margin of appreciation must in fact be 
understood as “an essential constitutional device designed to preserve the fundamental prerequisite 
democracy and pluralism”. See Takahashi, supra note 13, 249.  
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sorted out the long jurisprudential debate on whether third country nationals could be 
allowed first entry in the EU Member State in accordance with EU law, the Court 
decided that the applicants were allowed to reunify with their third country national 
family members in Ireland, even though they were not previously lawfully resident 
within the territory of the European Union, because “the refusal of the host Member 
state to grant rights of entry and residence to the family members of a Union citizen is 
such as to discourage that citizen from moving to or residing in that Member State 
[…].”40 As it was noted, the Court adopted the approach introduced by Singh on the 
ancillary relationship between free movement and third country national family 
reunification but gave to it a new reading. After Metock the denial of family 
reunification does not simply hinder the right of a EU national from moving from a 
state to the other but also the right to reside in the host Member State. Connecting the 
ancillary relationship between EU free movement and third country national residence 
rights not just to the idea of moving but also to the idea of residing extends the 
protection granted to third country national EU family members. One in fact could 
argue that the denial of family reunification rights would not interfere in the decision of 
the EU citizen to move, especially if the move happened temporarily before the decision 
to reunify with the third country national. It is instead more difficult to argue that the 
denial of family reunification would not interfere with the decision of the EU citizen to 
reside in the host Member State at any time, even if this denial happened after the EU 
citizen had been residing in the host Member State for some time. If family 
reunification is denied by the host Member State this implies surely that the moving 
citizen will have to think about moving again in order to be able to be with his family 
and, consequentially, his/her right of residence in the host Member State will be 
obstructed by this potential refusal. For this reason, after Metock, it does not matter 
anymore when and how the family came into being and when the refusal to family 
reunification occurred. Indeed, the Metock interpretation of the ancillary relationship 
between free movement of EU citizens and residence family rights makes the 
acceptance of a third country national EU family member within the territory of the host 
Member State almost41 certain. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Case 127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2008] ECR I-6241, para. 64.  
41 It is necessary to point out that family reunification rights granted by Directive 2004/38/EC are subject 
to some limitations. In fact, according to Arts 7(1) and 14(2), economically inactive migrant Union 
citizens who wish to reside in the host state for more than three months are still obliged to fulfill the basic 
requirements of having sufficient resources and sickness insurance, and their right of residence subsists 
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With regard to cases concerning non-moving EU citizens, as mentioned before, 
the Court used the idea of dependency in order to evaluate whether the enjoyment of the 
substance of citizenship rights could not have been pursued without granting the right of 
residence to the third country national family member. In Zambrano, the Court stated 
that Art. 20 TfEU, “which precludes national measures which have the effect of 
depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union”42 had to be applied in the 
circumstances at stake because the refusal of granting the right of residence to a parent 
of dependent EU minor children would have forced the latter to follow the parents and, 
therefore, to leave the territory of the Union. Although the Court retained that in the 
post-Zambrano judgments the conditions for the application of the test were not met, it 
is worth noting that this test, when the Court considers that the relationship between the 
EU citizen and the third country national fulfills the criterion of dependence of the 
former upon the latter, can potentially grant family rights with no limitations.  As a 
matter of fact, given that the ancillary right of third country national family members 
derives directly from the EU citizenship treaty articles, this right will not be subjected to 
the requirements that the EU citizen has to fulfill in order his/her right of residence to be 
granted in case Directive 2004/38/EC is applied such as either being workers or self 
employed or being self sufficient and having a comprehensive sickness insurance.43 
This is evident in the Zambrano case in which Mr. Zambrano was given not just the 
right of residence but even a working permit in order to grant his children, EU citizens, 
the enjoyment of the substance of their EU citizenship rights despite them being not self 
sufficient.44 Moreover, as seen previously, the recent O and S case has specified the 
notion of dependence by extending it to cases of legal, financial and emotional 
dependence. As mentioned before, if the Court in the future does open the application of 
the Zambrano test to more circumstances it might be possible that family reunification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
only for as long as they continue to meet those conditions. The effects of these rights have been however 
neutralized by the so-called Baumbast rule. In the Baumbast case in fact, the Court acknowledged the 
presence of these limitations but, at the same time, stated that limitations and conditions imposed upon 
the exercise of the right of free movement under Art. 18 had to be applied in compliance with the 
principle of proportionality (rec. 91). The same reasoning was proposed also in Chen at para. 32. 
However, it is worth noting that the application of this principle in the EU cases is different from the 
application that was suggested by the ECHR. In the Baumbast scenario proportionality is used simply to 
lighten the strict application of Directive 2004/38/EC and not to take into account other compelling 
interests of the Member State.  
42 Case 34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-1177, para. 
42.  
43 Art. 7(1) (a)(b)(c) Directive 2004/38/EC.  
44 Zambrano judgment, para. 44.  
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will be granted also to those third country nationals that do not necessarily belong to the 
household of the EU sponsor such as step-parents, legal guardians or even friends.  
In the light of these considerations it is now easier to understand the peculiarities 
of the CJEU’s approach in comparison to the ECtHR’s one. With regard to EU moving 
citizens the CJEU, as seen by recalling the analysis of the Metock case, has practically 
endorsed an approach that grants third country national family members the right of 
residence in the host Member State as long as the border is crossed by the EU sponsor. 
Moreover, with regard to EU non-moving citizens the CJEU seems to allow family 
reunification by applying the enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights test each 
time the requisite of dependency between the EU sponsor and the third country national 
is fulfilled. The post-Zambrano case law has shown how the Court does not seem to 
consider that the dependency criterion can be fulfilled easily but there are some hints 
that suggest the possibility of future more liberal interpretations. 
Both these approaches seem to grant a sort of unlimited right of residence to the 
third country national EU family members, once proven that the denial of this right 
would either hinder the exercise of free movement or the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of EU citizenship rights.45 Under the ECtHR instead, protection to the family 
unity would be granted in accordance to the principle of proportionality and, therefore, 
only in case when the interests of the family to preserve their unity would outweigh the 
interests of the state such as public safety, national security, economic welfare of the 
country or prevention of criminality. Therefore while the CJEU, once found that 
denying the right of residence to the third country national would either hinder the right 
of free movement of the sponsor or push him/her to leave the territory of the EU, 
automatically protects the right to stay of the third country national family member, the 
protection granted by the ECtHR in the same circumstances would be subject to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 It is worth noting that EU citizens and their family members are technically still subjected to the public 
policy, security and health restrictions provided at Artt. 27-29 of Directive 2004/38/EC. Nevertheless, 
consolidated case law has shown how the threshold to apply these restrictions is particularly high, owing 
in particular to the application of the proportionality principle and the idea that the measures should be 
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. For a broad overview see Paul 
Craig, and Grainne de Burca, EU law: text, cases and materials, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 755-759. It is also worth noting that the principle of proportionality has been utilized by the CJEU 
as well in some relevant cases such as Carpenter (para. 42) and Rottman (paras. 55, 58, 59). However, as 
A.G. Sharpston pointed out in her opinion in the Zambrano case, the Court seems to have developed its 
own line of reasoning rather than relying completely on the Strasbourg case law. On this point see 
Zambrano opinion, paras 56-60.  
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application of a balancing exercise between the individual and Member States’ 
interests.46  
It is worth noting that the reason of the different approaches adopted is rooted in 
the structural difference of aims pursued by the two courts. On one side the CJEU aims 
to preserve a consistent and fair application of EU law by the Member States. The right 
of free movement and the rights deriving from the status of EU citizenship, values at the 
heart of European integration, are two aims that the Court tries to take into account and, 
when appropriate, to protect in the circumstances brought to its attention. On the other 
side the ECtHR does not have any free movement or EU citizenship right to protect but 
simply the evaluation on whether or not the national measure is in breach of Art. 8 
ECHR. There is obligation on Strasbourg in finding a violation of Art. 8 ECHR and in 
granting the right to reside of the applicant in the territory of the signatory state because, 
as already mentioned, the elsewhere approach applies. For these reasons it seems that 
the CJEU is more naturally prone to adopt nearly absolute standards of protection for 
EU citizens and third country nationals when free movement or EU citizenship issues 
are at stake while the ECtHR is more free to apply a balancing exercise between private 
and public interests. In the Zambrano case A.G. Sharpston suggested to the national 
court to assess the right of Mr. Zambrano to reside in Belgium in accordance to the 
proportionality test and suggested that it would have been disproportionate to deny him 
such a right.47 The Court refused uphold this approach. Without speculating on the 
reasons that might have pushed the Court not to consider the application of 
proportionality to the circumstances at stake, it can be noted that even if the Court in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 It is worth noting that also the CJEU, in Carpenter, referred to Art. 8 ECHR and to the principle of 
proportionality. However, although the Court claimed the application of the principle of proportionality, 
it is important to underline that the proportionality applied by the CJEU is different from the one applied 
by the ECtHR. This should not surprise because, as Scheeck well points out, individual ECHR articles 
have been mentioned and reinterpreted by the CJEU since 1975 (See Laurent Scheeck, “The Relationship 
between the European Courts and integration through human rights”, Heidenberg Journal of 
International Law 65, no. 4 (2005), 850-52. On this point see also Elspeth Guild, and Guillame Lesieur 
eds., The European Court of Justice on the European Convention on Human Rights: who said what, 
when?, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998.). Specifically in this case, as explained in Chapter 3, 
one can see how the CJEU did not conform to the application of the proportionality principle proposed by 
the ECtHR (balancing out individual’s and Member States’ interests) but simply stated that the expulsion 
of Mrs. Carpenter would have been disproportionate and contrary to Art. 8 ECHR without explaining on 
which grounds. On the application of the principle of proportionality by EU law see Grainne De Burca, 
“The principle of proportionality and its application in EC law”, Yearbook of European Law 13, no. 1 
(1993); of the same author “Proportionality and Subsidiarity as general principle of law”, in General 
principles of European Community law, eds. Ulf Bernits and Joakim Nergelius, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000); Francis Jacobs, “Recent developments in the principle of proportionality in 
European Community law”, in The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe, eds. Evelyn Ellis, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999); Tor-Inge Harbo, “The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU 
Law”, European Law Journal 16, no. 2 (2010) 
47	  Opinion Zambrano, paras. 109-122.	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future will decide to utilize proportionality in EU-third country national family 
reunification cases a high standard of protection will still be granted to these families. A 
national measure would stand against the application of EU law on family reunification 
cases simply when the third country national can be considered a threat to public order 
or public safety or he/she becomes an unreasonable burden on the public finances.48 
In this part we have seen how the approach granted by the CJEU provides a sort 
of family status rights for those EU citizens who fall within the scope of application 
either of the secondary legislation on free movement or of the concept of EU 
citizenship.49 Paradoxically, although the Court of Strasbourg is the body deputed to the 
protection of Human Rights, it is the CJEU that seems to preserve family unity better.50   
 
5. Conclusions 
In this chapter I looked more closely at the CJEU’s jurisprudence on family 
reunification in order to show how the Court has managed to offer family status rights 
in order to grant protection to families composed by EU citizens and third country 
nationals. Using the jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg as a comparison, I pointed 
out that, unlike Strasbourg which refers to the principle of proportionality, the CJEU 
prefers to recur to family status rights in cases in which the exercise of the right of free 
movement or the genuine exercise of the substance of EU citizenship rights is hindered. 
This analysis has shown that the CJEU seems to pursue a policy of protection of EU 
citizens and their families.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  On the criteria accruing to the application of the proportionality test see Opinion Zambrano, paras. 116-
118. With regard to the issue of being a threat to public order or public safety in Carpenter the fact that 
she had not been the subject of any other complaint that could give cause to fear that she might in the 
future constitute a danger to public order or public safety, although she was an illegal immigrant, was 
treated as not being an insuperable obstacle to her subsequent claim to rights under EU law. With regard 
to the issue of becoming an insourmountable burden on public finance see the comment on Baumbast 
case, footnote 42. 	  
49 Van Elsuwege, and Kochenov, supra note 36, 464.  
50 Ibid., 465.  
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Conclusions  
In this thesis I have aimed to shed some light on the intricate issue of family 
reunification between EU citizens and third country nationals under EU law. In order to 
do so I have placed the CJEU jurisprudence in the broader history of EU law. Starting 
from the post World War II era until today, I have presented a detailed analysis of the 
historical, legislative and jurisprudential changes that have characterized these years and 
I have showed how these trends influenced the case law on family reunification between 
EU citizens and third country nationals. To summarize, these are the findings that that I 
have extrapolated from this analysis: 
1) The first provisions included in the first free movement legislation (Council 
Regulation 15/1961/EEC, 38/1964/EEC, 1612/1968/EEC) were created bearing in mind 
the need to enhance the movement of the Italian workers towards the northern European 
Member States in order to fulfill their lack of manpower and achieve the completion of 
the Common Market project. In a period in which immigration was not seen as a 
negative I showed how these provisions were drafted as secondary rights to be granted 
also to third country national family members once their Community relative/sponsor 
crossed the border.  
2) After the oil crisis the Member States begun to adopt much stricter immigration 
policies towards illegal and legal immigration of third country nationals. On the other 
hand, the EU has continued to pursue the enhancement of the right to free movement of 
EU workers (through the jurisprudential activity of the CJEU and, subsequently, 
through new legislation that extended the category of beneficiaries of the right of free 
movement from workers to students and people not engaged in an economic activity) 
and worked towards the introduction of the concept of EU citizenship. The development 
of free movement and EU citizenship as opposed to the Member States’ concerns versus 
third country nationals was the background upon which the first CJEU’s cases were 
built. Starting from this backdrop, I showed how the reasoning of the Court, both in free 
movement and in EU static citizens cases, tried to take into account Member States’ 
immigration concerns and, respectively, free movement and the development of the 
concept of EU citizenship as a source of independent EU family residence rights. 
Looking at the case law of the Court through this lens I pointed out how the 
inconsistencies of the CJEU’s reasoning cannot be considered the fruit of some random 
decisions of some European judges but, more likely, a meticulous attempt to satisfy the 
various interests at stake. 
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3) Overall, as things stand today, family reunification of third country EU family 
members has been built as a status right. Using the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Strasbourg as a comparison I pointed out that, unlike Strasbourg which refers to the 
principle of proportionality, the CJEU built the concept of EU citizenship as a status 
right granting residence to third country national EU family members in cases in which 
the exercise of the right of free movement or the genuine exercise of the substance of 
EU citizenship rights is hindered. Through this final analysis I have shown that the 
CJEU is pursuing a general policy of protection of EU citizens and their families.   
From the findings that I have gathered it is possible to understand the value of 
this research. By looking at the phenomenon of family reunification between EU 
citizens and third country nationals from a historical perspective I have been able to 
include all relevant pieces of legislation and case law in my analysis - from Singh until 
Iida. Therefore, recurring to a historical approach has managed to give a sense of 
continuity to the long debated discourse on family reunification between EU citizens 
and third country nationals that, perhaps, another method would not have allowed. This 
is unlike the many previous doctrinal pieces that offer their view on family reunification 
between EU citizen and third country nationals basing their findings on the analysis of 
just some pieces of legislation or some law cases.  Moreover, with particular regard to 
the legislation, this historical approach has also managed to point out that, for the first 
time, the first provisions on family reunification were not simply a white canvas upon 
which the Court could build up its reasoning but the fruit of precise political choices 
determined by historical needs of the time in which the legislation was drafted. 
However, most importantly, the historical approach has allowed me to put the case law 
into context. Most of the previous literature has focused its assessment on the 
comparison between the various most relevant CJEU’s cases and on highlighting the 
inconsistencies between their reasoning or their solutions. The historical analysis that I 
have used, instead, goes beyond simply finding out what is incoherent in the CJEU’s 
judicial approach, but rather suggests the deeper reasons why these inconsistencies 
exist. To conclude, the original contribution of this research is very much linked to the 
historical method that has been adopted to analyse the phenomenon of family 
reunification. This approach has not just favoured a more complete analysis of the 
phenomenon of family reunification between EU citizens and third country nationals, 
but has shed light on the deeper motivations that might have pushed the Court to make 
the judgments it has.  
	   167	  
Finally, at the end of this work, it is worth mentioning a very last consideration.  
As highlighted earlier the Court has remarkably managed to guarantee, under certain 
circumstances, a quasi-unlimited right of family reunification to EU citizens. 
Nevertheless, as things stand now, the Court still endorses a strict approach when 
challenged on most cases concerning the granting of the right to reside to third country 
national family members of EU static citizens. As a matter of fact as seen, although the 
Court has shown signals of possibly more liberal solutions in the future, at the moment 
its position seems quite austere. This approach clashes with the already adopted open 
approach embraced in cases concerning third country national family members and EU 
free moving citizens and triggers the well known reverse discrimination issues that have 
been mentioned in earlier chapters. Why this discrepancy? In the light of this analysis, it 
is suggested that the Court’s hesitations are provoked by the pressures of some Member 
States that see the issue of third country national immigration as being simply a matter 
of national law when no cross border movement is involved. Today among the more 
reluctant Member States to accept a concept of EU citizenship to be applied in 
situations when movement is not involved there are still those that, after the oil crises, 
pushed for the sealing of their borders against third country nationals; in particular 
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium.1 The negative attitude of these 
Member States toward an idea of EU citizenship that would protect also EU static 
citizens still seems to be driven by the fear of immigration.  
Without the ambition of giving definitive judgments, since Member State’s 
concerns over third country nationals seems to be the reason for the delay in taking 
further steps toward a more holistic application of the concept of EU citizenship, it is 
worth wondering whether these concerns are reasonably grounded. Data shows2, as it 
was already pointed out in the introduction, that the phenomenon of family reunification 
between EU citizens and third country nationals is not a trivial issue in the EU as it 
affects the life of many people. However, whether the numbers are high enough to 
justify the austere approach against third country national family members and, 
consequently, a restrictive interpretation of the enjoyment of the substance of EU 
citizenship rights test, is disputable. Perhaps steps should be taken to help Member 
States to become less worried about third country nationals and more concerned about 
families. Only then EU citizenship will start to “unquestionably belong(s) to the realm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To these states one should also add Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Austria and Poland that were often listed 
among the intervening states in the post Zambrano cases.  
2	  See appendix, at 168.  
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of EU law” 3 and Zambrano will stop being treated as an exception to wholly internal 
situations but as the general rule to be applied to all cases involving EU static citizens 
and third country nationals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Dimitry Kochenov, and Richard Plender, “EU Citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient 
substance? The discovery of the treaty text”, European Law Review 37, no. 4 (2012), 393.  
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Appendix 
Charts 1 and 2 below show the numbers of family reunification permits issued to 
third country nationals EU family members in the 27 Member States and the number of 
family reunification permits per capita.  
 
Chart 1: Family Reunification Permits TCNs EU family members: 2011 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013) 
 
Chart 2: Family Reunification Permits TCNs EU family members/Population: 
2011 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013) 
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In Chart 1 it can be seen that France and Spain are the countries granting more family 
reunification permits (more than 50,000 a year), followed by the UK (nearly 30,000), 
Italy and Germany (around 22,000), Belgium (around 15,000) and the Netherlands 
(10,000). From the second chart we can also see that some of the states that have low 
absolute numbers of family reunifications, such as Austria, Ireland, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland, actually have quite high numbers given 
their population.   
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